The missing five hours.

Are the maps associated with this document accurate. Or are the errors in the placements over the various events.

It's OK looking at the maps, but one needs to visit the areas inquestion, to understand the reasoning behind the map. Does anyone disagree with the maps?

Hi 24th
The topography has changed, the Nqutu/Babanango road now cuts across the ngwebini stream and the end of the iThusi ridge where it joined onto Mbaso hill is now a cutting to allow passage for that road. In addition there is now a road that leads from the end of mabaso to isandlwana. So yes there are some significant changes but overall the maps are accurate in terms of distance and format.
Last year I walked the route from the Ngwebibi stream over the point X ridge to isandlwana, afterwards with an ice cold beer sitting at the lodge I re read TMFH, it works for me.

Cheers

Hi Springy .
When are you going back and are you allowed ? :[url=http://ww 
Cheers 90th.  

Of course he will go back, he's a stubborn old boer!

There is something on his mind with regards to the locations of the various last stands, and Zulu movements. He feels something is not quite right, and that's what keeps taking him back. That's why many are looking forward to his new book. In the UK we called it obsession!  

Hi CTSG .
I'm glad you spelt Boer correctly ! :[url=http://ww  :[url=http://ww . Springy may have got a little upset ! Hhahahahahaha.
90th.

Ah yes, trip is planed for October.
The app is scheduled for release in September so I want to go up and test it, plus start work on the next one.
Not stuborn just stupid!

Cheers:[url=http://ww 

Stubborn old Boer?  

Wrong CTSG, Springy is a proud Red Rose Lancastrian  


Springy.

You mind what you are doing my friend, you have had a few scares just lately.

Hi Martin.
I think you'll find our old mate Springy is only Red Rose Lancastrian in Biology only ! . He's more Sth African / Boer than anything else I suspect ! . :[url=http://ww  :[url=http://ww .
Cheers 90th.

I think the name and avatar says it all gents.
 

:[url=http://ww 

Nice one 90th, but it's still nice to know that our old buddy springy's roots are from The Red Rose County.

But you might be right mate judging by the flag on his avatar. :[url=http://ww 

   Springy .
90th.

:[url=http://ww 

Post's crossed springy mate.

So is now accepted that the X on map 2 is the place where the Zulus were found, and not in the Ngwebeni Valley?

If you read Keith Smiths publication. It ends

" On the basis of all the evidence then, it would seem that the orthodox view should prevail. There is no evidence that the Zulu bivouac was anywhere other that where the Zulu said it was: in the Ngwebeni valley below Mabaso Hill."




So it appears that some do not accept it. 

The question for me is. What did the Zulu have to gain, by saying they were in the Ngwebeni Valley, when they wasn't. 

My guess would be, to hide the fact they.were planning to attack on the 22nd.

OK. Raw departed Isandlwana camp at about 11 a.m. ( Springbok how far in the Ngwebeni valley from Isandlwana?) 


There had been loads from reports and sightings of large masses of  Zulus moving towards and around Isnadlwana. I think it was Chard who estimated in his sighting around 7000. 


Does Raw not mentioned where he found them?  


Of course it could be that the Zulus had been in the Ngwebeni valley and hid, And on seeing LC moving out with half the force took the opertunity and commenced in surround the camp. Therefore there claim to have been in the valley would be true. Perhaps Raw stumbled on them where X marks the spot, but surly we still couldn't be talking 20000 warriors hidden where X marks the spot, possibly small a portion.  

Was it not estimated 30000 + Zulus at Isandlwana  

Possibly I have heard 30000.

This I think is the first report! TMFH.

Trooper Barker, Natal Carbineers.

“ ……[we] arrived on the hill [assessed to be Qwabe] about sunrise [0522 hrs] After being posted about a quarter of an hour we noticed a lot of mounted men in the distance and on their coming nearer we saw that they were trying to surround us….. we discovered they were Zulus. We retired to Lieut. Scott about two miles nearer the camp [assessed to be Conical Hill] and informed him of what we had seen, and he decided to come back with us but before we had gone far we saw Zulus on the hill we had just left and others advancing from the left flank  [an area including iThusi Valley] where two other videttes (sic), Whitelaw and another had been obliged to retire from. Whitelaw reported, a large army advancing ‘thousands’ I remember him distinctly saying ….this would be about eight a.m.”
…….. shortly afterwards numbers of Zulus being seen on all the hills to the left front.”  1

"A lot of mounted men" never heard that before, where did they go after this encounter? There were no mounted Zulu units at RD  

That would be one for our experts.  

I'm off to look for anything on "Raw" 

John do you have a copy or link to this publication you mentioned by K. Smith!

The knowledge I gain was that Lt. Raw stumbled on 20,000 Zulus sitting around in the Ngwebeni Valley.

