Lt Col Pulleine - responsible for the loss of iSandlwana?

The shop was closed on his second visit. Things have changed.

littlehand wrote:

Those mounted men under Durford, could have moved a lot of ammuntion to the firing lines.

Those mounted men under Durford. Could have moved some of those waggons into some form of defence.

But the guys who we know for sure ran out of ammunition WERE Durnford's men and the reason that matters is they were holding open the escape route. Keeping them in camp would have potentially led to encirclement sooner. One thing we know for sure is that the camp was going to be enveloped from behind either way...unless Durnford took the initiative to oppose the uDududu, iMbube and iSangqu on the other side of iSandlwana...which again would have been "disobeying orders."

As for laagering the wagons, I've done a lot of research on what it took to wrangle them and that was no easy thing, especially for those not accustomed to working with oxen. Perhaps if they had focused on like Chard and Bromhead did at RD (starting at 7:30 when the first reports came in,) then something like the final redoubt might have been built, but it would have been located of necessity on the nek. Doubtful that many guys on the firing line would have reached it during the battle but some might...and had an ammunition wagon been moved inside some might have survived that way I suppose. But that's a whole lot of "ifs" in my opinion.

Supplying the British firing lines with thier own ammuntion would have proved benifical to all those on the Battlefield that day, apart from the Zulus.

Forget the oxon, there were over two hundred horseman, use the horses to move the waggons.

In terms of defence, Ive posted a picture of the ground conditions, not digable. The wagons werent an option, from the time they realissed they were in trouble it was to late.

Chelmsford later commented that the best defence would have been to drop the tents and take position behind them surrounding an ammunition wagon. It would have worked.

There is Zulu testimony that says the chest and left horn were defeated and ready to give in, it was the arrival of the right horn that changed the balance. So if the companies were drawn up above the tent line they would have decimated the zulu..............possibly.



Cheers

In terms of the orders to Durnford.
This is what Chelmsford had to say about it: "......and then when I ordered Col Durnford to come up from RD I refrained from sending any fresh instructions to that officer which might only have caused confusion."

The italics are mine.

That word says that Durnford allready had his orders, the first part of the sentence mentions his order to move, the second refers to other orders.

Martin

Sorry Mate the area we discussed earlier, this is as close as I can get.

Pulliene had many hours and many more men to move wagons into some form of defence, and he could have arranged for boxes of ammo to be made ready for use for when they were needed. What could Durnford do about the defences in the hour or so that he had after he arrived, don't forget that he was getting all sorts of conflicting reports coming in about Zulus in the area, and sent out scouts to try to get better information (which is what Pulliene should have done). When he got the report of Zulus heading in the direction of LC, he was duty bound to find out where they were going in order to protect his General.The camp was not under attack when he left with his men, so they couldn't run ammo to the firing lines as the battle had not yet started. In any case, Pulliene was in command of the camp, and had been ordered to defend it, so it was he who should have organised better defences and arranged for a good supply of ammo to the firing line.

That's ok mate, I do understand.

Personally I can't see the relevance of any of the orders issued. Everything had changed. Everyone should have work as one to defend the camp as those in it. Worrying about problems that might be occurring elsewhere should never have come in to it.

impi wrote:

Everyone should have work as one to defend the camp as those in it.

And so they might have IF they knew there were 25 thousand enemy encamped five miles away...but it took Durnford's initiative to discover that. By RD the defenders had a pretty good idea that the enemy was abroad in great force. After the decision was taken to stay put there was only one thing to do. They obviously weren't responsible for protecting anybody's flank at that point. Survival was their only possible mission.

Good post 6pdr.

impi.

Can you imagine what might have happened if the Zulus had been trying to cut Chelmsford off and attack his portion of the centre column? Durnford had to act when the report came in of Zulus heading in Chelmsford's direction.

With hindsight, we now know that this was a ruse by Ntshingwayo, and that it was actually part of the Zulu left horn, but Durnford was not to know that at the time, and was furious when the carbineer advised him of it. He made a fighting retreat back towards the camp, and held up the left horn for ages fighting from the donga. His men only had 50 rounds, not the normal 70, however, they fought the Zulus to a standstill until they started to run out of ammo and were being outflanked, he had to move back towrds the camp or be over run. And the fight that he and the rest of the men put up in trying to keep the left horn joining up with the right and encircling the camp is well worthy of praise, it let many others escape via fugatives drift until the right and left horns joined and the gate was closed.

