Isandlwana, Last Stands

Hi Pascal

Thanks for the time line, i know there was no problem of ammuntion, i was asking Barry if he can prove anything he has said in the above post


Cheers

Why was the ammunition question paid so my attention too, in "Zulu Dawn"
Someone somewhere had researched the facts about the ammunition problem.

Because it was one of the great Myths of the battle, everyone believed it.



Cheers

Quote :

Because it was one of the great Myths of the battle, everyone believed it.

Say's who DB14

Read most of the books from 1965 downwards

Also a fair few reacent books Zulu Victory and Zulu also they there was a lack of ammo

It's best if we believe what we want to believe.

Hello Tasker

The intensity of the fire of a unit that performs a tactical folds decreases all the time.

It has nothing to do with a lack of ammunition.

If the Brave Pulleine had not ordered companies from 24 th to retreat, was 13.45, they were destroyed ...

The head of all this is Durnford that precipitated the defeat by improper deployment of all defenders.

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Neil,

'Thanks for the useful information on the MH.
The canvas 400 round ammo carrier is of particluar interest as that is the most probable method used for the non mounted troops. But, there is no provenance on that. I would like to see pictures of it in use on the Isandlwana battlefield etc.
Now a correction, there were survivors from the front line albeit in the mounted section , ie the NMP. They were Doig and Shannon and were the very persons who did make the statement about the ammo problem. See the recent post about this.


regards


barry

Hi Barry

Sure,

an unknown officer tried to organize a distribution of ammunition with mules, ...

Also no special equipment or scotch car at Isandhlwana for the distribution of the ammunitions...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Pascal,

Yes the mules were used by the NMP as a preferred method, as did,I think the other mounted colonials.
I have been examining losses and recovery reports in the NMP archives but have not yet found anything about the loss or recovery of Scotch carts ( many wagons, MH's and ammo, however).
My next step is to digitally enhance pictures of the batttlefield taken in the days immediately post the battle to see if I can pick up anything there amongst the debris.


regards

barry

Yes Barry and the mules were used also by the 24 th as a preferred method...

Cheers

Pascal

Barry

I mention the ammunition carrier, as it became standard issue in L.O.C 3263 10.12.77 as an authorised and approved of equipment available, It answers the question of distribution from the regimental reserve boxes which has been a basis of this topic.

In respect to Jamming rifles, I discussed this in my lecture at Brecon in May, and, you makes your own decisions. The big Jamming issue was bought ot a head in the Sudan five years later, investigation of the primary sources put the jamming down to two main problems, one can be discounted straight away, dust and sand ingress. As you know Zululand is grassy soil, however, I found two interesting quotes as to what indeed was causing jams.

On 28.10.1882 Lt Col Ricardo 3rd Btn Grenadier Guards wrote " In nearly every case of a cartridge sticking I have noticed with the service ammunition , I have noticed with the foil case had been pressed out of shape.", this is an interesting note, Buller wrote the same in 1880. Protected in the pouches the ammunition is well supported, it is only when subjected to rougher handling in the expense pouch does it create a problem, however as I have written before, if you can get it in the chamber and bring up the block, it's gonna go off.


likewise a quotation 27.5.1881, OC HMS Excellent " in slow firing, no problems of extraction has been experienced" ( volley firing is controlled and slow), however "in rapid firing the extraction did not work so well after the 80th round"

80 rounds!, thats bashing them out at one hell of a rate.

80 shots!

At Isandhlwana before retiring ,ordered by Pulleine ,the 24 th shooting only per volley fire, shooting four cartridges per minutes at the maximum, so it did not have a problem with guns stamped out, as he has not had supply problems in cartridges ...

Cheers

Pascal

Neil. There was a documentary a few years ago, I think was called the Day of the dead moon. ( something like that ) Ian knight was present during the filming. There was a part where they tested a M.H Rifle of the day using ammunition of the day 1879.
The first test was a penetration test, firing at a lump of wax. The second test was continous fire. If my memory serves me right after 14 rounds the barrel flowed up and was render useless. This was part of the evidence to suggest there was problems with rifles jamming.

Does anyone know where i could watch that, its sounds intresting ??



