The missing five hours.

Hi Frank (just before I go to work and churn out some 'Royalty' digestives for the SA market)

The idea that the Zulus let the enemy know they were for it - the 'ingomane' (probabaly spelt wrong)and stuff like that was very important - once battle was joined - when the army was advancing into combat but I do not feel any commander who not care if his army was bounced in camp.......tactically agree whole heartedly but not whilst on the march/encamped and at a disadvantage.

Imagine if Raw had not been seen, gone back and a greater force had turned up at the valley - ducks (or something - fish?) in a bucket spring to mind.

Cheers

Simon

Allways that to it Simon but don't forget it was a generation before that the Zulus last faced a White army. Lessons learned were lost in the sands of time. They were far to used to facing other tribes.

I appear to have gone off half cocked......in my haste to get you Digestives....

I have no doubt that Ntshingwayo was the best general the Zulus had and his advance to Isandlwana was faultless but his offensive scouting that I mentioned was immediately prior to Isandlwana - Mehlokazulu wandered up had a look and reported back - it does not strike me as particularly effective method - although that said other scouting parties were probably used (so perhaps that is a little unfair of me).

A chap called Zibhebhu kaMaphitha was reported as being in charge of the scouts & advance guard...

Cheers - bye

Sime

Hi Simon
The zulu army throughout the war had the same trouble as your opening line , look at the attack at Kambula ( Half Cocked ) Nyezane ( Half Cocked ) Isandlwana ( Half Cocked ) they got lucky there , numbers won the day . I don't buy the zulu decoy strategy , if they devised that decoy strategy that worked that well , why would they have conducted the war as they did ? , which , when you look at it , wasn't very well planned at all. Any digestives winging there way to Oz ?
90th

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this is a magnified view from Barry's Picquet position , looking to the so called X spot , you can see the mouth of the Ngwebeni Valley just left above centre , its the cleft which leads into the valley itself.


Image from the 90th.

Don't forget that the L and Q 'X' is not the place the Zulu were occupying it is theoretically the spot that Raw first fired on them. This is a brilliant photo that doesn't do what Gary wishes.
Slightly to the right of the rise above the village is the 'X'. What this view from the piquet position cant show however is the area below that rise, on the other side. There is a major road, farm fields, a school and the Ngwebini stream. So even from this height any impi in that hollow would be invisible. To the left, as you look however is the reputed position of the Nodwengu and the Nokenke regiments. They would be highly visible.
I have no doubt whatsoever that Barrys' force saw the impi. Vereker saw it, Higginson saw it, Essex quotes a report arriving from Mkweni ( although L and Q insist it was from a piquet on iThusi) Higginson in fact mentions that he found Barry and Vereker watching a large body.
So the question would be, if the impi was still hidden away behind Mabaso what was all the activity in the area in front of it. Are we not in danger of discounting a massive amount of evidence because our European mentality says that the impi could not have been in front of Mabaso because they should have been hidden. From Gary's photo its self evident that there was the potential for a portion of the army to be hidden.
If I was a doubter the question I would be asking would: Did Barry warn Raw etc when he joined that patrol with his NNC what they were heading into? That in essence is the crux of the debate.

Cheers
Pity that Barry never left a statement.

Sorry Gary - we don't do Digs for Oz. We send out biscuits to Australia (sold in Woolworths) but not Digestives......

I spose when the Zulus scampered out of their valley to look at the British, it gave the Zulus an unexpected opportunity to assess the British strength - as they called the alarm (and formed up in units in front of the camp?)

So despite the (what I see as a) disadvantage of revealing themselves in considerable number to the British, it did give them a chance to see what they were up against.......

I wonder what would have happened if (Lord C was there) and twice the number of troops had formed up, would the attack still have developed, as it did.....I spose it depends if you think the attack was spontaneous or pre planned......

'Course those sneaky Zulus would still have come round the back and over the nek to attack from the rear, so the outcome might have been much the same.