If the Zulus had been heading towards Chelmsford to cut him off and attack him, there could well have been a double iSandlwana type loss that day, so Durnford had to try to find out where the Zulus were going in an attempt to protect Chelmsford.

But Chelmsford wasn't attack if he had ,then that would have had his own little war.

The discussion in question is based on the camp at Isandlwana. And who was ordered to do what. And I see we are back to the " In hindsight"

What if Durnford hadn't been ordered to the camp. He would have remained at RD. what would he have done when the message arrived that the camp had been taken. Would he have rode to the camp to assist.

Well I need your help again. I can't find anything that says Durnford left to prevent Chelmsford coloum being attacked. Would be great if someone could point me to the source.

Ulundi wrote:

Well I need your help again. I can't find anything that says Durnford left to prevent Chelmsford coloum being attacked. Would be great if someone could point me to the source.

This is a cross post from a forum different forum here but it relates to what you are asking...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actually on p. 328 [of Ian Knight's ZULU RISING] I have, "According to Cochrane, 'Constant reports came in from the scouts on the hills to the left, but never anything from the men on top of Isandlwana hill, that I heard. Some of the reports were: "The enemy are in force behind the hills on the left", "The enemy are in three columns", "The enemy are retiring in every direction", "The columns are separating, one moving to the left rear, and one towards the General."'

The footnote (#27 in Chapter 19,) says Higginson, Official Report.

Knight writes that this seemed to strike Durnford immediately. Later he quotes Cochrane as saying that the Colonel intended to prevent the force that had been spotted from joining the supposed main impi that Chelmsford was pursuing. Later still he writes that, "Durnford simply told his men that the enemy was retiring, and that he intended to follow them up." (p. 331)

And finally, on page 332 there is the quote related by Jabez Molife that, "If they are going towards the General we must stop them at all hazards."

So, overall I think we have Higginson's report but also both Cochrane's and Molife's testimony as witnesses to its impact on Durnford and his subsequent intensions. Knight also stresses, btw, that Durnford had every right to make these decisions based on his rank and also because he was an independent column commander with recent information of a changed situation.

Thank you for the reply.

How far did Durnford get from Isandlwana on his journey to save Chelmsford

Hi Ulundi .
From Zulu Rising p 331 , '' Cochrane thought they cantered 8 or 10 kilometres from the camp . F/note 36 which is on p 640 .
'' Going at a canter ..... Between 5 and 6 miles '' , Cochrane , Report , London Gazette.
Cheers 90th.

Hi Martin .
Here is the order you asked me to find for you , thought I may as well post it here as well .
The following from '' Lord Chelmesford's Zulu Campaign 1878 - 1879 '' Edited by John Laband . Produced by The Army Records Society . Page 73 ,
Lt General Lord Chelmesford to Colonel Anthony Durnford . Head Quarter Camp , Near Rorke's Drift , Zululand , 19th Jan 1879.

'' No 3 Column moves Tomorrow to Insalwana Hill and from there , as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Indeni Forest . From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas if they refuse to surrender . One is in the stronghold on or near the Mhlazakazi Mountain , the other is in the Indeni Forest . Bengough ought to be ready to cross the Buffalo R. at the Gates of Natal in three days time , and ought to show himself there as soon as possible . I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorkes Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaks . I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas , but will send you fresh instructions on this subject . We shall be about 8 miles from Rorkes Drift tomorrow '' .

I have copied it verbatim , which includes the spelling .

Gates of Natal is footnoted as downstream from R.D.
Cheers 90th.

90th wrote:

I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas , but will send you fresh instructions on this subject . We shall be about 8 miles from Rorkes Drift tomorrow '' .

I have copied it verbatim , which includes the spelling .

Gates of Natal is footnoted as downstream from R.D.
Cheers 90th.

Wow! I don't think I've ever read this order before. I think I've seen the contents summarized in some accounts but I didn't realize that Chelmsford had literally promised Durnford fresh orders were forthcoming. I appreciate you taking the time to look it up and type it out. - 6pdr

Hi 6pdr.
This is one of the books I havent had time to read , just glad I remembered I have it !. Springbok mentions in his earlier post on the 21st at 7.03 pm that Chelmesford issued orders to Durnford on the 19th , which I've just posted , the 21st which I think are the ones that may have conveniently gone missing ???? , happy to be shown these and corrected if need be ! , and those of the 22nd which were to '' move to the camp '' , these orders are the ones , which we are , it seems always debating !.
Cheers 90th.

