Lt Col Pulleine - responsible for the loss of iSandlwana?

LH.

In reply to the points you made (in yellow), to my post above.

No, they did not know they were going to be attacked, however, with all the reports coming in of Zulu activity in the area, Pulliene should have had the common sense to try to find out more information about this activity, but he failed to do this. This may have been because although he was an officer of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment, he was more accustomed to admin work, and was not what you would call a line officer, and the other officers should have offered him their advise about these reports, but they also failed.

When Durnford arrived and heard of these reports from outlaying piquets and vedettes, he had the common sense to realise that this needed investigating, and sent men out accordingly to get better information. Yes, Chard had told him that he had spotted Zulus in the area, and Durnford had the foresight to order Lt Vause to reinforce the baggage guard.

Chelmsford and co were also unaware of the hidden zulus. Agreed

It is not rubbish, and yes, he was ordered to march to the camp, which he did, and he was in command of an independent column. The source you ask for is from Chelmsford himself, where he states in a dispatch,;

"When a column is acting separately in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the column under his command".

So with the information that Durnford received, he was quite at liberty to do something about the situation, especially when the report came in about a large body of Zulus heading in Chelmsford's direction.

Durnford.s men were only issued with 50 rounds, and it was his intention (as he informed Pulliene), to sweep the area, thus drawing out the Zulus and turning them away from Chelmsford. If Pulliene had loaned Durnford the 2 coys of the 24th, I should think that Durnford's plan was to turn the reported Zulus away from Chelmsford, so that the rocket battery with their NNC escort, could open fire on the Zulus, then if the Zulus had come towards the battery and NNC, they could have fallen back behind the 2 coys of the 24th and made a fighting withdrawal back towards the camp, whilst Durnford's mounted men attacked their flank and rear.

Yes, they were all fighting for their lives, however, if those men had not rallied to Durnford and fought alongside him (even the carbineers rallied to him), the ones that escaped would have been killed in the massacre, and don't forget that some of those men did have horses and could have escaped, but they gave their horses to others and stood alongside Durnford keeping the left horn at bay long enough for others to escape, and for that, these men deserve our respect and admiration.

Durnford did follow orders, he marched to the camp, as ordered.

Hi Chard .
No , I dont mean Dave , read Littlehand's post at 2.35 am ( I think thats the time ) . He attempted to answer a query posted by Ulundi , but obviously hadnt seen my post on page 4 which gives the info required .
Cheers 90th.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

LH.

... and the other officers should have offered him their advise about these reports, but they also failed.

One wonders what might have happened had Melvill been as assertive about sending out scouts as he was would be about keeping Durnford from absconding with two companies of the 24th. But alas, these were INFANTRY officers and that was not really their usual role or forte. Again and again one notices how the absence of an organic cavalry component in 3rd column led to troublesome discontinuities. Durnford had different instincts but his arrival was at least a day late and a dollar short (through no fault whatsoever of his own, I hasten to add.) Of course Chelmsford spent a lot of time and energy personally riding out on reconnaissance but he seemed to be too close to the trees to see the forest.

Hi 6pdr.

Quite right my friend, you have hit the nail on the head.

Quote :

Martin. It is not rubbish, and yes, he was ordered to march to the camp, which he did, and he was in command of an independent column. The source you ask for is from Chelmsford himself, where he states in a dispatch,;

"When a column is acting separately in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the column under his command".

Martin. i'm confused what as this got to do with Durnford at Isandlwana

Quote :

and don't forget that some of those men did have horses and could have escaped, but they gave their horses to others and stood alongside Durnford keeping the left horn at bay long enough for others to escape

,

Your source please Martin. Or is this speculation.

An observation regarding Durnford.