Hi,

Myself and Gary have 'punched ourselves out' over this one.......in the end I gave him "it would probably still be a home win" (just to make him feel happier over the 'ball tampering scandal').

There are too many variables in the situation to give a definite answer as to the victors.

Would the British have committed all the troops to the firing line or kept that most valuable of military assets - a 'reserve'......would the Chest - who in my view was in desperate straits and close to breaking have held - with a few more casualties........Would the Zulu reserve have to be committed  - winning the day, but saving RD and if so 'Zulu' would not have been made and many people would not have heard of the Zulu War?

I'm not sure......but I do wonder not about the fact that DID they attack because they knew only a 'small' force was there but instead WOULD they have attacked had they known a larger force was there......

To me the M5H (which I am a fan of - at least as much as I can understand) is not about 'x' and where a drip was but (at its basics) was the battle spontaneous or pre-planned......

Ta

Sime

Hi Simon
They attacked larger forces than that at Isandlwana at Kambula , Gingindlovhu and Ulundi , the size of the force they were up against never deterred the Zulu ! . The British Force at Ulundi , from memory was in total 3 times larger than that at Isandlwana ,
and probably had 4 times as many Imperial troops than the number at Isandlwana . If LC had stayed the Zulu were going to attack , no doubt about it , they needed a quick battle as did the British .
90th

Hi gary

Damn, I thought you'd be in bed or watching some silly sleeveless shirted rugby type game, and I'd steal the march on you.

I always feel 'uneasy' about quotes such as "no doubt about it"

I must really get this time zone thing sussed out.........

Sime

I agree the fundamental question in relation to TMFH is whether the attack on Isandhlwana was planned or spontaneous. The Zulu army were planning to attack something, and they could not sustain themselves for very long in such numbers, so speed was of the essence. The camp presented the opportunity and whatever plan they formulated to do that can only have been contrived within hours of it happening. So much more opportunistic, spontaneous and relatively uncontrolled in my book.

Steve Reinstadtler

Steve
My two pence worth. The line of advance of the Zulu was on the same line of advance as the British. The Zulu were behind Siphesi on the 20th/21st. if the British had not been so bloody slow in advancing I believe an attack would have taken place in the Mangeni Valley. If before then somewhere east of there. As it was Ntshingwayo was forced to travel further on the 21st towards the Camp at iSandlwana. Arriving there on the 21st I have no doubt that he wanted a days rest before attacking on the 23rd. As it was on the 22nd he became aware that Chelmsford had advanced, he needed then, as Gary says, a fight and so I believe he planned to advance and attack and sod the day of the Dead Moon ( It was not that important down on the Nyezane ). It was then in the process of getting his companies out of the valley, via the western gap ( as well shown in Garys/Les photo ) and was then seen in his advance position on the morning of the 22nd.
I firmly believe that was his revised and opportunistic plan to attack and take advantage of the split in the Brits. Possibly get an easy victory then hot foot it after Chelmsford and ruin his appetite with a well placed pointed stick up the Khyber.
Again just an opinion.

For the Zulus I suppose the one certainty among a whole load of variables was that Chelmsford would have to use the road. So it makes absolute sense for them to parallel that course of advance in the hills to the north. I think you are right that beyond that strategy they depended entirely on opportunities arising which they could not plan for in advance. They did not have the luxury of waiting more than a couple of days and it was fortuitous that Chelmsford was equally anxious to come to battle.

Steve

I'm finally getting around to reading Ron's book, iv'e got three
on the go at the mo.. Ron's, Kate's and the Rorke's Drift Diary.
this is just one of many many account's of the Zulu transmitting
message's over great distances. in the early hour's of the 22nd
i imagine the Zulu were all over the British movement's.

