Lt Col Pulleine - responsible for the loss of iSandlwana?

Martin its "Springbok" Not "Sprinkbok"

Thanks LH, my typo has been corrected.

[quote="littlehand"][quote]Who really was commard. We have an order that shows Pulliene was in command.
We have eyewitness accounts, that state Durnford took over Command.

Hard one! Can't see a deciding factor will be found to prove one way or another. And certainly members on this forum will never agree.
Yes he did, literally or figuratively, he had to even though he told Pullein he wasnt going to, any "sugestion" he made would have been construed as an order,

We don't really know for sure what was discussed between Pulliene and Durford before he left.

Agreed it will only ever be speculation, no one can prove what indivuals at the camp may of heard.
Disagree we have a pretty good reporting of what was said

We have the dispositions of the companies, we're they to far out, why wasn't they drawn in.

The main failure in the dispositions was that the infantry were spread out. There were hugh gaps between companies and, even within each company, individual soldiers were spaced out up to four paces from each other. As a direct result, it was easy for the Zulus to pour through the gaps between the companies and to envelop them.
Circumstance dictated the troop formations, CEF were forced from the spur line to their positions. The balance were posted to counter the left horn elements and left chest, when the right chest came over the ridge they had to spread out to fill the gaps,

Was there a problem with the ammuntion.? We have accounts they say there was.

I think is true to say that,that question was answer in the "Ammuntion proble debate.

Not as much as is thought, despite all the missleading posts in that debate

Was there a problem with the weapons. Over heating, Jamming, Fowling.

Some members say there wasn't, but I think common sense should prevail to say there were some problems.
Minor and didnt have any bearing

Why wasn't the reports of mass Zulu presents around the camp taken more seriously.

Good question. As suggested by other members, they didn't know they were going to be attacked
Negligence and or bad reporting

Why were the NNC units pushed the furthest out, with minimal fire power, how long we're they expected to stand, before running or dying.

The NNC had been placed at the north-east corner of the defences, they broke and ran before the Zulus had actually reached them; but with only one rifle per ten men and being led by indifferent white officers and NCOs, their morale would have been low. But their withdrawal left a gaping hole in the line.
Agreed, as far as it goes but there are conflicting reports on the position of the NNC

How did all those officers on horseback manage to escape using the same route. Did they all gather in one area.

Good question John. I'm sure certain other members could answer that.

They all left seperatly and slightly different times, so no not together.

How long did the commard structure stay intact. When did it collapse leaving officers of the various companies to fend for themselves.

I would say as soon as they were sent to thier positions.

When the right horn became visible.

You see John.. The Isandlwana debate will never be put to bed.

People just need to be level head when debating look at the facts as they are and not read between the lines. Springbok unfortunately has been infected with the MIke Snook syndrome.

He has walked the Battlefield so many times, he has seen the Battle unfold in his minds eye. And nothing anyone says will change his opinion. He will never be motivated into thinking logically. If you cut him in half he would have Isandlwana written inside him like a stick of Blackpool rock.

Hmm whats that phrase incorporating pots and kettles?

Having walked the battlefields is really not a bad thing. And I do look at hard fact, have done for 40 years. Im not driven by flights of fancy or Wikepedia and Google, my thinking is totally logical.

I do analize the facts and information, because I dont come to the distorted conclusions as others on the forum is this a bad thing?

Personally Ive taken so much abuse from various members in e mails etc that I really dont care anymore.

And to the member thats pointed out where I can stick my photos, I cant Im allready accomadating my Quote" Stupid F*******g theories.

Im outta here.

Mike Snook often makes assumptions, or gives his own opinions of what he thinks happened, often without adding any evidence or time frames to back up what he says, but at least springbok does add other evidence and time frames to back up what he says, and often asks what other members of the forum think about his analysis. So in that respect, I don't think springbok could be classed as having been infected with the Mike Snook syndrome.

He has done what many of us on here can only dream of doing, and that is visiting the various battlefields, and has taken many pictures of the different areas and had them posted on the forum by Pete, so that those of us who have not got a hope of ever visiting the areas can at least appreciate what those areas look like, and all credit to springbok for that.