Commander Howse

Raw said, "We left the camp proceeding over the hills, (Nqutu Plateau) Captain George Shepstone
going with us. The enemy in small groups retiring before us for some time, drawing us on
for four or five miles from the camp where they turned and fell upon us, the whole army
showing itself from behind a hill in front of where they had evidently been waiting."

Mr. Hamar said, After going some little way, we tried to capture some cattle. They disappeared over a
ridge and on coming up, we saw the Zulus, like ants in front of us, in perfect order and as
quiet as mice, and stretched across in an even line. We estimated those we saw at 12,000."

Commander Howse

Hi All. the situation was fluid in the extreme.but,remember the
temperament of the Zulu..masters of camouflage.imbued with
an array of Mutti and total resistance to a previous Allie's invading
their sovereign territory with the most unlikely concoction of unjust
charges ie, smith and dieghton, sihayo, and completely disregarding
ultimately the findings of the boundary commission.

What Peter and Ron suggest completely alters the perception of the
battle of isandhlwana as we who have studied it for many years, have
grown to perceive it as correct history. so who is right. i suggest who
is wrong...the british..colonialism,imperialism,the Zulu were and remain
the ONLY moral victors in all of that.5 hours..we should not of been there
for 5 minutes.special service nut jobs.abolishment of service created a
very desperate breed of a man of their times,advancement above all...

Ilove this subject,i suspect i be will fascinated for all time, but i end by say-
ing again..the African wars were about in the end Diamonds and Gold and
the poor Zulu suffer even today..mine workers last year.
God bless you Madima, and your wonderful country.all opinions are my own.
cheers xhosa2000

John
That takes the Keith Smith line out of context. There is no argument from Lock and Quantrill that the Zulu spent the night in the Ngwebini Valley. Their contention is that they moved out of that valley and were seen from point X. Keiths articles agree pretty substantally with the thesis.
Keith wrote a paper 'The Zulu Bivouac', since been grouped with others and published as "Studies in the Zulu War'. He also explores the same issue in his,'Select Documents-A zulu war source book.'
Commander Howse
The other eye witness account is Nyanda
CTSG
Chelmsford saw a group of mounted men on the late afternoon of the 21st ( it was then he remarked that he wanted to explore that area more fully on the 22nd, Crealock, unfortunatly Dartnels messages stopped him). There were also groups of horsemen harrasing the piquets the morning of the 22nd ( Whitelaw). Knowing his fondness for horses its highly probable they were Dabulamanzis men.
CTSG
The timing to get to the valley and back to the camp just doesnt work, and a big plus is that it doesnt fit the general descriptions.

I dont think there are to many voices disagreeing with L and Q, in broad principle that is. The main objections Ive come across in conversation have been: The authorship of the notes on the map ( Wood or Henderson): The position of the reserve: And the line of attack of the left chest and right horn.

Cheers

Perhaps the whole artical should be read. Here's the link I have. 

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Hi John
So having read Keith Smiths article would you agree that it doesnt conflict with L and Q?

Cheers

xhosa
A story I told to 90th in an e mail some time ago.

For me one of lifes great pleasures is not just wondering around the battlefields, but absorbing the atmosphere. I very very often get an ice cold bottle of Chardonnay from the hotel, some sandwiches and biltong and go and sit someplace and just contemplate and visualise. Last August I sat on the side of Mgaga Knoll, around half way up, looking North over the plain towards Mabaso hill thinking of the route the various regiments would have taken chasing Raw, Roberts etc.
Just below me a rather eldery Zulu stopped and looked up at me and gave a friendly wave of his cane so I returned the guesture. he slowly made his way up the hill and with all the politeness and respect of his generation enquired if everything was OK, all in fair English/Afrikaans. I told him what i was doing there while all the time he was looking at the Glistening Chardonay bottle in its cooler, it was a hot day. I offered him a sandwich, he accepted and we started talking of the battle, down he sat all the time he watched the bottle and my glass. I talked of the path the left wing and the chest had taken, and he disagreed, very animated he started to point and talk, then coughed rather pointedly looking at my glass. I gave him my coffee cup with some wine, it was consumed in a flash, and lubricated his throat perfectly.
We sat for an hour, drinking the wine, eating the sandwiches, not the biltong he had no teeth.
By the time the wine was gone he had described in minute detail exactly where each regiment had come from the route they travelled the destruction of the impis and the attack.
When he finished we sat for probably close to twenty minutes in total companionable silence then he stood up and we shook hands, the double shake which is the african way, and he saunted of down the hill. When he reached the bottom, he stamped his foot and called out 'Bayete'! A salute. And wondered of.

The point of a long winded and probably boring story is that he had described the whole saga of the Missing Five Hours Theory, with some differences! But in essence it was all there.
Oh yes he totally disagreed with me on the aproach around the back of Magaga by the uThulwana.............but thats another story.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Hi John
So having read Keith Smiths article would you agree that it doesnt conflict with L and Q?

