Crealock's notebook.

Chard1879 wrote:

If Dunford's men hadn't found and attacked, the Zulu's, would the Zulu have attacked the camp. That's not to hard to understand is it.

Actually, it is hard to understand so let me rephrase it and you can just affirm or deny. What you are saying is, "The Zulu would not have attacked the camp if Durnford's men hadn't discovered them."
Is that your argument?

Maybe not in your eyes, but in many they do. It has been said before if you can produce a detailed document on par with TMFH that shows it to be incorrect, I for one would be very interested to see it.

Chard1879 wrote:

Maybe not in your eyes...

This isn't about me. And is it also true that you hold if Durnford hadn't sent out patrols the British wouldn't have been defeated? Or, to put it another way, that Durnford is responsible for the British defeat at Isandlwana because he sent out reconnaissance patrols?

Read his post above yours.

Durnford sent out Raw and Roberts to scout and find out what was happening in the hills, not to attack the Zulus.

littlehand wrote:

Read his post above yours.

So, is that to say you believe that LH? Feel free to answer yes or no.

TMFH is a plausible theory that strongly suggests the Zulus were indeed attacking on the 22nd, no matter what their original plans were.
They saw an opportunity (Chelmsford leaving) and they took it.
Raw attacking or not is immaterial.
And remember, the Zulus found the 3rd column. Raw did not "find" the Zulus.

It basically boils down to 2 belief groups 6pdr.
One group that believes the Zulus won the day.
The other group that for reasons of their own, CAN NOT bring themselves to give the Zulus any credit for their great victory on 22/1/1879.

Tasker, this is not the first time you have mention this. Show me just one, where someone has said it wasn't a Zulu victory.

LH, you are keeping me awake.
No one is daft enough to say it LH, it is all implied.

Even the term "disaster of iSandlwana" does the Zulus no credit.

The sinking of the Titanic was "disaster", because there were no other human factors to blame other than the ship's crew herself. The battle of iSandlwana was not a diaster, it was a defeat.

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Dave. Quote:
As for relinquishing his command back to Pulliene is yet another story.

Can't find anything on this, and how it would work. But might be worth seeing if we can come up with an answer.

littlehand wrote:

Tasker, this is not the first time you have mention this. Show me just one, where someone has said it wasn't a Zulu victory.

I'm still waiting for your response to my question LH. Just as I am still awaiting for an attribution on the quote you posted earlier in the thread.

Ray63 wrote:

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Dave. Quote:
As for relinquishing his command back to Pulliene is yet another story.

Can't find anything on this, and how it would work. But might be worth seeing if we can come up with an answer.

The moment Durnford rode out of the camp, command officially reverted back to Pulleine. This has been well established previously, Ray.

By your lack of response on this, do I take it you are backing away too, Ray? What is your answer to my very basic question? Or do you only ask questions and make demands of others?

You can read my thoughts on TMFH here.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

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By your lack of response on this, do I take it you are backing away too, Ray? What is your answer to my very basic question? Or do you only ask questions and make demands of others?

Sorry about that, I was having me dinner, if that's ok with you. And posting in other threads. What was your question.


PS just seen this, if asking a question is making demands, then there's no point in posting at all. Most know I don't contribute often, because I spend a lot of time reading others posts. But when I do contribute, it will normally be in the format of a question. Or if I can see a point that could be debated, then I will post. But I don't think any member deserves a reply as such below. You do have a habit of twisting the topic, and taking others with you. Which is more the pity.

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Or do you only ask questions and make demands of others?

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Subject: Re: Crealock's notebook.   Today at 10:01

By your lack of response on this, do I take it you are backing away too, Ray? What is your answer to my very basic question? Or do you only ask questions and make demands of others?

6pdr. There was no need for this reply. It would be beneficial to the forum, if more members contributed. This kind of responce will only prevent members from participating. Please give some thought to your replies in future.

Admin wrote:

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Subject: Re: Crealock's notebook.   Today at 10:01

By your lack of response on this, do I take it you are backing away too, Ray? What is your answer to my very basic question? Or do you only ask questions and make demands of others?