Hi Gary (90th).

Many thanks for that my friend, that is very helpful indeed, and puts a whole new light on the matter.

It would appear by these orders, that Durnford did expect new orders waiting for him at the camp, but that they were not there waiting for him in the care of Pulliene.

I also echo the words of 6pdr, and appreciate the time you have taken to dig out this great information, many thanks mate, you are a star.

Martin.

As my post above points out, Chelmsford afterwards admitted that he had sent orders to Durnford.

[quote="6pdr"]

And so they might have IF they knew there were 25 thousand enemy encamped five miles away...but it took Durnford's initiative to discover that.


Well said

impi wrote:

The shop was closed on his second visit. Things have changed.

He was told to go to the shop. Perhaps he should have stood outside the shop until it opened again?
He was told to go to the camp. Perhaps Durnford should have stayed at the camp.

And as he waited a gas leak caused an explosion destroying the shop, and killed him.

Or, he uses his initiative, goes to another shop and is run over by a bus en route.

Either decision he makes, he is dead, and the wife still doesn't get her bacon, eggs and tomatoes.

Yer she does from the first trip he made...

PS. I wonder what Pulliene and Durnford had for breakfast on the morning of the 22nd. Do you think it was " Eggs & Bacon"

springbok9 wrote:

As my post above points out, Chelmsford afterwards admitted that he had sent orders to Durnford.

Yes, you were clearly making this point and I also got the bacon and eggs metaphor, but I thought it was merely a good working theory. Seeing the message from the 19th moves it into the realm of fact, IMO. At the very minimum it's a strong proof point. And combined with Chelmsford pointing out after the battle that he didn't elaborate further so as not to confuse the matter...well....for me the whole issue is cast in a new light.

Now I see why Ian Knight and others have come down so strongly on issue that Durnford was well within his rights. And that's one of the questions I came to this board hoping to clear up in my mind. Personally I no longer see much reason to dwell at such lengths on the issue of whether Durnford was "following orders." If the strict constructionists have been aware of the contents of the 19th orders and still believe his conduct is reprehensible or incomprehensible in military terms, then they are never going to be dissuaded from accusing/attacking him anyway. Just my opinion. - 6pdr.

Ulundi wrote:

Yer she does from the first trip he made...

PS. I wonder what Pulliene and Durnford had for breakfast on the morning of the 22nd. Do you think it was " Eggs & Bacon"

Err, now I am lost.
He was asked once, didn't go, asked a second time, went and the shop was now closed!
I'm out of the eggs and bacon comparison!

Ulundi.

Quote :

How far did Durnford get from Isandlwana on his journey to save Chelmsford

Durnford sent two troops of his NNH to reconnoitre along the Nqutu Ridge where Chard and Pope had spotted the hordes of Zulus.

Durnford & Pulliene had a discussion which was typical of the day; as to which of the two was senior. Durnford leaves on his intended mission but minutes after his departure. Cavaye see's the NNH soldiers sent out earlier by Durnford riding rapidly towards them, being chased by a very large body of Zulus. Cavaye's men opened fire - but the Zulus did not attack them, but were tearing past towards the west. Col: Pulleine sent Captain Mostyn to reinforce Cavaye. Around 11: 40, the rocket battery was overwhelmed by Zulus North of Conical Hill as they tried to take a short-cut to catch up with Durnford who had left them behind in haste to carryout his mission, they rode headlong into a mass of Zulus, managed to fire only one rocket, which hit nothing.  The left wing of the Zulu advance ran into Durnford at about 1200. Forcing  him to retire back to the camp. Around 13:20 Durnford rallied to him some of his NNH black soldiers, some white colonials join them of course this was no more than a gallant failure, its effect negligible, a gesture only. So in a nut shell he didn't get far in carrying out the task in saving LC. 