Cheers

Yes, there seems to be a few thinking along the same lines. I'm about to read Adrian Greaves's artical, here's an extract to give you some idea. 

We have three articals, basically saying the same thing. Which one was published first?

Extract. Overview of the document I'm about to read! 

"The purpose of this article is to show how the Zulu army deployed during the night and early hours of the 22nd January. In my humble opinion, the theory of Lt. Raw finding the Zulu army six miles away in the Ngwebeni Valley at 11a.m., with all the warriors sitting on their shields, doesn‟t tally in any way with any of the above quoted reports which indicate that by 11a.m. on the 22nd January 1879 the Zulu army was under way to attack the British camp at Isandlwana. I believe the Zulu attack was too perfect to have been undertaken by chance; it was no mean feat to advance 25,000 warriors, with no battle experience, along a ten mile front with hills and valleys in between. My research indicates their attack was a well planned and highly coordinated attack against a confused and unprepared British position. I have based my theory on written accounts of British and European survivors: there are no written accounts from the Zulus who took part because their language was oral and not written. The few Zulu accounts ever committed to paper were from Zulus frightened for their safety or from the handful of Zulus who became pro-British. Their accounts were recorded by the British. I rest my case."
 

John, the publication you mention by Adrian Greaves, is it in a book, or are you able to post a link. 

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]
Let me know what you think. 
 
I think we can rule out the cock & bull story about not attacking on the 22nd. They were prime and ready to go, if not the night before,certainly not long after LC split. But I don't believe the Zulu' s decoyed LC. The Zulu's just got lucky and took advantage!

The knowledge I obtain was that the Zulus were going to attack the 23 of January 1879. The argument was why were Zulus seen around the camp if they were going to attack the next day. It was because the Ngwebeni Valley was not wide enough and the right horn had to redeploy to another location. When they were redeploying the main body heard shots from LC's fighting to the Southeast and thought the right horn was under attack so they started the attack. They were quickly stopped and told to go back that they were not under attack. The right horn saw the movement of the main body and started their attack but saw that they stopped and they fell back but not before being spotted by several men including Lt Chard.

This revealing caused Durnford to send out scouts after arriving at the camp, which resulted in the scouts finding the main body of the Zulu's army causing a premature attack on the 22 of Janurary 1879.

Commander Howse

Why did they attack Pearson column at Inyezane. Didn't the New moon theory apply to that Impi? Perhaps LC leaving Isandlwana, was an annoyance rather than a stroke of luck. The Zulus possibley wanted to attack the whole of the third column planned for the 22nd.

All Zulus said the attack on Isandlwana was always planned for the 23rd. Why would they lie, unless they do not want to be seen as the aggressors. Some more information I obtain was that on the 22 they were going to send diplomats to the camp for one last chance to avoid a war.

Commander Howse

The theory behind not wanting to attack on the 22nd was to do with the new moon? So my question still stands. "Why attack Pearsons Column" on the.22nd.

John, to answer your question, the British column forced that action too.  