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It was not long before Captain Henry Mainwaring of the 2nd 24th, marching
with his men observed two horsemen watching the column's progress. Takeing
them to be vedettes he was surprised when, on closer inspection, they proved
to be Zulu scout's. Writing later in his journal Mainwaring reflected " they
were placed there to watch our force depart preparatory to the attack on the
camp by the Zulu impi.

Extract taken from The Anglo Zulu War Isandhlwana The Revelation of a Disaster
by Ron Lock.

So that does it for me! yet another account of the Zulu watching the movements of
the central column. Mainwaring actually watching Zulu scout's observing his lord-
ship's departure.

Hi Les,

What is This latest book like - I have heard its a bit of a rework (or draws heavily on) of Zulu Victory and that RL is trying to dissociate himself from M5H, slightly?

I'm plodding thru Labands Rise and Fall...... (its a bit wordy.....) and the moment and looking for my next investment/read.

Thanks

Sime

What is This latest book like - I have heard its a bit of a rework (or draws heavily on) of Zulu Victory and that RL is trying to dissociate himself from M5H, slightly?....

Yeah Sime your right about the rehash, but then arnt they all, i have alway's enjoyed Peter and
Ron's work's... if you follow the m5h debate in the other place it end's in a shamble's... But i am
greatly in favour of giving the Zulu every credit for the way they ' winged it ' on the 22nd and
seizing the opportunity that had presented itself. Ron and Peter were amongst the first author's
to attribute Isandlwana as a stunning Zulu victory.. Laband's works are the dog's b.....k's you wont
go far wrong with him, also Keith Smith who write's with meticulous authority. in Ron's latest i have
just read his chapter on Isandhlwana, the recrimination's that followed will i'm sure make
fascinating reading. cheer's Les.

Ive had a problem with that statement of Mainwaring, it implies that the Zulu knew that Chelmsford would leave the camp. Considering that he assumed they were Piquets places them very close to the camp, waiting for the march to happen. The fact that Ntshingwayo had scouts out is beyond doubt, even to the extent of monitoring Dartnell to see if he would return to camp, possibly more of a possibility than anything else.
But to say they were placed deliberately in order to monitor the split is pretty far fetched, again it implies knowledge of Chelmsfords decision effectively before it was made.
As I said above I'm pretty positive that the split in forces prompted Ntshingwayo to make his move, and that was after Mehlokazulu made his report, some 6 to 7hours later.
Les I don't know if you have got to the point where Ron seems to change his mind on the position of the impi? that's the interesting part of the book.

Cheers

Mainwarings account quoted by Ron Lock was written in 1895 and appears in full in Holmes's Noble 24th. He makes the remark about the two horsemen to Clery who opined that they were the enemy's men. Mainwaring says "I have no doubt now (ie in 1895) that they were placed to watch our force depart". The implication is that he did not necessarily think so at the time. Mainwaring says he was travelling south east accompanying Harness's battery and the two horsemen appeared on some hills to the right. This is not therefore on the ridge but well to the south. All a little odd. Is Clery guessing?

Steve Reinstadtler

Hi Frank, i have just finished Ron's book and a very good read
it was.

But to say they were placed deliberately in order to monitor the split is pretty far fetched, again it implies knowledge of Chelmsfords decision effectively before it was made.

To my mind Frank that view is just ' wrongheaded '. if you accept the Zulu scouted efficiently.. most
do!. then why do you think ' they were placed deliberately in order to monitor the split?.
they were in place from the very onset of the invasion!. from the moment they crossed the river un-
apposed.. to the storming of Sihayo's again almost un-apposed. but not without attendance from a
distance by scout's who informed Cetshwayo and kept him abreast of development's as the Central
column advanced deeper into Zululand. as for the two horsemen clocked by Mainwaring, who say's
they were there by happenstance?. if we are to believe that the Zulu were able to transmit oral
messages with accuracy and great speed over many miles in a very short space of time, how much
of a stretch is it to ' have it ' that they could relay message's over a distance of only a few paltry
miles virtually instantaneously. Did the Zulu ( in their own country ) know every inch and fold of the
land?... why yes of course they did!. did the British?. err no they did not. were the Zulu wily and 'cunning enough to decoy and entice the british into splitting their force and then run them ragged up
hill and down dale for most of the next day, while the MAIN Zulu army massacred the camp on the
plain at Isandhlwana.. common sense must surely play a part in this. i have read dozen's of account's
which state that the camp was decoyed and the account's stared almost immediately after the failure
of the first invasion. but we all believe what we want i guess.