There had been many conflicting reports of Zulus in the area, these reports had been coming in since the early hours, however, Pulliene had done very little about these reports. When Durnford arrived at the camp and heard of these conflicting reports, he realised that they needed looking into (as Pulliene had done very little to find out), he sent out scouts in all directions, he had men sent up onto iSandlwana Hill, and he sent out the two troops to gather much needed information. Don't forget that no one at the camp, including Pulliene and Durnford, knew that such a massive force of Zulus were hidden close by, so by sending out these scouts and troops, he was trying to get information as to the strength of the force of Zulus in the area, which is what Pulliene should have done in all the hours that these reports had been coming in. When he heard that a large body of Zulus were heading in the direction of Chelmsford, and with him being in command of an independent column, he was duty bound to try to find out where these Zulus were going, just in case they were trying to cut off, outflank or attack Chelmsford, he really didn't have much option about this, he had to try to protect his General and that portion of the centre column. However, he was not to know that this was a ruse by Ntshingwayo, and in fact the large body of Zulus heading in the direction of Chelmsford were part of the left wing of the horn. He had to make a fighting retreat back towards the camp, and held up the Zulu left horn for ages from the donga His men only had 50 rounds each, not the 70 rounds that the imperial troops had, and he stopped the left horn in its tracks until running out of ammo and starting to get outflanked, he had to leave the donga or be overrun. When he and his men rallied, others joined them, including men of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment, and between them they put up a very gallant fight, holding the left horn at bay and giving others the chance to escape the massacre by fleeing down fugatives drift. These brave and gallant souls let others escape by keeping the left horn from joining the right until finally they could keep the gate open no longer. This act surely deserves admiration and praise, as many of them could have also escaped, but they stood with Durnford and died with him, what a noble thing to do, let others escape at the expense of themselves, all praise to them.

Well said Martin

Durnford was a brave and honourable man. End of.

Thanks tasker.

tasker224 wrote:

Well said Martin

I'd like to second that. A fair and accurate summary.

Quote :

There had been many conflicting reports of Zulus in the area, these reports had been coming in since the early hours, however, Pulliene had done very little about these reports.
Why should he according to your goodself and other members, they didn't know they were going to be attacked, even with the reports coming in so why should he have done anything. None of the officers done anything, because they were obeying Pullienes orders.

When Durnford arrived at the camp and heard of these conflicting reports, he realised that they needed looking into (as Pulliene had done very little to find out), he sent out scouts in all directions, he had men sent up onto iSandlwana Hill, and he sent out the two troops to gather much needed information.
He sent his men out based on the reports received by Chard and Pope.

Don't forget that no one at the camp, including Pulliene and Durnford, knew that such a massive force of Zulus were hidden close by, so by sending out these scouts and troops, he was trying to get information as to the strength of the force of Zulus in the area,
Chelmsford and co, we're also unaware of the hidden Zulus.
which is what Pulliene should have done in all the hours that these reports had been coming in.

When he heard that a large body of Zulus were heading in the direction of Chelmsford, and with him being in command of an independent column, he was duty bound to try to find out where these Zulus were going, just in case they were trying to cut off, outflank or attack Chelmsford, he really didn't have much option about this, he had to try to protect his General and that portion of the centre column.
Rubbish, he was ordered to march to the camp. And he wasn't acting independently. If he was please show me a primary source that states he was while at Isandlwana.

However, he was not to know that this was a ruse by Ntshingwayo, and in fact the large body of Zulus heading in the direction of Chelmsford were part of the left wing of the horn. He had to make a fighting retreat back towards the camp, and held up the Zulu left horn for ages from the donga His men only had 50 rounds each, Not good preperation taking men into battle with only 50 rounds knowing your supply waggon was back at the camp.not the 70 rounds that the imperial troops had, and he stopped the left horn in its tracks until running out of ammo As i said not good preperation running out of ammo and starting to get outflanked, he had to leave the donga or be overrun.

When he and his men rallied, others joined them, including men of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment, and between them they put up a very gallant fight, holding the left horn at bay and giving others the chance to escape the massacre by fleeing down fugatives drift. He wasn't fighting to keep the door open for the the others he was doing what the others were doing fighting for his life.

These brave and gallant souls let others escape by keeping the left horn from joining the right until finally they could keep the gate open no longer. This act surely deserves admiration and praise, as many of them could have also escaped, but they stood with Durnford and died with him, what a noble thing to do, let others escape at the expense of themselves, all praise to them.

If he had followed orders, none of what you say above regarding Durnford would have happened.

Using that logic, if LC had not illegally invaded Zululand, Durnford would never have received any orders to follow (or not).

When Durford first cocked up, Chelmsford should have relieved him of his command. He could have become a lay preacher for the Colenso's.