Commander Howse

Sir SIR,
    I HAVE the honour to report my arrival here at 10 A.M. this day, with the column under my command, and, I am happy to state, without a casualty of any kind—except, of course, those which occurred in the engagement of yesterday, of which I have already duly informed you by telegram, despatched yesterday evening.
   Yesterday morning, the mounted troops which preceded the column under Major Barrow, had crossed the Inyezane River—which is about four miles from our camping ground on the previous night—when I received a note from him to say that he had selected a fairly open space for a halting place, which he had carefully vedetted. I at once rode forward, to reconnoitre, and found the ground covered with more bush than seemed desirable for an outspan ; but as there was no water between the Inyezane and the places where we bivouacked last night—four miles further on, and with several steep hills to climb—I decided upon outspanning for a couple of hours, to feed and rest the oxen, and to enable the men to breakfast.
    It was then just eight o'clock, and I was in the act of giving directions about the pickets and scouts required for our protection, and the wagons had already begun to park, when the leading company of the Native Contingent, who were scouting in front—personally directed by Captain Hart, Staff Officer to the Officer commanding that Regiment — discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges in our front, and making for the clumps of bush around us.
    The Zulus at once opened a heavy fire upon the men of the company who had shown themselves in the open, and they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and three men killed, almost immediately after the firing began. Unfortunately, owing to scarcely any of the officers or non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent being able to speak Kafir, and some not even English (there are several foreigners among them), it has been found most difficult to communicate orders, and it is to be feared that these men who lost their lives by gallantly holding their ground did so under the impression that it was the duty of the contingent to fight in the first line, instead of scouting only, and, after an engagement, to pursue.
   I must add, however, that every exertion has been made by Major Graves, Commandant Nettleton, and Captain Hart, to explain to both the officers and men the duties expected of them. These officers, indeed, have been indefatigable in their exertions.
   As soon as the firing commenced, I directed the Naval Brigade, under Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd's division of guns, and Captain Jackson's and Lieutenant Martin's companies of the Buffs, to take up a position on a knoll close by the road (and under which they were halted), and from whence the whole of the Zulu advances could be seen and dealt with.
   Meanwhile, the wagons continued to park, and as soon as the length of the column had thereby sufficiently decreased, I directed the two companies of the Buffs, which were guarding the wagons about half way down the column, to clear the enemy out of the bush, which had been already shelled, and fired into with rockets and musketry, by the troops on the knoll above-mentioned. These companies, led by Captains Harrison and Wyld, and guided by Captain Macgregor, D.A.Q.M.G., whom I sent back for this purpose, moved out in excellent order, and quickly getting into skirmishing order, brought their right shoulders gradually forward, and drove the Zulus before them back into the open, which again exposed them to the rockets, shells, and musketry from the knoll.
   This movement released the main body of the Mounted Infantry and Volunteers, who, with the Company of Royal Engineers, had remained near the Inyezane, to protect that portion of the convoy of wagons. -The Royal Engineers happened to be working at the drift when the engagement began.
   When thus released, both the Engineers and Mounted Troops, under Captain Wynne and Major Barrow, respectively moved forward with the infantry. Skirmishers on the left of the latter, the whole being supported by a half-company of the Buffs and a half-company of the 99th Regiment, sent out by Lieutenant-Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, who with the rear of the column, was now coming up.
    About this time the enemy was observed by Commander Campbell lo be trying to outflank our left, and he offered to go with a portion of the Naval Brigade to drive away a body of Zulus who had got possession of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, and which was helping their turning movement. The Naval Brigade was supported by a party of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent, under Captain Hart, who were posted on high ground on the left of the Etshowe Road, and who checked the Zulus from making any further attempt on our left.
   Shortly afterwards, when the kraal was evacuated, Commander Campbell suggested that the enemy should be driven off still further, to which I at once assented, and I desired Colonel Parnell to take Captain Forster's company, the Buffs, which up to this time had remained at the foot of the knoll, and assist the Naval Brigade to attack some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable body of Zulus were still posted.
   The action was completely successful, and the Zulus now fled in all directions, both from our front and left, and before the skirmishers on the right.
    I now ordered the column to be reformed, and at noon we resumed our march, and bivouacked for the night on the ground described in the first part of my letter.
   The last shot I fired was about half-past 9 A.M. I enclose a list of the killed and wounded, and, in addition, I beg to state that both Colonel Parnell and myself had our horses shot under us.
The loss of the enemy I can, of course, only approximately give. By all accounts, however — and I have taken every pains to verify and confirm the statements made—upwards of 300 Zulus were killed. The wounded, if there were any, were either carried off or hid in the bush, as only two were found. The dead were lying about in heaps of seven and eight, and in one place ten dead bodies were found close together. At another 35 were counted within a very small space.
    As far as I can ascertain, the numbers opposed to us were about 4,000, composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and the Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district.
    I had already been warned, through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and other sources, that I might expect to be attacked at any moment after crossing the Umsindusi River, but the number of Zulus stated to be in the neighbourhood was estimated at about 8,000.
    All the commanding officers speak highly of the behaviour of their men during the engagement, and of the coolness of the officers and the pains taken by them to control the expenditure of ammunition.
   This I can personally vouch for as regards troops on the knoll, as I was present with them the whole time. The practice made by Lieutenant Loyd's guns, and by the rockets of the Naval Brigade, directed by Mr. Cotter, boatswain of H.M.S. "Active," was  excellent, and no doubt contributed materially to the success of the day.
   Major Barrow particularly wishes me to mention the steadiness and good conduct under fire of the Natal Mounted Volunteer Corps. Those engaged were the Victoria and Stanger Mounted Rifles and the Natal Hussars.
    Of the commanding officers themselves I have already, spoken.
    From the officers of 017 staff, Colonel Walker J.B., Captain MacGregor, and Lieutenant knight, the Buffs,—my orderly officer—I have received every assistance, not only during yesterday's engagement, but ever since they joined me.
   I cannot speak too highly of the energy and attention to their duties of Staff-Surgeon Norbury, R.N., my Senior Medical Officer, and his assistants. The field hospital was established in a convenient place, almost immediately after the firing began, and the wounded received every attention.
  Lastly, I wish to report the good example shown to the Native Pioneers by Captain Beddoes and Lieutenant Porrington, who, throughout our march, under the direction of Lieutenant Main, R.E., repaired our road in front, and during the engagement remained on the knoll, fighting rifle in hand.
   I must apologise for the great length of this letter ; but as the present is the first campaign of British troops against the Zulus, and as the Natal natives were being tested as soldiers for the first time, I have purposely gone into details. Should we again be engaged with the enemy there will, of course, be no further necessity for describing everything so minutely.
  To-morrow morning I propose sending two companies of the Buffs, two companies of the Native Contingent, and a small number of mounted men, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, left behind for the purpose, is now on his way to Etshowe, with a convoy of 60 commissariat wagons.
   I have written to request Colonel Ely not to advance beyond the Umsindusi till reinforced.
  On Saturday, Major Coates starts for the Tugela with 50 empty wagons, escorted by four companies infantry, two native companies, and a few troopers to bring up more stores.
  I enclose a couple of sketches of the ground on which the engagement took place, made by Captain McGregor and Lieutenant Knight, from memory.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
C. K. PEARSON,
Colonel.