"Ekowe, February 6, J 879.
DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,


I RECEIVED yesterday morning your letter of the 2nd instant and a Telegram from the Deputy-Adjutant-General of the 4th. In the latter I am reminded of the inadvisability of reinforcements being sent to me as they would only help eat our food. When I wrote upon this subject I was not quite clear as to the immediate future course of this column. I now quite recognize our position and I quite see, too, the mistake which would be made by reinforcing us.
We are now very strongly intrenched. Good thick parapets, ditches no where less than seven feet deep and ten feet wide. In places they are both deeper and wider, the ditches are partly flanked as well, either by flanks, stockades, caponnieres or cuttings in the parapet. Enfilade and reverse fire have been well considered and traverses have been constructed to protect us from both. The batteries are masked and spare sand bags provided to protect the gunners from fire upon any point from which the gun is not actually firing.

Trous-de-loups are being made on the glacis, and a zig-zag will be made to the watering-place about 60 yards from the fort, to ensure the safety of the watering party. We have three entrances, a main entrance over a drawbridge, over which carts or unloaded wagons can pass ; this is drawn back at night; a small foot bridge to the watering place which is topped up on the alarm sounding, and a trestle bridge, also a foot bridge, which is dismantled at retreat. Near the main entrance is a sally port leading into the ditch where at night we have some earth closets, as, of course the day latrines are some distance from the fort. In a hollow below this face are two cattle laagers built of wagons chained and reined together. The circular one holds the slaughter cattle, and the other most of the trek oxen. These are protected by an L shaped work, nevertheless, the cattle are a constant source of anxiety to me, as they might be taken away during a dark night if the Zulus should be enterprising, at least so it seems to me. I trust I may be wrong.

We are better off for food than I thought we were, and, if our cattle are left to us, we shall be able to get along for over three weeks from this day, and, with many essentials for some time longer. Heygate has sent a pretty accurate return to the Commissary General, which he must have received, as it went with my letter which you have acknowledged.

Our resources in the way of ammunition you also know. As regards dividing our entrenchments, so as to defend our stores efficiently in the event of the garrison being reduced, I am afraid it could not well be done without very, materially altering everything. Every building is now within the fort, and was preserved in the belief that all your columns were to have been fed from. this line, and that, consequently, stores on a large scale would be required, also a fair sized garrison. I mean some three hundred or four hundred men, for, of course, it was not then contemplated that the garrison would have to deal with any large bodies of Zulus.

As it is, it is highly probable, I suppose, that Cetywayo may make a supreme effort to drive us out and bring the bulk of his army this way. I trust he may do so and he will find it a very hard nut to crack indeed. We have got all the distances measured and this afternoon a table of ranges will be issued to the troops. If we have time the distances will all be cut on the hills which slope our way, and the cuttings filled in with white clay, which we get out of the ditches, so as to make the figures visible.

As regards our immediate future, I am of opinion, and I trust you will forgive me giving it frankly that, a convoy of wagons not exceeding 20 in number and all with good spans of 20 oxen, and none with larger loads than 4000 lbs. should be sent us, as soon as you can get an escort together, equal to a battalion of 600 or 700.

The wagons to contain nothing but food for men and a little more ammunition, especially for guns and rockets, which we want and would not be much good to the Zulus if it fell into their hands. The escort would not require tents, and could carry two days' provisions on their persons, which would gave something. I would ask to have the two Companies Buffs, now at the Lower Drift, sent up, and with the return wagons I would send back the three companies and Head quarters 99th, half the company Royal Engineers, the Native Pioneers, the odds and ends of Volunteers, Native Contingent, and drivers and leaders still here. In fact the latter have signified their intention to bolt, the first opportunity. If the escort reported the road pretty clear, I would also suggest sending back the sick and wounded, who are fit to travel, and some of the trek oxen which I should be very glad to get rid of. The drivers and leaders could take charge of them. I most respectfully hope you will remember that I am only giving my opinion. I am ready to reduce the garrison to any limits you may choose to order, and to take my chance with the remainder, but having pretty well studied our position, I hope from every point of view, I do not think (unless we see no chance of being attacked by a very large body of the enemy) that it would be prudent just yet to reduce the garrison beyond the limits I have suggested.