Thank you 6pdr.

I feel that Col Durnford is unjustly blamed for the loss at iSandlwana, and he was unfairly scapegoated by others in an effort to protect Chelmsford's backside. But there were those people back home that could 'smell a rat' (as the saying goes), and many questions started to get asked, however, Chelmsford ended the war at Ulundi before he could be relieved as commander in S.A.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Thank you 6pdr.

I feel that Col Durnford is unjustly blamed for the loss at iSandlwana, and he was unfairly scapegoated by others in an effort to protect Chelmsford's backside. But there were those people back home that could 'smell a rat' (as the saying goes), and many questions started to get asked, however, Chelmsford ended the war at Ulundi before he could be relieved as commander in S.A.

Martin, I have been trained to "sniff out rats" and I smell one!

littlehand wrote:

When Durford first cocked up, Chelmsford should have relieved him of his command. He could have become a lay preacher for the Colenso's.

On that note, time to click off the browser and pour a wee dram I think.

Don't get me wrong. I feel for every man that feel at Isandlwana. I just cannot accept that so many people try to justify the actions of two incompetent officers, who sent the men to their unattainable positions. I just get comfort by knowing the officers of the indivual companies kept there men together and died on the battlefield with them. Those involved in maintaining covering fire to allow Durford to fall back only to be killed in the act of doing so.

Those of you that say Dunrford was a brave man for keeping the gates open remember this.

He kept the gates open to allow a large number of British officers on horseback to escape. No wonder they give a good account of Durnfords actions in their accounts in the court of enquiry, they were indebted to him.

Brickhill's states he could see no officers.....

Nice one LH

Quote :

He kept the gates open to allow a large number of British officers on horseback to escape. No wonder they give a good account of Durnfords actions in their accounts in the court of enquiry, they were indebted to him

Ouch!! Certainly packs a punch..

Saving the lives of brother officers?
Perhaps Durnford should have been recommended for the VC???

Just off for a top up!

Hey Tasker. Never mind the ordinary Tommy, left there. Like LH says thank god there were a few brave officers who stay and fought with their men

Martin..

Quote :

Chelmsford ended the war at Ulundi before he could be relieved as commander in S.A.

Martin, Chelmsford asked for a replacement just after Isandlwana.

Chelmsford's presence was a constant embarrassment to, Colonel Glyn, commanding 1/24th. He had no way of communicating with the other columns under his command, Chelmsford devoted all his time to commanding, in effect, the third column completely by-passing Glyn. Each man was allocated his own staff; Chelmsford's consisted of Colonel Crealock, Glyn's by Major Clery. Neither Chelmsford or Glynn was well-served by these principal staff officers, both of them being small-minded, stubborn and vindictive whenever possible, issuing confusing and incomplete orders and being unable to take notice of other men's counsel. Worse, the whole command structure, including Chelmsford, seemed incapable of taking advice from local men of vast experience and specialist knowledge of the country and the tracks, the Zulus and other black tribes, with both British colonials and Boers being totally ignored. When the command structure fails at the top, you can be sure there's none at the bottom.

But none of them, was at Isandlwana. I agree LC didn't listen to advise by those who knew the ways of the Zulu. But Durnford knew only to well. If he had intended on protecting LC rear so to say, why did he take his men who were only supplied with 50 rounds of ammo knowing full well his supply waggon was in the camp. What did he hope to achieve.

If they thought the Zulus were heading towards Chelmsford, didn't they know he was 16km away, they would have had some running to do to get to him.

Hi Littlehand .
If you go to page 4 and read my post at 8.48am , you'll see Cochrane's report on how far Durnford went towards Chelmesford .
Cheers 90th.

littlehand wrote:

No wonder they give a good account of Durnfords actions in their accounts in the court of enquiry, they were indebted to him.

Brickhill's states he could see no officers.....

Well, as long as we have Saul David here please allow me a quote from his book which demonstrates that the Zulu seemed to take notice of his bravery:

"A Zulu eyewitness claimed that a one-armed officer killed four Zulus with his revolver as his party was forced by weight of numbers up the slope of the stony koppie. 'It was a long time before they were overcome said Mehlokazulu, who took part in the fight." (p. 151 of ZULU -- THE HEROISM AND TRAGEDY OF THE ZULU WAR OF 1879.)

90th don't you mean "Dave" find it on page 4.