Lieutenant Hart and his NNC saw a small force of Zulus and chased after them and ended up running into the left horn which initiated the attack.

Commander Howse

copy of the official report from Commander Campbell, Naval Brigade, of the action on 22nd 


    22nd, 5 A.M. marched. After passing 5 miles along a fertile valley the path turns, suddenly to the left, and the ascent of the high land on which Ekowe is situated commences, the head of the column reached this turning, and was preparing to halt for breakfast, when it was suddenly attacked along the entire right flank and on both fronts by the enemy, who had evidently been lying concealed in the bushes; they boldly advanced to within 150 yards in extended order rushing from bush to bush and firing with great rapidity. Two 7-prs. Royal Artillery and two 24-prs. Naval Brigade rockets were placed on a knoll at the foot of the pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was proceeding, these supported-by two companies of the Buffs and A and B Companies of Naval Brigade opened a heavy fire on the enemy, checking their advance. This knoll continued to be the head quarters of the column during the engagement.
   From head quarters to the head of the pass, the road or path to Ekowe leads along the top of a low ridge for about a mile; this ridge is commanded on both sides by two higher ridges running parallel to it and distant 800 to 1,000 yards. On these high ridges the enemy were posted in large numbers, they also occupied a position B, 300 yards from head quarters on the same ridge, and had commenced to open fire from this latter post when a well directed rocket from the Naval Brigade was driven right through the Kraal B instantly expelling the enemy.
6. Having been instructed to defend this part of the position I advanced A .and a part of B Companies of the " Active's" men in skirmishing order along the ridge above-described, leaving the remainder of B Company with the rockets, to assist in protecting the head quarter position, which throughout the day was exposed to an irritating fire from the bushes on the sides of a mountain opposite, as well as from the enemy in the plain, the colonel commanding having already had a horse killed under him.
7. My attention was now wholly directed to the advance along the ridge (see sec. 6, par. 1), along the top of which runs the track to Ekowe. Notwithstanding the heavy fire directed against our small party from front and both flanks, steady progress was made, and the enemy driven back step by step for about three-quarters of a mile, when he posted his troops for a final stand in a strong position perpendicular to the road parallel to which the Naval Brigade were slowly advancing. By this time four men of the Naval Brigade had been sent to the rear badly wounded, and another temporarily stunned by a bullet passing through his helmet, when the arrival of a company of Buffs under Colonel Parnell enabled the attack very rapidly to be pushed to within 100 yards of the Zulu position. A final rush was then made, headed by the Naval Brigade, and the position carried by assault. The first unmounted man in the enemy's position was Thomas Harding, Ordinary of H.M.S. " Active," closely followed by the remainder of A-Company, under Lieutenant Hamilton.
    Two other hills were carried as soon as the men had recovered breath, thus breaking through and driving back the right horn of the Zulu army, dispersing it in all directions, and clearing the road to Ekowe, along which the column shortly after advanced without molestation, camping for the night five miles south of that place.
   The action lasted nearly three hours, and resulted in the enemy being driven back on all sides with a loss of 300 dead; only one wounded Zulu was found on the field, so it is to be presumed the wounded were removed by their companions.
   The loss of Europeans in the engagement was eight killed and sixteen wounded, one of whom has since died.; out of the killed six were officers or non-commissioned officers of the Native Contingent; these men fought, as far as came under my notice, with great bravery, being, of course, unsupported by their men, one out of ten of whom only have fire-arms, while the Zulus appear all to be possessed of them.
    I enclose the reports of Lieutenant Dowding, commanding Royal Marine Light Infantry, and Midshipman Coker, in charge of the Gatling, both of whom were placed so far in rear that I had up opportunity of observing their movements.
    It is with greatest gratification I report the splendid behaviour of the Naval Brigade in action of 22nd instant; all were remarkably steady under fire; those employed on the ridge were exposed to a cross fire for nearly two hours, after which they responded to my call for the final assault with alacrity, and led the rush till success was secured.
  I particularly recommend Lieutenant Hamilton, whose company was in front during the action.
  Sub-Lieutenant Fraser also did good service in command of the Reserve, being under fire the whole time. Boatswain Cotter was most successful with the rockets I placed in his charge.
  Lieutenant Craigie, Gunnery Lieutenant, rendered valuable services as Acting Adjutant.
  Ekowe was reached early on 23rd, and the head quarters are expected to remain for eight or ten days before any further advance is made.
  200 men marched in the direction of the Tugela this morning, and 400 more leave tomorrow, to escort convoys; reports have reached that attacks have been made on these.
  The force lately beaten, by the 1st Division of the Column are said to be assembled in the bush at Umlatoo River, there to attack us on advancing. It seems probable that they will not be dispersed without some loss on our side. The Zulus seem adepts at skirmishing, always in extended order; they rush from one bush to another, delivering their fire, and then retiring under cover to load. It requires a good marksman to bring them down. Nothing like the masses of men spoken of as composing their armies has been seen, and they show no disposition to meet us in the open, but confine themselves to taking us at a disadvantage as on the 22nd instant.
  The enemy have unfortunately carried off the six Martini-Henry rifles and ammunition of the Europeans of the Native Contingent killed; doubtless these will be used against us with effect in the next action.
I trust my proceedings may meet your approval.
I have &c.,
(Signed) H. FLETCHER CAMPBELL,
 Commanding Naval Brigade.