In my own humble opinion, springbok has a very good knowledge of the AZW, and others would do well to take note of what he says on the subject, and I for one always look forward to his contributions to the forum.

springbok9 wrote:

Im not driven by flights of fancy or Wikepedia and Google, my thinking is totally logical.

As a relative newcomer to this site I've been very impressed with your conduct. I don't always agree with you but I have found you to be logical and consistent. Your list of the questions conflated together in the Durnford debate, for example, is quite astute and very different from the usual shambling about one generally finds on these types of forums.

Also, it should be said that understanding this battle without having a firm grasp on the topology is VERY, VERY difficult indeed. It's almost impossible to get that from books alone. Hopefully someday somebody will construct a 3D computer simulation so that one can get a better idea of the sight lines etc...without having to travel to KwaZulu/Natal.

It is easy to tell when somebody is trying clarify and elucidate as opposed to the reverse. You are quite clearly trying to do the former and have increased my understanding of the battle with your analysis and other contributions -- so thank you for that -- I am grateful! - 6pdr

Springbok. You have taken my post out of context. I wasn't ridiculing you. I was pointing out that you are passionate like Mike Snook, that your views cannot be changed. Which shows you have a passion beyond most interested in this subject.

As far as someone telling you where to stick your photos, that's just one member. As we say back in the UK. Sticks & Stones.

Some debates to get heated, but that's wat debates do when an agreement cannot be reach.

springbok9 wrote:

CTSG
Yep stand by what I said about Durnfords actions. But I dont believe he can be pilloried alone, that belief extends to Chelmsford as you know.
I dont believe I have ever discounted Smith Doreans account. The status of the man demands that we accept his word, however time does affect our perceptions of time and order and for that reason SD has to be read with the other accounts and not in isolation. I dont believe that any account can be used as a stand alone.
And it terms of that cross comparison when four seperate people say the same thing you pay attention. And Staffords account is backed up, it cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Its highly possible that he shouldnt have left, he made a judgement call based on his information on the table. Wrong or right, thats open to debate ( as has been the case for 130 odd years ) . However this debate mixes up a couple of issues.
Did he have the right to leave.
Was he morally right to leave.
Did he make the wrong judgement call.
Would it have made any difference if he had stayed. This could be extrapolated yet again into the full realms of fantasy.
Would the attack then have taken place.
Would the camp have moved
Would the zulu have attacked the column on the move
My contentions are, yes he had the right to leave.
Yes he was morally right to leave
Without a doubt he did, however he acted on the information at hand. I believe he should have waited for Raw or one of the other scouting parties to report back before he left. That would have changed his mind.
According to all of his detractors he was a crap soldier, so he wouldnt have made and difference. B ut try any of the extrapolations before answering that.

Excellent post Springy, well said as usual.
I think this is all we non-Durnford-blamers are saying!

Hi All.
Littlehand I'm not ridiculing you either , but you are as much inflexible as you think Springbok maybe .
Cheers 90th.

90th you know only to well that debates regarding Isandlwana always ended up with someone getting wounded. And others licking their wounds.

All.

We are all members of this great forum because we all share something in common, and that my friends is that we are all fascinated by The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879.

Whether this interest was as a result of watching the films Zulu or Zulu Dawn, or by having a relative that fought in the war, or by reading a good book, or for whatever other reason. It is this interest in the subject that has brought us all together, and we share information and ideas with each other via this forum, and many of us become friends even though we have never met, and in most cases are not likely to ever meet each other.

Sometimes there are disagreements or differences of opinions, and the heat can rise a little, often at times to boiling point. But let us all not forget that this is a public forum, and many people can read the comments made by members, so being civil with each other is of great value and importance, as we don't want to give the public the wrong impression of our 'Band of brothers'.