In making the above suggestions, I have studied to reduce the number of mouths, and to retain, at the same time, all the fighting men I could. It will be better too, to keep units, i.e., battalions together. The Natal Pioneers will be useful in repairing roads between this and the Tugela and the half company Royal Engineers will be necessary, should any intermediate station be fixed upon as a fortified post. I know of no place as I have already told you. The Inyone dries up in winter generally, and what water remains is brackish. Perhaps our camping ground on the left bank of the Umsindusi might do. The water is beautiful, but it is commanded, as I think I also told you, from the high ground towards the Amatakula, only in that direction, however, so perhaps the Engineers might manage to defilade it. The locality as regards the distance between Ekowe and the Tugela would be a very convenient one, I am speaking of places on the road, but I remember none adjacent to it. A few hundred men could cut down the bush along the road for several hundred yards on either side between the Inyone and Umsindusi, but I do not know whether it would not be too big a job to attempt to do so about the Amatakula and Inyazuue. It would be a grand thing if it could be done. I think any escort coming up will have to look about them very carefully nearly every where between the Umsindusi and the high ground on this side of the Inyazune. On some places the bush is pretty thick ; a few mounted scouts with the convoy would be of great use.

As regards the composition of a column, I have come to the conclusion that, although mounted men, if the horses could be fed in this country, would be of immense value, yet, considering that all their forage has to be carried, their utility is much lessened by the fact of the column being materially increased in length by the additional transport.

The Native Contingent, too are of little or no use, unless all the men have firearms; when, perhaps, they would be as dangerous to friends as foes ; and the officers and non - commissioned officers can speak Kaffir.
In the 2nd Regiment, scarcely one could do so, and I could never get anything done I wanted. The men were always grumbling at doing fatigue work, notwithstanding that they saw the soldiers working alongside them, and said they were enlisted to fight, and not to work. Yet, when they had the chance, they did not do over well.

We should be very glad of a newspaper or two giving an account of No. 3 Column. About what number of Zulus did poor Durnford's party kill before they were overpowered and slaughtered ? Did the two guns fall into the hands of the Zulus ? Did the plucky company of the 2nd Battalion 24th at Rorke's Drift (I suppose it was guarding the Depot) beat off the 2,500 Zulus whom they fought for twelve hours ? How very foolish of poor Durnford's detachment to scatter about so far from the camps. Has any raid been made on Natal ? The men here are very savage at the thoughts of so many of their wounded comrades being butchered, for, of course, as all were found dead, the wounded must have been murdered.

We are all still in very good health, and the work will not be so hard now I hope, as all the heavy work of the entrenchments is completed. 37 on the sick report to-day, two of the Buffs rather bad with the diarrhoea, one of them, Oakley, the married man whose name I sent the other day, is not so well, he had only fever then. Wounded doing very well. We had some rain last night and the night before a very heavy thunderstorm. To-day it has been exceedingly hot. I am going to send this letter off to-night. The messengers say the road is thoroughly watched, but I cannot hear of any large force of Zulus being between us and the Tugela."

Sincerely and respectfully yours,
(Signed) C. K. PEARSON.

Thanks for that Ray.

I didn't know what a "Trous-de-loup" was so I looked in up. Very interesting these were used in the Zulu War. ,We learn something new everyday.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

I believe Wynne used them extensively as part of the defences at Eshowe

John.

Durnford was ordered to march to the camp, which he did, he was in command of No2 column, which was a separate independent column. We all know now that Chelmsford did not order him to take command of the camp, nor was he ordered to reinforce the camp, he was simply ordered to march to the camp, which he did. Chelmsford had sent a dispatch to Durnford in which he stated,; "When a column is acting separately in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the column under his command". On arrival at the camp, Durnford received conflicting reports of Zulu activity in the area, and on hearing the report of a body of Zulus heading in Chelmsford's direction, he wanted to find out where they were going just in case they were trying to cut off, outflank or attack Chelmsford. The above statement from Chelmsford's dispatch gave him the right to do this, as he was in command of a separate No2 column, and not in command of the camp, that honour fell to Pulliene.


In answer to your other question.