I beg to recommend to your notice, E. White, Principal Officer First Class, who continued to fight after having been struck by a ball. E. Futcher, Principal Officer First Class, took a leading part in the movements.
Thomas Harding, Ordinary, the first unmounted man in enemy's position.

Inyezana, January 23, 1879.

SIR,
    I HAVE the honour to report that in accordance with orders, I marched the Marines from the camping ground near the Amatikulu, on the morning  of the 22nd inst. in rear of the Gatling gun.
After marching about; 2½ hours we heard rapid firing commencing at the front of the column; almost at the same instant an officer of the Native Contingent rode up to me, reporting that the enemy were in large numbers on our right. Immediately told Captain Forster of the Buffs, who was in command of the rear guard.
    He ordered us to extend on the right flank of the wagons, at the same time the Gatling gun was brought into action. I advanced the Marines in line with a Company of the Buffs under Captain Foster, but owing to the height of the reeds and bush we only occasionally got a glimpse of the enemy about 400 yards in front of us, and apparently, in large numbers. They appeared to be trying to get round the rear of the column. I was able occasionally to open fire at them on arriving at the edge of the reeds.
   After advancing in this way about a quarter of a mile, we found another company of the Buffs, moving from the front of the column, and some 300 yards to our front. I therefore at once moved  my men back on the Gatling gun, and made my way at once to the Head Quarter Staff, and reported my arrival to Colonel Pearson.
    He ordered Mr. Coker to bring up the Gatling gun at once. I was told to place my men at the top of the hill to the left of the Gatling gun, when I at once opened fire on the enemy, who were keeping up a fairly continuous fire in our direction. The Gatling gun shortly opening fire on our right; after about a quarter of an hour Mr. Craigie rode up with half of " B " Company, saying he had orders to bring up the rest of the Naval Brigade to support " A" Company, and as the Gatling gun was now well guarded, I at once joined him with the Marines.
   We moved rapidly along to the kraal on the top of the hill that had been already taken, where we found the remainder of" B " Company, keeping up a continuous fire at the enemy on our left, and then advanced on the main road, up a steep hill, until we joined Mr. Hamilton's men.
   The men behaved well and steadily under fire. The marching at the commencement in extended order being very heavy through the thick bush and reeds.
   The amount of ammunition expended was between 500 and 600 rounds.
I have, &c.
(Signed) TOWNLY W. DOWDING,
Lieut. Comdg. R. Marines.
H.M.S." Active "

Inyezana, January 23, 1879.

SIR,
   I HAVE the honor to report I was placed in rear of the leading column with Gatling gun. About two and a half hours after leaving the camping grounds, the head of the column was engaged. A report having come in that the Natives were threatening the rear of the column, I placed my gun on a hill, in a good position for firing if necessary.
   I brought my gun into action, but through the clumsiness of my driver, my disselboom carried away. I repaired it as quickly as possible; no natives appearing, I moved on with the wagons; owing to the disselboom I was very much delayed.
    On arriving at the foot of the hill, where the head quarters were, I was ordered by Colonel Pearson to bring, the gun up and place it opposite a hill where some natives had taken up a position.
    I immediately opened, fire on them, they retiring into the bush I ceased firing, having expended, about 300 rounds, and stationed my men to try and pick off a few natives who were annoying us considerably.
    The men behaved well under fire and worked hard to bring the gun into action.
I have, &c.
(Signed) LEWIS C. COKER.