Many recent members have joined because they have heard of the warm welcome and the friendliness of the forum members, and of course because of some of the great banter that comes into play from time to time. So come on chaps, let us keep this forum the best on the web, disagree or have a difference of opinion by all means, but let us keep it civil, and let us all remain firm friends, after all, we do share the same interest.

Hi CTSG.
True , :lol: . An old saying ... The first casualty of war , is the truth ! , seems rather profound looking at the AZW doesnt it
Cheers 90th.

Agreed 90th, there were lots of casualties in this short, sharp, conflict and i reckon the truth was one of them.

However, there are certain facts that can't be denied. The extraordinary bravery, companionship and sheer guts of the warriors on both sides for example. This is something that even today, the Zulu people, the colonials, and the British (apologies to those I've missed out) are extremely proud of and still continue to find fascinating.

But you sometimes got those that coundn't stand the heat, so they deserted.

littlehand wrote:

But you sometimes got those that coundn't stand the heat, so they deserted.

You're always going to get a tiny minority of those LH, but they are not typical.

We can't stand in judgement of the so called deserters.
Anderson, who was mentioned on here the other night and was shot deserting RD, was over run with fever. Who knows what the other deserters' stories were.
Interesting that of the 306 names on the "shot at dawn memorial" only ONE is an officer. Whereas at iSandlwana, the mounted officers fled in their droves.
At least one of those executed in WW1 by his own side was decorated for bravery 3 times. He had initially been turned down when he volunteered in 1914, but persisted and nagged the army until they gave in and recruited him. A brave man, shot for so called desertion. Imagine what he must have gone through?

Quote :

Whereas at iSandlwana, the mounted officers fled in their droves.

I said something along he same lines once. Was told that they saw all was lost, so they left.

I remember that

Quote :

I said something along he same lines once. Was told that they saw all was lost, so they left.

Sauve qui peut: '(let him) save (himself) who can'; every man for himself; rout.

Littlehand and others .
Agree with Tasker , throughout history there has been countless instances of people leaving their posts in the heat of battle , why do you think that those at Isandlwana are any different ?. Once the known outcome was perfectly clear , it's human nature for our survival instinct to take over , fleeing being the option , but it wasnt a realistic option as the troops didnt realise what they had to overcome ( Those at Isandlwana ) to actually get away !. I'm sure if we were there many of us would've attempted to survive one way or the other , hope this makes sense !.
Cheers 90th.

" I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are killed"

Littlehand .
Of the 5 officers that escaped , none were line officers , so it wasnt as if they were duty bound to stay with their men , the fact is they didnt have any of ' their ' own men . The only possible exception was Curling but as nearly all the RA men were killed attempting to flee why couldnt he ? .
90th.

As for |Curling - there is a long tradition in the British Army of "Saving The Guns" as important as saving the colours.

AT times they were rewarded with gallentry medals including the VC
from memory _
Toombs troop - indian Mutiny
E/B RHA at Maiwand - arguably no different from Isandlwana - 2VCs Q Battery - Sannas Post - Boer war - 4VC's

Not only was curling entitled to try and save the guns he probably would have been given the VC if he had gottent them off the battlefield

An officer is an officer, and should behave like one. Men look to the officers for guildence during their hour of need. How many of the 24th escaped

littlehand wrote:

" I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are killed"

I agree that it would be extremely troubling if on a contemporary battlefield the officers all fled from an encirclement via helicopter or whatever. But the fact is that officers often supplied their own mounts, and many bought an extra one if they did not like what they were issued. The British Army was a deeply stratified institution which had only recently digested reforms that put an end to purchasing commissions. It was also more or less a profit making institution -- or at the very least intended to break even in its theater of operation. (That is why the British were CONSTANTLY chasing after Zulu cattle and other livestock. Chelmsford had to make his campaign PAY.) So, I think if you understand the way that class-based society (and its army) works, you aren't very surprised to see a disproportionate number of officers get off the battlefield alive. They definitely had material advantages like pistols, swords and horses.