The source I used was from Ian Knight's book Zulu Rising, where it is stated that Durnford had with him Lt Scott and the Carbineer vedettes and the survivors from the rocket battery. Trooper Barker had ridden to replenish ammunition, he then goes on to say "Here they dismounted. Hawkins, myself and others giving our horses to one of Durnford's natives to hold, promising to tip him when the fight was over. However, he left our horses after a time and rejoined his troop". So, yes, ok John, you may be right, I may be speculating that these horses were used by others to escape, but someone must have used them to get away, and didn't Durnford give his horse to one of his men.

Quote :

Chelmsford had sent a dispatch to Durnford in which he stated,; "When a column is acting separately in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the column under his command"

Martin this was not a dispatch, it was part of a reprimand sent to Durnford for disobeying orders. :sleep:

Martin here is the reprimand in full.

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."

Saul David 1879 wrote:

, the whole command structure, including Chelmsford, seemed incapable of taking advice from local men of vast experience and specialist knowledge of the country and the tracks, the Zulus and other black tribes, with both British colonials and Boers being totally ignored.

Wasn't this just typical of the class arrogance of that type of man back then, thinking he knows better than the plebs and the natives.
When I was on one of my trips down under, in the Blue Mountains to the West of Sydney, our guide was told us about the struggle that the white settlers had, many men perished, in looking for a route to cross the "great divide."
The man who eventually "found the way", can't remember his name, guess what he did?
Yes, he asked the local aborigines and they showed him the way!

Quote :

Saul David 1879 wrote:
, the whole command structure, including Chelmsford, seemed incapable of taking advice from local men of vast experience and specialist knowledge of the country and the tracks, the Zulus and other black tribes, with both British colonials and Boers being totally ignored

.


Tasker your Learn nothing from that from that man, except how not to behave.

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."


Martin. The above order was received by Durnford on the 14th of January. Durnford, acting on his own initiative on information he received from local spies, had taken his column down from their encampment on the hills above the Thukela to the river in anticipation of a rumored Zulu attack. Chelmsford, surprised and angered by this move sent Durnford the above order

Dave wrote:

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."


Martin. The above order was received by Durnford on the 14th of January. Durnford, acting on his own initiative on information he received from local spies, had taken his column down from their encampment on the hills above the Thukela to the river in anticipation of a rumored Zulu attack. Chelmsford, surprised and angered by this move sent Durnford the above order

And a bit of an over-reaction it was by LC too! No harm was done.
Durnford was acting on info from a trusted man, Bishop Schreuder. OK, the Bish got his info from local spies, but Durnford acted in good faith. He was doing what he was there to do, trying to protect the border from a Zulu threat.

Martin. We are just giving you an in-sight into Durfords back ground prior to Isandwana. Hey! No wonder LC wanted to keep an eye on him.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Quote :

Saul David 1879 wrote:
, the whole command structure, including Chelmsford, seemed incapable of taking advice from local men of vast experience and specialist knowledge of the country and the tracks, the Zulus and other black tribes, with both British colonials and Boers being totally ignored

.


Tasker your Learn nothing from that from that man, except how not to behave.

CTSG, look who's talking! :lol:

You CTSG are a very, very, naughty boy! And everybody knows it!

Ah! Come on Tasker, he's changed.

Martin, when your ready, you can post that source that states Durnford was acting independantly. After he received his order to March with all his force to the camp.

It doesn't matter if it was a letter, a dispatch, or an order, the sentence that Chelmsford wrote would still stand to show that Durnford was quite in order to leave the camp to sweep the area, and try to draw away or turn the reported body of Zulus away from heading in the direction of Chelmsford.

Don't forget that Chelmsford had also sent Durnford an order on the 19th Jan (see 90th's post in this topic yesterday, Sep 23rd 12:15 am), in which Chelmsford says that he will send Durnford fresh instructions. When Durnford received another order (via Smith-Dorrien), to move from RD to the camp at iSandlwana, he would most likely have expected these fresh instructions to be waiting for him in the care of Pulliene, but there were none, and the order that he received via Smith-Dorrien from Chelmsford did not order him to take command of the camp, nor to reinforce the camp, which in effect, meant that he was in command of just his own separate and independent No2 column, and so was quite in order to investigate the reports of Zulus in the area, especially the report of Zulus heading towards Chelmsford.