Cheers

Hi Dave

That MH have such problems, it may well still be a legend (for the Custer massacre, they talk too)

It's like the Supplying ammunition, always excuses to hide the responsibility of some...

Cheers

Pascal

DB14

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Now I'm not really sure if it was call, what I Said. Anyone know the name of the documentary with Ian Knight in.

Quote :

Now I'm not really sure if it was call, what I Said. Anyone know the name of the documentary with Ian Knight in.

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Hi Dave,

Thanks for that. I also saw that show here in SA too.
Now being an avid ,30 cal nut, shooting and reloading all of my own, I totally agree with the belief that the quality of the brass (*) used was the problem and that was a direct function of the number of rounds fired in quick succession and the consequent heating of the barrel.
Seizures of the breach were in fact far too common for the MH to be too reliable ( particularly in view the 34 deg C ambient at mid day in Zululand.) .
So once we have settled on the delivery method to the lines and the possible frequency I will be feeding the numbers into a mathematical model which i think is going to reveal all.
Neil,
Thanks for those further bits of information. In terms of my note marked (*) could you help with information on the brass case annealing processes, ie what was the spec.

regards

barry

Dave
You can't judge the results with the effectiveness of 100 year old ammunition, I fire 1940's ammo in my Lee Enfields, they go click...........................................................bang!, couple that wth 100 year old paper and beeswax and you get....bad results . In the same film they made out the barrel overheated after five rounds, it was rubbish. I fire 30+ rounds in less than an hour, it's hot, just like any barrel, but not oppressive. Jamming was due to three issues, none actually related to firing
1) Paper rucking causing jam during insertion
2) Malformation of round as above
3) Case delamination

Here is a quote from the period in test done in October 1875 by Col H.C Fletcher 2nd Bttn Scots Fusilier Guards
Rifle No 87 & 647 fired over four days without cleaning.
400 Rounds fired, Two handfuls’ of dry sand poured in action & three rounds fire with no problems.
2 rifles buried in Snow, sand and earth, again 10 rounds fired and worked perfectly.
50 rounds fired with great rapidity, had become extremely hot “some extraction difficulties”, but on cooling the rifles worked well

Dave
You can't judge the results with the effectiveness of 100 year old ammunition, I fire 1940's ammo in my Lee Enfields, they go click...........................................................bang!, couple that wth 100 year old paper and beeswax and you get....bad results . In the same film they made out the barrel overheated after five rounds, it was rubbish. I fire 30+ rounds in less than an hour, it's hot, just like any barrel, but not oppressive. Jamming was due to three issues, none actually related to firing
1) Paper rucking causing jam during insertion
2) Malformation of round as above
3) Case delamination

Here is a quote from the period in test done in October 1875 by Col H.C Fletcher 2nd Bttn Scots Fusilier Guards
Rifle No 87 & 647 fired over four days without cleaning.
400 Rounds fired, Two handfuls’ of dry sand poured in action & three rounds fire with no problems.
2 rifles buried in Snow, sand and earth, again 10 rounds fired and worked perfectly.
50 rounds fired with great rapidity, had become extremely hot “some extraction difficulties”, but on cooling the rifles worked well


Barry
The Boxer case was not annealed, it was made from coiled .0004" brass, the whole idea was expansion (and contraction) on firing and apart from the base plate (which was gas tight in the chamber) the rest was designed to be loose fitting. Drawn brass cartridges were trialled but the Boxer disposable round was still made until 1910, so if it was so bad why did they continue its use?.

In 1885 the first drawn brass cartridges were issue LOC 4756 9.6.85, under the order " a supply of cartridges of this description has been ordered for Egypt (Sudan) for use with the Martini Henry rifle only"., a direct result of the the problems encountered in the 1884-85 Sudan campaign, but Zululand ain't the Sudan, in neither topography or climate and the study of that campaign is my latest research.


In 1880 in Afghanistan, (ulitmately a far more challenging climate than Zululand ever is) , I can find scant reports of jamming rifles, so why is that, the same Mk1 & Mk2 rilfes, the same Mk111 ammo, the same accroutements, the same ammo boxes get no or little bad press?.