Once the sauve qui peut threshold is breached, its 'catch as catch can' of course, but the men who owned horses, knew where they were located, and were close enough to make a beeline had a huge survival advantage. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions there don't seem to be many accusations of cowardice in memoirs and letters after the battle. Certainly SmithDorrrien makes no mention of haviing to defend himself socially. I believe one of the bereaved wives made a very cutting comment about Pulleine hiding under a wagon or something years later. (Correct me if my memory has failed me please.)

OTOH, I have often wondered what the sobriquet, "Lucky Essex" really said about him however...as he had a penchant for surviving disasters that makes one wonder whether you really wanted to be around that guy.

Chard1879 wrote:

An officer is an officer, and should behave like one. Men look to the officers for guildence during their hour of need. How many of the 24th escaped

Ah, so you must be a big Durnford fan then, eh?

I hear you Chard - but it is not like Curling or Smith to that matter just got on their horses and rode off- They tried to rescue the guns and their men who where on the carriages.

trying to lead your men from certain death seems like pretty good officer stuff to me!!

SergioD wrote:

it is not like Curling or Smith to that matter just got on their horses and rode off-

In fact, the only possible professional criticism of their conduct was that they stood to their guns TOO LONG. After two final rounds of canister they were virtually overrun, one men being speared on the same conveyance occupied by Curling. How much more "with his men" is it possible to be?! Some of these discussions become absurd.

littlehand wrote:

" I don't like the idea of officers escaping on horseback when their men on foot are killed"

Have to agree with LH. I like to think, I would like to hope, that I would have stayed and fell with my men.

Does anyone know the name of the officer who wrote this....

--Unknown British officer in a letter describing the battle of Isandlwana

"On 22 January 1879, British colonial forces clashed with native Zulu warriors at the mountain of Isandlwana in Zululand. Though armed with far superior weaponry, the British were vastly outnumbered and could not overcome the Zulu enemy, dying almost to a man in valiant last stands along the sloping plains at the base of the mountain. However, the defeat was not a simple case of being outnumbered. Commanders on both sides made critical leadership decisions that contributed to the outcome. For the Zulu, these were good decisions; for the British, fatal ones. The resounding victory for the Zulu at the Battle of Isandlwana demonstrates how the proper employment of the military principles of mass and surprise can contribute to military success. The outcome of the battle also exhibits a failure of the British leadership to adhere to the principles of mass and unity of command".

Just found this little gem from John Dunn:

"During the short time I was with Lord Chelmsford, the opinion that I formed of him was that he was a thorough gentleman and a good and brave soldier, but no general. Should this ever meet his eye, I hope he will forgive me, but the reason for my forming this opinion was that I could see that his personal pluck led him to have no regard for the safety of his men. He would select any spot for a night encampment without studying the surroundings. Another of my reasons for my opinion was that he did not keep his men sufficiently together on the line of march so much so that if the Zulus had been properly led they would have given us much trouble and out many a column up." (John Dunn, Cetywayo and the Three Generals by John Dunn p.105)

I don't necessarily agree with all of this. To me it stinks of 20-20 hindsight, like the account left by Maori Browne who was probably Dunn's only rival as an opportunist...but since I stumbled upon it I thought that I'd pass it along.

You can read it for free on Google Books:
-----------------------------------------------------
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Good post, but none of us would expect him to give a glowing account of Lord Chelmsford.

John wrote:

Good post, but none of us would expect him to give a glowing account of Lord Chelmsford.

Sometimes it seems the main reason he published the book was to document all the debts Chelmsford incurred to him, promised to pay, and did not. Dunn repeatedly states the he didn't wish to be actively involved in the fight against Cetshwayo but in the end, he always did so if he could negotiate a suitable rate of compensation. Virtually everything he did on either side of the Tugela, he seems to have expected to be paid/compensated for so it's believable that he wasn't much liked, and also that LC might have stiffed him on those grounds. It's definitely not a pretty picture that their financial disputes were documented in a book after the war this way.

He didn't do bad...