6pdr. There was no need for this reply. It would be beneficial to the forum, if more members contributed. This kind of responce will only prevent members from participating. Please give some thought to your replies in future.

Oh, I have given thought. And Admin, I think you are doing a very poor job of it too.

Thank you Admin... I have re-posted the last question relevant to my first post today in this section. After which the discussion was taken elsewhere.

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The information Durnford received regarding Major Bengough's movements, is quite clear for all to see in the Durnfords order. Major Bengough’s instruction clearly shows what was required of him. Durnford being ordered to the camp is clear and concise.

To me Durnsford's order to move to the camp, puts him in a prime position to be called upon if needed with his mounted infantry and if necessary to defend the camp. And his skills in defences being an officer of Engineers would have been usefull.

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Oh, I have given thought. And Admin, I think you are doing a very poor job of it too.

If your not happy with the way, I moderate the forum, Perhaps you should try other forums that might meet your expectations.

LH - SD. Thanks for support, but we don't need to turn this into a discussion. let's just stay on topic.

Martin.

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Read what Cochrane says, he states that Pulleine said that he was sorry that Durnford had come to the camp has he would take over command, however Durnford replied that he would not interfere with Pulleines command of the camp, and that he was not going to stay at the camp.

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Durnford replied that he would not interfere with Pulleines command of the camp, and that he was not going to stay at the camp

Even more so begs the question, why did he take command then??

Cochrane
Is this not the chap, who starts of his account with, "no one else is alive to day apart from me, so only I know what was said" or is that another chap.

Perhaps it would be beneficial to work out what orders were issued to who, from the 19th up until the 22nd Jan. In connection with Isandlwana and surrounding areas.

“

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You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No. 2 Column.

Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24, artillery & mounted men with the General & Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant.
J.N.C.
If Bengough’s battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Nangwana Valley).”

You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No. 2 Column.

There really is no margin for error, its straight forward.

Crealock, court of enquiry.

" I subsequently heard Major Clery state that the had left precise instructions to Lieutenant-Lionel Pulleine "to defend the camp." Such instructions would, I consider, as a matter of course, be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the camp."

We know Crealock never ordered Durnford to take command of the camp directly.
But taking in to account the senior rank and army protocol thing, Crealock and every other officer would have been expecting Durnford to take command. Which he did.

Had some time to think about this.
If it was indeed army protocol and Durnford was expected to take command, Why did Crealock and co lie at the court of enquiry,

Durnford did not 'take over command' from Pulleine, but with him being the senior officer he would 'technically' be seen to be in command.

The unabridged copy that I have of Lt Cochrane's narrative starts with; 'On the morning of the 20th Jany. 1879, No2 column, to which I had been appointed'; and not with; 'no one else is alive today apart from me'; so you might have a different account than mine.

You are only reading the part that you highlighted in yellow, what about the rest of the order? Why do you think that an order to Durnford from Chelmsford would also let Durnford know about Bengough? And why did he tell Durnford that he (Chelmsford) was moving off to attack a zulu force about 10 miles distant?

'You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 column'. O.K, and then what??

You are all just making your own guesses at what he was supposed to do, but you are not reading the earlier orders.

It is not as straight forward as you all seem to think.

Read the earlier orders.

Fare point!!