No! The letter was a reprimand not the go ahead to do as he please's he was not in command and Chelmsford was referring to commanders in the letter inquestion. You cannot read between the lines, it was Chlemsford giving Durnford a "Rollocking" for disobeying orders.

It was said in an earlier post, that Chelmsford had expected to be back at the camp before Durnford where upon fresh Orders may have been issued.( if that was the case?) It has been established a while back that he wasn't in command.

As Pulliene had been put in command of the camp in the absence of Glynn, Durnford would have been under his command. What you are saying with reference to Durnford being in command of just his own separate and independent No2 column is wrong, unless you can post a source that states this. Read the order again. It does not say act independantly. You need to stop speculating and second guessing what the order says.

This has always been the problem with debates discussed about Durnfords roll at Isandwana, because his order is basic, and doesn't give much detail. Perhaps there were no other details to give, and that's all LC wanted him to do. Trying to guess or mind read what the Order meant will go no where. What members write about Durnford brave deeds are mostly speculation into what he was thinking on that day. But that's all it ever will speculation. The order is there for all to see.

Durnford's role had been ambivalent. Upon his arrival at the encampment he had been, strictly speaking, senior to Pulleine, but he chose not to take command, preferring instead to spread his forces too far to the right of the defensive line to offer much protection to the main encampment.

littlehand wrote:

Chelmsford had expected to be back at the camp before Durnford where upon fresh Orders may have been issued.

But things changed.....

Tasker. I wrote

Quote :

"It was said in an earlier post, that Chelmsford had expected to be back at the camp before Durnford where upon fresh Orders may have been issued.( if that was the case?

)"

If it was the case, then yes things had changed. But the fact remains, Durford would have been under Pullienes command until Glynn returned, and Durnford was issued with new orders.

I appreciate your point LH, but it is all a bit vague and open to interpretation isn't it? Hence, the debate!
Lawyers in the court martial would have a field day!

Hi LH.

I have searched high and low for this, and finally found it in Ian Knights book 'Zulu Rising', P380.

Ian Knight states;

"Durnford sought out Pulleine. It is possible the two men had met before, but if so it can only have been briefly for their paths had seldom crossed despite their service in Natal, and they had certainly not worked together in the field before. Nonetheless, there should have been no awkwardness between them, as their respective positions were perfectly clear. As a brevet Colonel Durnford outranked Pulleine, who was a brevet lieutenant-colonel: although Durnford held an independent command, he was now the senior officer at iSandlwana, and the protocol would have been well known to both men: while he was present at the camp, Durnford was deemed to have taken command of it".

I knew I had read it somewhere, but just couldn't think where or what book I had read it in.

Martin. Ian Knight is not a primary source.

Littlehand
Talking of primary sources.

'Chelmsford intended to return and give new orders to Durnford? '

'50 rounds of ammunition?'

Would you be so kind?

:lol:

Springbok. Read his post again he did same maybe!
And it was Martin who stated 50 rounds. LH was making light of the matter ie. sending men to protect LC read with only 50 rounds each. When they ran out of ammo during there fall back.

Far to often on these pages casual remarks get turned into facts. I merely ask that they be substantiated.

An example of that is the oft quoted remark the Mules were seen running through the camp with ammo strapped to them. Untrue, a little research will show that A mule was seen and it was part of the rocket battery with rockets strapped to it.

There are many others and we as participants in discussions have an obligation to the many people who read these pages to be as accurate as we can, otherwise what is the point?

Incidentally check the army lists, Durnford was commisioned in the imperial forces, it makes no difference what regiment he was in or what forces he commanded in the field. He was senior to Pullein, this was known by Pullein himself when Durnford arrived.

LH.

Well, I can't see such an authoritative historian on the AZW subject, such as Ian Knight is, writing something like that in his books if he had not checked, double checked and varified the facts before writing them, and I am sure that he will give you the primary source if you contact him on his new site.

Hi springbok.

I had read that Durnford's men only had 50 rounds on the rdvc site. It was a full article called 'Isandlwana a military enigma', written by Mark Hobson.