"

Quote :

On 1st September 1879, Independent Zululand ceased to exist as Britain carved up her spoils of war. John Dunn became one of thirteen "Kinglets" when one fifth of Zululand was given to him by the British Government, adding to his already substantial land holdings.
John administered Dunnsland effectively and efficiently. Employing senior officials from all walks of life, awarding his 6,000 plus subjects, the security of a politically and economically stable environment.

The hunting fraternity adored his lavish hospitality. His reputation spread throughout Europe, bringing in its wake, many influential people to enjoy a unique cross-cultural experience as guest of the "White Chief of Zululand".
Meanwhile Cetshwayo, still in exile, became extremely bitter towards the friend whom he considered had betrayed him. He mistakenly believed John to be behind a powerful conspiracy opposing his return to power. He longed to reclaim his throne and in 1882, the British authorities allowed him to travel to England to plead his case before Queen Victoria. The queen was fascinated by him; she later described their meeting as "enjoyable". Cetshwayo; originally displayed to London society as a curiosity, became the darling of the press; his quiet charm winning the hearts of the British people.

On 10th January 1883, the much maligned Cetshwayo was unceremoniously restored to his Zulu throne. But his victory was to be fleeting: barely a year later, Cetshwayo died at Eshowe, an embittered victim of British bureaucracy.
John Dunn wept; bitterly regretting the passing of the single most influential man in his life. Though estranged, the umbilical cord that had bound the two men in friendship and affection, had remained intact."

When walking past the huge yachts in Monaco with Mrs Tasker224 a few years ago, I wondered why I didn't, in fact couldn't own one.
I asked Mrs Tasker224 what we had done wrong and why we didn't own a huge yacht.
She thought for what appeared to be a long time, but in reality it was only perhaps 30-40 seconds, then replied "nothing."

And she was right! We had done nothing wrong!

And we still haven't, and we still don't own a yacht!

Well you won't get nothing if you don't do nothing, nothing is for free. You just need to work harder.

littlehand wrote:

Well you won't get nothing if you don't do nothing, nothing is for free. You just need to work harder.

If you offer mates rates on your sunseeker LH, PM me :lol:

Mates are like wifes,, They cost money.

littlehand wrote:

Mates are like wifes,, They cost money.

Tight-wad! :lol:

I am coming back to just one conclusion really.
A loss like iSandlwana can not be blamed on one man alone, but a whole raft of failings from several men.
And Crealock's subtle mistake, played a much bigger part in it than I had first thought.
LC had intended for Durnford to strengthen the camp, but Crealock somewhat carelessly failed to relay this intention to Durnford.

No!! Crealock send his own order to Dunford, not the one he was told to send. Pulleine was fully aware of what was expected of Durnford. It was Durnford who didn't know what was expected of himself! Because of Crealock.

littlehand wrote:

No!! Crealock send his own order to Dunford, not the one he was told to send. Pulleine was fully aware of what was expected of Durnford. It was Durnford who didn't know what was expected of himself! Because of Crealock.

1st Witness.— Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B., operating against the Zulus. The General commanding accompanied this Column from the time it crossed the border into Zululand.
On the 20th January, 1879, ............................
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Unless I am misinterpreting this, Clery seems to say that Chelmsford wanted Clery to write to Durnford to ask him to bring up his column to "strengthen" the camp. LC then changes is mind and asks Crealock to do it; Crealock writes the order but leaves out the crucial detail of LC's intention of asking Durnford to come up and "strengthen" the camp?

You have got it 100% if Durnford had received the original order, Durnford would have known what was expected of him.

It was Crealock's order that set the wheels turning for the down fall of the camp. He missed out that one little word. The one word, that may have led to Durnford to start fortifying instead of leaving the camp.

But how would Pulleine have known what was expected of Durnford, The order was sent to Durnford.

Perhaps Pascal can start a new thead:

"Crealock, was he capable?"

I think Crealock is one that he hasn't picked on yet.

Good question. Impi.

Clery states.

"I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it."

This is what Pulleine expected Durnford to do!

Clear to see. I was going to say, perhaps LC should have checked it before Crealock sent it. But i guess he was to busy putting together his plan to assist Major Dartnell...