HiAll,
I have been following this debate with interest .
I do not believe that the Zulus knew Chelmsford left the camp on the day of the attack as this was done in the darkness in the  very early hours of the morning anyway, as; The Zulus  would not  have gone on record  post Rorke's  Drift saying that  that they thought the relieving force heading for RD under Chelmsford was an , quote ' an army  of spooks' as they had killed everyone the day before. So, if that is true  everything else in these arguments is pure fallacy.
The Zulu is a very superstitious soul and this belief in an army having risen from the dead was the reason, and substantiates,  why Chelmsford's relieving force was not attacked on the 24th, as the Zulus were too terrified to do so.  

Regards

barry

Hi Barry, I am never sure about the idea that the Zulus really thought that Lord Cs column was The Walking Dead 1879 style.......I believe that the Zulu's definitely knew that Lord Cs force had left ( but at what point in time, they knew, I don't know) I think they had a more pragmatic reason for not attcking on the 23rd......they had just had a right wigging at RD - in the region of 25% casualties, tired, hungry and probably quite a few with minor wounds......although that said, neither ghosts nor tiredness stopped one fella trying to instigate battle..... maybe some did think that the British were some kind of ghost army but perhaps they thought, those back home would excuse them not attacking if they said they were ghosts......

Les you misread my post.
It wasn't about the lack of monitoring or the scouts, rather the deductions drawn from it by Clery and Mainwaring.
Barry
Interestingly I had a long conversation last week and the week before with two descendants of men from the uThulwana and a big factor was the 'risen from the dead' factor. Both of these friends are University graduates but they firmly refuse to discount the family oral history. A memory passed down was after the battle and while preparing for Kambula it was discussed amongst the Amabuthu that the British can come back from the dead.
I will at some point amplify the conversations. Mosst interesting.

Cheers

Sorry Frank,

Doh, I actually thought I was going to break my duck and post something someone agreed with......

I'm a big exponent of oral history (whether written or spoken..... ) but I will take some convincing that, that was the whole (or real) reason for not attacking on 23rd.....

Many of the Zulus would have been suffering from or starting to suffer with PTDS.....it was all to easy for stories to take hold.

I read that the Zulus talked of the British having monkeys (or apes) fighting for them at Isandlwana and all manner of weird stuff (the British fired their guns with their feet). It was believed that the Zulus lost such heavy casualties at Isandlwana because the King moved his ass from the Sacred Coil during the battle....

Whilst I agree that the Zulus were (maybe are according to the Daily Sun) a superstitious people and the British were most strange to them.......if you think only 60 years before they thought they were some kinda 'mermen' (was it?) washed up on the beach.

If you think many rumours existed regarding WW1 - which either came from the army into society (or went from propaganda writing in society back to the army) - The Angel of Mons, Crucified Canadian (maybe this had a basis if fact - I watched a TV Doc once) and the Sandringham Company at Gallipoli....

I look forward to reading the context of the conversations....

Cheers

Sime (watch it 90th is abroad in SA)

Sorry Simon I'm not intending to be disagreeable, at least not today. The Zulu peoples can recite chapter and verse going back generations with uncanny accuracy and re call. Ive witnessed it on numerous occasions as have most of the old Zulu hands, IK drawas very heavily on it at times and I know JY is a proponent of the accuracy.
But just because a story has been retold over the generations doesn't of course make it the truth, but all of these old story' generally have their roots in some form of fact. I would fully agree that the most probable reason, or at least a very large portion, for the non combatative passing was exhaustion. That impi had marched hard for days, run long distances and fought a long hard battle. Who knows what sort of thoughts were conjured up by those exhausted minds. Or in fact what they believed they saw.
So there you go mate, fully agree with you, Duck broken.