Extract from an  Interview with Mehlokazulu Kasihayo (The Battle Of Isandlwana) 

Q: What orders were given with respect to the attack ?

A: No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first. 

Commander Howse.
Looking forward to your eyewitness accounts, that confirms the British forced the Zulus to attack them? 

The times between Pearsons attack and Isandlwana, are not that far apart! 

Coordinated.   Somewhat 

Chelmsfordthescapegoat, I am just going by that both attacks started when the British ran into the Zulu forces. The Zulus could have been already engaged in the battle before being spotted but there is no real evidence to suggest this to my knowledge. Just reports of Zulu movements before the battle. I posted earlier an explanation of that at Isandlwana, but that is speculation. I am going by the knowledge out there not by mine.

The eyewitness to the Isandlwana battle said that the battle was to be the 23rd of January but becuase the British attacked them first they were forced to fight on the 22nd. The false start of the Zulus to reveal the right horn is also mention by an eyewitness.

Commander Howse

mike snook 2


Joined: 04 Jan 2006
Posts: 870

Post Posted: Tue Sep 03, 2013 2:04 am Reply with quote

Quite so Mel....

Which self-evidently they did at around noon, in order for the serious fighting to be underway at around one. The logic of that is inescapable. They attacked either through discovery, the imminent inevitability of discovery by Nos 1 and 2 Troops, (or somebody else - see further on), or possibly as a function of a command decision springing from the army commander's acceptance that his operational level intent had been compromised by the 9-30 fiasco, when parts of the impi went off at half-cock in response to the firing across the plain. Who can say whether or not there was a council of war between the army commander and some regimental commanders (exclusive of right horn regiments) on what the implications of the 0930-ish compromise were. I can certainly accept the possibility that a deliberate attack was getting underway at around noon, parts of which had not yet started moving by that time. Other early movements included the arrival not long after first light of the flank guard, (emphatically not 'decoys'), detached the previous afternoon to deflect Dartnell, and the move of the right horn at around seven to its own hide positions on the upper plateau, which was the cause of the 0800 alarm and stand to in the camp.

As I recall it TMFH started life as a contention that the Zulus launched a deliberate attack beginning at 0730, leading me to observe that it must therefore be the slowest moving attack in the history of the Zulu empire, by an army, lest we forget, inculcated in a doctrine of rapidity of tactical manoeuvre and shock action, and that there was therefore a missing five hours to account for. I know that sarcasm is the lowest form of wit, but TMFH, having bizarrely been adopted as the title for Peter's paper, still fails to explain what exactly the Zulus were playing at for what now appears to be a missing seven hours. These days the paper appears to fixate solely on x marks the spot where the Basutos were and battlefield tours by Evelyn Wood. Its assertions that such and such a piece of evidence is unambiguous and can only be interpreted so as to accord with the author's arguments are manifestly tenuous: a great deal of the source evidence is terribly ambiguous; certainly I know from long experience of soldiering that one man's hill is another man's ridge. These days I'm no longer sure of the totality of the argument or arguments that TMFH seeks to make. What is it the Zulus were supposed to be doing under the latest construct? Leaving an optimal place of concealment for a hugely inferior one carrying an infinitely greater risk of discovery a kilometre further forward....and then what? Why? And are we seriously to believe that the British mounted vedettes had been 'driven in' to the extent that Scott, who to my mind showed all the qualities one would expect of a high grade officer, made no attempt between 0730 and 1230 to ride up through the notch and have a peek-a-boo up there, but rather hung around aimlessly on Amatutshane for hours on end and to no good effect. Soldiering ain't like that: officers of the cavalry arm, volunteers no less than regulars, are insatiably curious. It's their job. Then there is the primary source reference at contact to three bodies of horsemen...Raw Roberts and....? Scott I would suggest. I agree that there is no watertight case in support of Raw personally peeking into the Ngwebeni Valley, as Morris portrays it, and I said that, I recall, with acknowledgement to the quality of Ron and Peter's argument on that specific point, in the preface to the paperback edition of HCMDB, but by the same token there is nothing to say that Roberts, Scott (both KIA) or a handful of riders from any one of the three mounted commands didn't. And why oh why, if there was a deliberate attack underway, were there Zulus engaged in rounding up cows and ushering them back towards Ngwebeni (or anywhere else for that matter).

Never agreed with the original early deliberate attack postulation - if so why the hell didn't it happen (?), when we have the Chard sighting of large numbers of Zulus on the spur as an incontrovertible fact to incorporate into the big picture. These days I don't understand what the P.Q./R.L. big picture is meant to be. Shifting sands it seems to me. That's what I have to say on the matter, Peter. Terribly sorry if you don't like it and no offence intended.