I have also read the same thing in one of my many books on the AZW subject, however, I cannot think which book this was in, I will have to browse through them to try to find it again.

Durnfords Men were re issued with a further 20 rounds by Stafford before they left. The Native troops only had 5 rounds each, they were also issued with a further 20 rounds. Hence the comments from Essex that the native troops blazed away at an astonishing rate, yet still had ammunition when they joined the line and were re issued again.

Cheers

Hi springbok.

Right, many thanks for that mate, that has saved me from trawling through all the books trying to find it.

Cheers springy.

50+20= 70 The normal allocation of ammuntion per man ( Standard) unless you was a Black Soldier in the NNC.

Quote :

Well, I can't see such an authoritative historian on the AZW subject, such as Ian Knight is, writing something like that in his books if he had not checked, double checked and varified the facts before writing them, and I am sure that he will give you the primary source if you contact him on his new site.

Then it should show the primary sources in the footnotes.

littlehand wrote:

Martin. Ian Knight is not a primary source.

No, but he refers to them and is probably a lot more objective and unbiased.

"poetic license" comes to mind, used quite a few times on this forum by certain members when it fits in with there theory.

John wrote:

"poetic license" comes to mind, used quite a few times on this forum by certain members when it fits in with there theory.

True enough with some authors but I am not sure if Ian Knight has ever been thought of in that regard.

Then all Martin has to do, is look at t he footnotes. Then he could tell us the source of Ian's text.

Easier said than done I'm afraid impi. as (although there are footnote numbers), there are no footnotes in the book, however, where the notes should be, it states the following.

We have placed a complete and extensive list of notes that accompany the text online. These can be found at the following location. [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

I have typed this in google, but cannot find these at all.
Others may have better luck, but I cannot find this "extensive list of notes" at all.

Martin
To Relieve you of searching. The question of the respective seniorities is covered fully by Ian with footnotes in Zulu Rising. However here are some key dates:
Henry Pullein received his Brevet Lt Colonel in 1887.
Durnford received his Brevet Colonelcy on the 11 December 1879.

There is absolutly no doubt that Durnford outranked Pullein.

Quote from Stafford ( His Statement sworn before CM Etheridge ) .........after Col Durnford and Capt Shepstone entered the tent a discussion took place between Durnford and Pullein as to seniority. Pullein in admitting that Durnford was the senior handed him the written instructions, which Lord Chelsford had left him when he went out of the camp. In looking over the orders Colonel Durnford remarked: "You have orders to draw in the camp." Pullein replied, "we can now discuss the matter." Durnford then said there is no time the scouts report the enemy is mustering behind the ridges.

As can be seen, Pullein was under no illusion who was the senior.


Hope that helps.

Cheers

We have been down this road with Staffords version a few times. He was outside the tent when this supposed conversation took place. His accounts were published 1929 & 1938.
He witnessed quite a lot during the Zulu War giving accounts many years later what year did LC die. 1905 I think....

Yet another account you dont believe? Read it in conjunction with Essex, Cochrane, and SmithD orean. They all tally.

Springbok you posted this on Thur Aug 30, 2012 10:010, 2012 10:01 am

Quote :

My issues with Durnford would be, his ( like the other two) failure to recognise the threat. His riding of into the sunset, ostensibly to engage the enemy but leaving behind the rocket battery. When he made contact instead of that rather vain attempt to slow down the left horn ( why bother? ) he should have got back to camp as fast as possible, taken charge and arranged the defence.

This is basically what we are saying. Difference being we think he should never have left in the first place. And with regards to Stafford’s account, when I used SD’s account you said along with others that he was an old man when he wrote the account, and memory would have been fading. So it’s hard to accept Stafford’s account for the same reasons.