Cheers

Thank you......

I think the problem is in the Western world (especially now) something is only fact if it is written down and can be proven.

In my own motley family we have loads of 'tales' which I have not actually disproved (in my family tree search) but I have at least refined..... and got to the root of it....

I spose before the written word all history was 'oral' - the Icelandic Sagas (and other Dark Age tales) were of course written down oral histories.....probably not more than 10% actual 'truth' (or whatever figure it could be) but 10% truth all the same.....but altered for the case of morality, or even to suit the audience the tellers were talking to......

Right, I'll quit whilst I am ahead........

Cheers

Sime

The rear dust cover of Ron Locks latest book shows an annotated sketch of Isandhlwana - anyone know where it's from?

Steve Reinstadtler

Steve,

The sketch was made by Insp. Mansel, N.M.P., and appears in Blood on the Painted Mountain, complete with the key to the annotations.

It is held in the Wood Papers at the Killie Campbell Library.

JY

Bonjour,
From memory (i am not at home), there is also a sketch made by Inspector Mansel, NMP, in "Zulu Victory".
Cordialement
Fred

JY/Fred

Many thanks.

Steve

It turns out that Insp. Mansel's sketch also appears in the 2nd edition of Colenso/Durnford's History of the Zulu War published in 1881 (it is not in the 1st edition), which ties in with Mansel giving it to Edward Durnford to aid his case together with a covering letter. First though, the only scan of Mansel's original map I can see is the one on the rear dust cover of RL's book (see above). All others are printers copies. It is interesting to note how well Mansel caught the shape of Isandhlwana from a particular angle which compares well with a modern photo - which means he was pretty good at representing the terrain.
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More intriguing though is the fact that the version in Colenso/Durnford's book has been modified in the numbering and in the location of the demise of the RB (numbered 18) which is shown to the right of the Conical Hill.  In RL's Zulu Victory (which appears faithful to the Mansel original at least in numbering - we cannot see as far east as the Conical Hill on the dust cover however) shows the RB (now numbered 12) to the left of Conical Hill. More little mysteries.
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Steve Reinstadtler

Bonsoir Steve,

I suppose that the two documents (the letter and the map) were sent from S.A. to E. Durnford in England.
So, why the map is held in KCAL and not in UK?
It seems to me that the letter and the map from Mansel were private documents, not official reports.
If copies of official reports/documents were written with absolute accurency (at least, in theory), it was not necessary the case about private documents.
Under these circumstances, I wonder if the map held in KCAL is exactly the same map which was sent to E. Durnford...Maybe a "draft", an "another" version?
Have you noticed other changes between the 2 maps?
Amitié
Fred

There are a few minor changes - you can see 18 is missing in the Durnford map on the enlargements above.

Bonjour Julian,
Thank you very much for your help but I had in mind eventual changes about annotations's map published in E. Durnford's book, 2nd edition (not posted by Steve).
You have studied "Durnford's papers" at R.E Museum.
I wonder if you have already seen the original map sent by Mansel to E. Durnford.
Amitié.
Fred

Hi Fred
Yes I've had a copy of the KCAL map for 20 odd years. The RB location is very interesting and useful (and supports the whole RB demise location in the Gunner Taylor essay). Durnford moved that location on his map apparently deliberately but without saying why - unless it was a typesetter's error (such things did and still do occur) and Durnford missed it in the proof-checking or, as you say, Mansel sent Durnford an amended copy. Durnford MUST certainly have been sent an original from which his map was taken but it is most definitely NOT with the Durnford Papers in Chatham. Another mission for Indiana Jones!
The vedettes' locations on the map are also interesting.
In looking at the map it's necessary to remember that Mansel could be certain only of what was there/happeningin the camp at 4.30 a.m. when he left. Anything that happened after that he would have only hearsay knowledge of (unless he qualified it by naming his source - and he didn't) which is why I didn't use the map's RB location in the Taylor essay.
Fortunately I now have a new eye-witness source.