As ever

Mike

Ron L


Joined: 05 Nov 2007
Posts: 14
Location: South Africa

Post Posted: Tue Sep 03, 2013 4:53 pm Reply with quote

Greetings Mike,

Good to hear from you, like me you have been a stranger to the Forum!

Let us conjecture that it was not the Zulu intent to attack on the 22nd. But at the moment, around 0500, when the Zulu sentinels on the ridge sent word to the commanders that more than half the camp was departing to what could be its only destination, Dartnell's bivouac, ten miles away, things changed. Here was an opportunity, an opportunity either bestowed by the ancestors; contrived by Zulu guile (decoy) or handed on a plate by Chelmsford and his staff. Take your pick. For the Zulu there was no cause for haste: the further the Chelmsford column marched from the camp, the better. Time was on the side of the Zulus. Let the remainder of the regiments make an unhurried march from Isipesi; let the commanders make an unhurried and precise a deployment as possible, a deployment, bear in mind, of a crescent shaped line of attack at least twelve miles long to be put in position with no means of communication other than runners and shouting from hilltop to hilltop.

Was it then the slowest attack in Zulu history as you suggest, Mike, or the most controlled and restrained attack in which Ntshingwayo ka Mahole outgeneralled his British rival, reaping the greatest victory in Zulu history whilst inflicting one of the most notorious defeats in the annals of the British army?

As for Scott not taking a peek-a-boo up on the escarpment, the Imperial officer in charge gave no order for him to do so. Perhaps you will say "why didn't Scott use his initiative?" The answer is the example of Durnford who earlier had done just that only to receive a severe roasting from Chelmsford with implied threats of dismissing Durnford from his command. More to the point, why didn't Chelmsford or one of his imperial officers, order Scott to take a peek-a-boo up on the escarpment after Chelsmford and Co. had seen the fourteen Zulu horsemen on Mabaso? And even more to the point, why didn't Chelmsford or Pulleine, for that matter, order a reconnaisance of the Nqutu Plateau and beyond?

Regarding your musing re. the Zulu rounding up his cows, what could be more natural for a man, having got wind of impending battle, than to protect his property? One incident along a twelve mile front! Come on Mike, you are floundering. You drench us in sarcasm and ridicule Evelyn Wood's constructive interrogation by ridiculing Wood as a tour guide! What scullduggery will you resort to next? If not constructive we are sure it will, as usual, be amusing.

Peter will reply separately.

Best wishes, Ron.

Who rattled their cages.. cheers xhosa

So the ' big guns ' have spoken..
but remember after all this
posturing, and attempts to re-
write history..where is the Zulu
voice in all this,shameful.
not cheers xhosa

CTSG
There is a hang of a distance between the two battles, good couple of hours driving time, so I dont think the coordination thing would work.

Mehlokazulus statement, plus the others is probably correct, there was no intention to attack on the 22nd, however good military commanders take advantage of situations. And the situation had changed since the army left Ulundi. I have absolutly no doubt that Ntshingwayo had told the impi they would attack on the 23rd after a days rest from the march but then after getting the early morning reports that the British had split changed his mind and moved his men into an early attack mode and out of the Ngwebini valley around Mabaso. Mehlokazulu says virtually that in his staement when he returns from his spying mission and Ntshingwayo starts to order his regiments forward.
Im allso certain the the right horn was well advance around the Ngqungoulu hills long before the Raw discovery.

Mike Snooks repartee is strong on sarcasm and weak on factual repudiation. He has made no effort whatsoever to dispute the time table or provide an alternate. TMFH theory is without a doubt all about the position of the impi when it was discovered and correcting the historical impression that the impi was relaxing in the Ngewbini valley.
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I wish I could spell supercilious properly, I would probably use it descibe the good Colonel and thats a pity because I really admire his HCMDB.

Cheers

Commander Howse wrote:

Chelmsfordthescapegoat, I am just going by that both attacks started when the British ran into the Zulu forces. The Zulus could have been already engaged in the battle before being spotted but there is no real evidence to suggest this to my knowledge. Just reports of Zulu movements before the battle. I posted earlier an explanation of that at Isandlwana, but that is speculation. I am going by the knowledge out there not by mine.

The eyewitness to the Isandlwana battle said that the battle was to be the 23rd of January but becuase the British attacked them first they were forced to fight on the 22nd. The false start of the Zulus to reveal the right horn is also mention by an eyewitness.  

. 

It's apparent in both Battles the Zulus were only ".ran into"as you say because the Zulu were trying to surround the British armies. 

Springbok what I mean by coordination. In Zulu terrm something like. 

You will attack, When the sun shines on the upside down tree that lays to the west of the old mans house who wears nylons. Along these lines. 

CTSG
Sorry mate dont agree with the high lighted para. It explains nothing really

I haven't posted any hi lighted text   Have I