"3rd Evidence.—Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, states: I accompanied the main body of the 3rd Column as Acting Staff Officer to Officer commanding 3rd Column when it left the camp at Isandlwana on the 22nd January, 1879. I was sent back with an order from the General between ten and eleven A.M. that day into camp, which order was addressed to Colonel Pulleine, and was that the camp of the force out was to be struck and sent on immediately, also rations and forage for about seven days. On arriving in camp I met Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements. We both went to Colonel Pulleine, to whom I delivered the order. Colonel Pulleine at first hesitated about carrying out the order, and eventually decided that the enemy being already on the hill on our left in large numbers, it was impossible to do so. The men of the 24th Regiment were all fallen in, and the Artillery also, and Colonel Pulleine sent two companies to support Colonel Durnford, to the hill on the left, and formed up the remaining companies in line, the guns in action on the extreme left flank of the camp, facing the hill on our left. I remained with Colonel Pulleine by his order. Shortly after, I took the mounted men, by Colonel Pulleine's direction, about a quarter of a mile to the front of the camp, and loft them there under the direction of Captain Bradstreet, with orders to hold the spruit. I went back to Colonel Pulleine, but soon after, observing the mounted men retiring, I went back to them, and, in reply to my question as to why they were retiring, was told they were ordered by Colonel Durnford to retire, as the position taken up was too extended This same remark was made to me by Colonel Durnford himself immediately afterwards. By this time the Zulus had surrounded the camp, "the whole force engaged in hand to hand combat, the guns mobbed by Zulus, and there became a general massacre. From the time of the first infantry force leaving the camp to the end of the fight about one hour elapsed. I estimated the number of the enemy at about 12,000 men. I may mention that a few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message directed to the Staff Officer 3rd Column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine. The Native Infantry Contingent fled as soon as the fighting began, and caused great confusion in our ranks. I sent messages to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar Camp that the Zulus had sacked the camp and telling them to fortify themselves"

Going by the statement above, is it not clear that it was due to reinforcements being sent at the request of Durnford, to cover his fall back. Its shows that Pulleine had formed up the remaining companies in line, the guns in action on the extreme left flank of the camp, he just never had enough men to form a proper defensive line. It was Durnfords action that caused them to be to extended. By the time he realised it was to late.

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Martin.

Subject: Crealock's notebook.   Yesterday at 11:49 pm
Durnford did not 'take over command' from Pulleine, but with him being the senior officer he would 'technically' be seen to be in command. He did take command. There are many witnesses to this.

The unabridged copy that I have of Lt Cochrane's narrative starts with; 'On the morning of the 20th Jany. 1879, No2 column, to which I had been appointed'; and not with; 'no one else is alive today apart from me'; so you might have a different account than mine. No one else is alive to day, in which case he could say just about what he wanted.

You are only reading the part that you highlighted in yellow, what about the rest of the order? Why do you think that an order to Durnford from Chelmsford would also let Durnford know about Bengough? And why did he tell Durnford that he (Chelmsford) was moving off to attack a zulu force about 10 miles distant?
Why shouldn't he not let his commanders know what's going on. And the only part that concerns this discussion is what was written to Durnford. Highlighted in yellow. It is you who is coming up with the what ifs.

'You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 column'. O.K, and then what?? Then nothing, everyone knew Durnford would take command, Pullienes orders were then binded to him. ( as someone suggested the fresh orders you mentioned)

You are all just making your own guesses at what he was supposed to do, but you are not reading the earlier orders. Pot kettle comes to mind

It is not as straight forward as you all seem to think. The orders shows otherwise

Read the earlier orders. The one from the 19th has nothing to do with the one issued on the 22nd
Remember The order on the 22nd was not a Myth. I do recall 24th asking how you came to the decision regarding the order on the 19th.


_________________
Remember The Warwickshires not the Myth.

Martin. What do you have to show the orders issued on the 19th has some bearing on those issued on the 22nd, what is the connection.

Martin wrote.

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I also have Snook's book, however, I only got so far through it and had to give up. He makes it very clear where he THINKS the blame lies, and I just could not read any more of this very bias book in which Snook's imagination takes over from fact. It is all supposition and assumption, he wants the reader to believe that because he THINKS that's what happened, then it must be right, and a lack of footnotes does not help at all, the book now languishes in a dark corner at the very back of the bookshelf.

Martin its seems to be a case of anyone who thinks Durfords at fault is wrong, and no argument however strong will change your mind. You give up on Mikes book, because you say, he makes it clear where the blame lies. Perhaps if you had read the all of the book, you may well have seen his argument and picked up a few facts along the way.

Ulundi.

"There are many witnesses to this" Who?

Cochrane's account is from 1879, not years later.