Julian,
You have a new eye-witness source about the RB's location???????????????????
Impatient to know your source! Have you got the intention to write a "Part II" to the Taylor's essay?
Incidentally, Mansel as Officer is somewhere intriguing: Lord Chelsmford himself had a very bad opinion of him.
It seems to me that Barry Clarke or Brett Hendey wrote on this forum that Mansel took "strange" decisions during the Bambetha rebellion.
Amitié.
Fred

For several reasons, I don't exclude that the RB was destroyed at a very close place to Conical hill...

The Durnford map has re-numbered the sequence of the KCAL map, as well as adding a note and moving locations around a bit. It was the change in the RB position which first struck me, but there is also a note of where the left of the Zulus advanced on Durnford's Horse (20) that does not appear on the KCAL map (at least the Ron Lock version printed in Zulu Victory). As I wrote in my article in the last edition of Julian's "Studies in the Zulu War - IV, the second edition of Colenso/Durnford's book (which has the Mansel map) came out in May 1881 incorporating suggestions by Bishop Colenso. My guess would be that Mansel had been encouraged by Frances Colenso to supply his map to Edward Durnford at that time - but that is speculation. It is yet another example of the efforts being made at the time from all kinds of sources to assist in the task of clearing Anthony Durnfords good name. Incidentally, thanks to a distinguished member of the forum, I now have an original  copy of the 2nd edition of Frances Colenso's and Edward Durnford's book.
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Durnford's Map
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Ron Lock - Zulu Victory

Steve Reinstadtler

Steve,
Thank you very for the informations given.
Amitié.
Fred

Fred
There will be something in vol. VI.
rusteze
I rather think you're correct about Colenso's encouragement of Mansel.

Julian Whybra wrote:

Fred
There will be something in vol. VI.
.

Frustrating answer...

Steve,
Until my return at home this evening, , I can't open the document joint to your message of today (10.58 a.m.).
Please, do you know if E. Durnford wrote expressly that the map printed in the 2nd edition was drawn by Mansel?
Amitié.
Fred

If the answer to the question is "yes", all the indications relating to the map printed in the second edition have probably not been modified by E. Durnford. In this hypothesis, at least two maps were drawn by Mansel...
Cheers
Fred

Fred

No, Durnford doesn't name Mansel at all in the book or say where the map came from. There is somewhere in the thread a reference to Mansel writing a letter to Durnford - i have not seen it but I suppose it may make some reference to the map.

Steve

Steve,
Interesting...
In my notes in French, I have this quote:
Mansel, Inspector, George, Natal Mounted Police, letter to Colonel Edward Durnford, 23rd November 1879 (KCAL, Wood Papers, file 32, KCM 89/9/32/10; quoted in Select Documents: A Zulu War Sourcebook by Keith I. Smith, D.P. & G Military Publishers , Doncaster, 2006, pp.162-165).
It seems to me that you have a copy of this book.
From memory, there is a letter written by Mansel's which is is quoted in "Hill of the Sphinx" (I don't remember if it is the same letter).

Amitié.
Fred

Fred there is a longish letter from Mansel to Durnford dated 23rd November. It is a full overview of his part in the Mangeni scuffles and the retreat back to the camp. Theres no reference to the map.

Steve / Frank,
OK
In my notes in French there is another letter written by Mansel to E. Durnford (from KCAL):
KCM 89/9/32 I dated 1 November [1879?] (sic)
Amitié
Fred

The "l" quoted in the previous message is "i"no "L".