CTSG
Yep stand by what I said about Durnfords actions. But I dont believe he can be pilloried alone, that belief extends to Chelmsford as you know.
I dont believe I have ever discounted Smith Doreans account. The status of the man demands that we accept his word, however time does affect our perceptions of time and order and for that reason SD has to be read with the other accounts and not in isolation. I dont believe that any account can be used as a stand alone.
And it terms of that cross comparison when four seperate people say the same thing you pay attention. And Staffords account is backed up, it cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Its highly possible that he shouldnt have left, he made a judgement call based on his information on the table. Wrong or right, thats open to debate ( as has been the case for 130 odd years ) . However this debate mixes up a couple of issues.
Did he have the right to leave.
Was he morally right to leave.
Did he make the wrong judgement call.
Would it have made any difference if he had stayed. This could be extrapolated yet again into the full realms of fantasy.
Would the attack then have taken place.
Would the camp have moved
Would the zulu have attacked the column on the move
My contentions are, yes he had the right to leave.
Yes he was morally right to leave
Without a doubt he did, however he acted on the information at hand. I believe he should have waited for Raw or one of the other scouting parties to report back before he left. That would have changed his mind.
According to all of his detractors he was a crap soldier, so he wouldnt have made and difference. B ut try any of the extrapolations before answering that.

Perhaps it's time to forget who was ordered to do what prior to the Battle, and concentrate on what went wrong, and what should have been done or could have been done. Springbok have gave a good account of what Durnford could have done, but didn't for whatever reason. So what was the main problems.

Who really was commard. We have an order that shows Pulliene was in command.

We have eyewitness accounts, that state Durnford took over commard.

We don't really know for sure what was discussed between Pulliene and Durford before he left.

We have the dispositions of the companies, we're they to far out, why wasn't they drawn in.

Was there a problem with the ammuntion.? We have accounts they say there was.

Was there a problem with the weapons. Over heating, Jamming, Fowling.

Why wasn't the reports of mass Zulu presents around the camp taken more seriously.

Why were the NNC units pushed the furthest out, with minimal fire power, how long we're they expected to stand, before running or dying.

How did all those officers on horseback manage to escape using the same route. Did they all gather in one area.

How long did the commard structure stay intact. When did it collapse leaving officers of the various companies to fend for themselves.

To name but a few issues.

Quote :

Who really was commard. We have an order that shows Pulliene was in command.
We have eyewitness accounts, that state Durnford took over Command.

Hard one! Can't see a deciding factor will be found to prove one way or another. And certainly members on this forum will never agree.

We don't really know for sure what was discussed between Pulliene and Durford before he left.

Agreed it will only ever be speculation, no one can prove what indivuals at the camp may of heard.

We have the dispositions of the companies, we're they to far out, why wasn't they drawn in.

The main failure in the dispositions was that the infantry were spread out. There were hugh gaps between companies and, even within each company, individual soldiers were spaced out up to four paces from each other. As a direct result, it was easy for the Zulus to pour through the gaps between the companies and to envelop them.

Was there a problem with the ammuntion.? We have accounts they say there was.

I think is true to say that,that question was answer in the "Ammuntion proble debate.

Was there a problem with the weapons. Over heating, Jamming, Fowling.

Some members say there wasn't, but I think common sense should prevail to say there were some problems.

Why wasn't the reports of mass Zulu presents around the camp taken more seriously.

Good question. As suggested by other members, they didn't know they were going to be attacked

Why were the NNC units pushed the furthest out, with minimal fire power, how long we're they expected to stand, before running or dying.

The NNC had been placed at the north-east corner of the defences, they broke and ran before the Zulus had actually reached them; but with only one rifle per ten men and being led by indifferent white officers and NCOs, their morale would have been low. But their withdrawal left a gaping hole in the line.

How did all those officers on horseback manage to escape using the same route. Did they all gather in one area.

Good question John. I'm sure certain other members could answer that.

How long did the commard structure stay intact. When did it collapse leaving officers of the various companies to fend for themselves.

I would say as soon as they were sent to thier positions.

Hi springbok.

Many thanks for the leg up mate, however, I did manage to get to the site with the notes (the site must have been down when I last tried).

The note in question states,; 'Cochrane, Evidence to the court of inquiry, Helpmekaar, 27 Jan 1879'.

Your analysis makes a lot of sense my friend, well done.

Cheers mate.