The yellow highlights are NOT the only concern, read the earlier orders.

Durnford was NOT ordered to take command, Pulleines orders were binding only to Pulleine, Durnford had his own orders.

Pot kettle eh! I have read the earlier orders, I suggest that you do the same.

"The orders shows otherwise" How?

"The one from the 19th has nothing to do with the one issued on the 22nd". It has EVERYTHING to do with it.

If you would read and digest them, you will see and understand.

Ray.

Read them and you will see the connection.

CTSG.

It also seems that if anyone can see and understand that Durnford was obeying orders and that he was scapegoated for the defeat at iSandlwana by Crealock, Chelmsford, etc, then any discussion to prove him innocent goes against what you and some other members on the forum think.

The facts that I pick are exactly that FACTS, not someones interpretation of what they THINK happened.

Martin, your going around in circles, your say nothing new. Why on earth do you keep telling us Durnford wasn't ordered to take command, when we already know.

You keep on about his orders issued on the 19th. Show how they are connected to the orders issued on the 22nd. This has been asked of you a few times, and you still avoid the question.

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There are many witnesses to this" Who?

5th Evidence.—Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment, states: I am employed as transport officer with No 2 Column, then under Colonel Durnford, R.E., on the 22nd January, 1879, the column marched on that morning from Rorke's Drift to Isandlwana in consequence of an order received from the Lieutenant General. I do not know the particulars of the order received. I entered the Isandlwana camp with Colonel Durnford about 10 A.M., and remained with him as Acting Staff Officer. On arrival he took over command from Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford a verbal state of the troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders he had received, viz., to defend the camp, these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation. Several messages were delivered, the last one to the effect that the Zulus were retiring in all directions—the bearer of this was not dressed in any uniform. On this message Colonel Durnford sent two troops Mounted Natives to the top of the hills to the left, and took with him two troops of Rocket Battery, with escort of one company Native Contingent, on to the front of the camp about four or five miles off. Before leaving, he asked Colonel Pulleine to give him. two companies 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine said that with the orders he had received he could not do it, but agreed with Colonel Durnford to send him help if he got into difficulties. Colonel Durnford, with two troops, went on ahead and met the enemy some four or five miles off in great force, and, as they showed also on our left, we retired in good order to the Drift, about a quarterof a mile in front of the camp, where the mounted men reinforced us, about two miles from the camp. On our retreat we came upon the remains of the Rocket Battery which had been destroyed.


Essex account.

I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, an account of an action which took place near the Isandlwana Hills on the 22nd instant. After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, commanding in camp, thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach. He also dispatched a mounted man with a report to the column, presumed to be about twelve or fifteen miles distant. Shortly after nine A.M., a small body of the enemy showed itself just over the crest of the hills, in the direction they were expected, but retired a few minutes afterwards, and disappeared. Soon afterwards, information arrived from the picquet before alluded to, that the enemy was in three columns, two of which were retiring, but were still in view; the third column had disappeared in a north-westerly direction. At about ten A.M. a party of about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket. battery, arrived with Lieu tenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., who now assumed command of the camp.

There is more, but I think two will prove the point. Primary Source.

Durnford’s orders from Chelmsford may not have been explicit, but the implication was that he was to act as reinforcement for the camp in the absence of Glynn’s column and by his seniority would assume over-all command.

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Cochrane's account is from 1879, not years later.

: Did I say years later...

Martin Your Cochrane's account. Have you posted the wrong date, has you are saying the 20th Jan prior to Isandlwana.

Ulundi
Re your statement:
"Durnford’s orders from Chelmsford may not have been explicit, but the implication was that he was to act as reinforcement for the camp in the absence of Glynn’s column and by his seniority would assume over-all command."
Whilst it is true that the orders were not explicit, they contain no implication that he is to act as reinforcement for the camp. In fact the opposite is true.

Ulundi wrote:

Durnford’s orders from Chelmsford may not have been explicit,

Thanks for spelling this out Ulundi, I have been thinking the same thing myself for many months now.

Given the vagueness of LC's orders, does this not point the finger right back at Chelmsford?
One thing a commander CAN NOT DO in the field is to be vague and not-explicit about his orders. They must be clear, direct and unequivocal, not open to interpretation in the least.
(Crikey, we are STILL debating the meaning and implied nuances of these orders nearly 133 years later). How on earth were men to be clear in their minds as to what their orders and tasks were on that day back in 1879??

Tasker
When you ask does it point the finger right back at Chelmsford, it begs the question - at Crealock for not getting the orders explicit or at Chelmsford for not ensuring that Crealock had got them explicit?

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Thanks for spelling this out Ulundi, I have been thinking the same thing myself for many months now.Given the vagueness of LC's orders, does this not point the finger right back at Chelmsford?

Not really, remember no one knew the camp was going to be attacked. Or a least not when Chelmsford was there. The vagueness of the order supports that. As far as everyone was concerned Chelmsford was taking the fight to the Zulus. There was enough information coming in that suggested all was not well around the camp. Durnford knew the ways of the Zulu better than any of the officers at Isandlwana. On assuming command, his orders diverted to defending the camp.

Julian Whybra wrote:

Tasker
When you ask does it point the finger right back at Chelmsford, it begs the question - at Crealock for not getting the orders explicit or at Chelmsford for not ensuring that Crealock had got them explicit?

Either way, I would say it points the finger AWAY from Durnford.

I can only speak from experience Julian, but whenever I gave an order verbally that I wanted someone to pass on to a 3rd party - for example over the PRR or telephone - I would have them write it down while I waited and then get them to read it back to me twice.

The military system have moved on from 1879. We have yet again hit a stalemate, its back to personal opinion. Pity I thought we were moving forward.

I agree with and understand your points in your 17.35 post, Chard, except one.

The one about "vague" orders. There is no excuse for leaving vague orders, today, in 1879, or prior to that, particularly when you are in enemy territory.
This is taught to young officer recruits from day one at Sandhurst and every day after that. This has always been and never changed. Not being ironic, but this can be a matter of life and death.

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Durnford’s orders from Chelmsford may not have been explicit, but the implication was that he was to act as reinforcement for the camp in the absence of Glynn’s column and by his seniority would assume over-all command.

Based on this, we can only form a personal opinion of what Durnford should have done. To argue the case over what we think should have been said and done, will get us no where. The whole thought process was not he same as it is to day.

So instead, we have to think as if WE are in 1879. Put yourself in Durnford's position and make of the orders what you will.

I'm guessing army protocol was different then?

"On arrival he took over command from Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford a verbal state of the troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders he had received, viz., to defend the camp, these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation."

Was this a part of the hand over process..

I have been giving this some thought and have been remembering one or two things. Sometimes I need to forget about today's military protocols which i find very hard to do.
OK, perhaps, maybe. I am wiling to accept that being vague, maybe, was not abnormal in 1879.

It all changed after the battle of Imjin River in 1951. I remember learning about this at Sandhurst. During the Chinese attack, the commander of the British forces and the commander of the US forces were asked to give sitreps.
The US commander reported: "We are getting the absolute shjt kicked out of us here." They were in fact taking very little fire, just the occasional effective round.
The British commander reported, famously: "Things are getting a little sticky." They were in fact on the point of being completey over run by the Chinese, the Glosters had been either killed, captured or in a disorderly retreat.

Guess who got the reinforcements?

Since Imjin River, commanders have been more precise with their sitreps.

A personal observation by Pearson.

Extract from Pearson letter to Chelmsford.Ekowe, February 6, 1879.

"We should be very glad of a newspaper or two giving an account of No. 3 Column. About what number of Zulus did poor Durnford's party kill before they were overpowered and slaughtered ?  Did the two guns fall into the hands of the Zulus ? Did the plucky company of the 2nd Battalion 24th at Rorke's Drift (I suppose it was guarding the Depot) beat off the 2,500 Zulus whom they fought for twelve hours ? How very foolish of poor Durnford's detachment to scatter about so far from the camps".