In my research for the book, I have a copy of the report from Kew, plus the Hansard parliamentary papers on the issue, and TBH, it does not appear to be the problem as bad as history has made it, I recently was sent copy of an anonymous letter sent from a Private of the 2nd Battn the Rifle Brigade about the rearguard of Stewarts 1885 Gordon relief expedition, he too reports jamming rifles but goes on to state quite clearly "the action gets stopped with the sand", I re-itterise that we are talking a world away from Zululands climate. What he does go on to say is how he cleared his gun, its something I have written about on this site many times.

So, whilst I do not do conjecture, I have an opinion, and FWIW, I do not believe Jammed rifles has any serious relevance, neither do I ammo supply in the outcome at Isandlwana, it was not reported at Khambula, or any of the other battles, Booth doesn't have (or mentions) it in the retreat from Myers Drift, Hook mentions it, but it is merely a comment in his memoirs, Likewise I am not drawn to comparison to later campaigns where the "jamming" was an very much investigated issue like the Sudan., why, because, just like any football match when you loose, the ref, the defence the lino is always to blame.

Just out of interest.

"The original cartridge case was made of a thin sheet of brass rolled around a mandrel, which was then soldered to an iron base. These cartridges were assembled by the orphaned children of British Soldiers, and were relatively cheap to produce. They were found to be vulnerable to being easily damaged, and produced inferior muzzle velocities. Later, the rolled brass case was replaced by a solid brass version which remedied both of these problems."

The other factor that should be taken into consideration, is that the defenders at Rorkes Drift we're using the same ammunition and there doesn't seemed to have been a problem there. It's assumed that 20,000 rounds were fired during that action.

Hi all

A number of years ago there was a T.V program that suggested that one of the reasons for the defeat was through the powder used at the time. The program suggested that the rifle bore became clogged with residue left by the powder, and that this shortened the effective range of the rifle, allowing the zulu to get nearer and nearer. The program also suggested that the firing line was too far out from the camp, and that the troops (companies) were too far apart, and that ammo wasn't being delivered to the line fast enough. I can't remember the name of the program, or what channel it was shown on (it is a number of years ago), but it was very interesting.

Does anyone on the forum remember this being shown?

Martin.

Hi Martin,

You summed this problem up very nicely.
Agreed there are just too many reports from that time to dispense with saying it was not an issue .
I do not remember the names of the many programs I have seen dealing with this problem, but, indeed they were there, including the program in which Ian Knight featured and in which empirical tests were done on the MH and which did not come out well at all.

Now, to get back to the ammo supply problem, which existed. One of the contributing factors to this was the kill rate ( I have read of 30-40 rds per instance which would be totally unacceptable by today's standards, by the way).
So, if the kill rate goes down, the ammunition usage goes up, to compensate.
Taking it the next step.
The kill rate goes down because of poor shooting accuracy.
Poor accuracy would have been very long range shooting, ie expecting results beyond the capabilty of the weapon, coupled to ;
Poor or malfunctioning ammunition.
So, any MH cases that were crumpled or malformed, would automatically cause pressure/gas leaks via the case neck , resulting in pressure loss and a blowback through the breach. Pressure loss means that bullet is not going to impact where aimed, but somewhere else.

There are many reports too about the cartridge extractor of the MH not pulling the cartridge out of the chamber, but rather pulling the back, the rimmed part, off the back of the cartridge and leaving the rest of the empty shell jammed in the chamber. One rifleman down. Repeat this 10/ 20 times per standoff coupled to a difficient ammo supply to the line and the clever Zulus have seen the gap, taken their chances, and won. Each getting their red coat, boots and MH .

I know that some of the more technical aspects of this may be a liitle diificult to see.

The main problem being dicussed here however was that the defenders lost the battle, despite the mighty MH.
Why was this so ?. To this end there is a mathematical model presently being worked on which will cater for the variable inputs in the ammuntion supply function in use that day,. and the results should be revealing.


Kindest regards

barry

Hi all

The only problem with the MH is that the barrel heats quickly enough as the old soldiers, put the bullock-hide guard sewn over the stock to protect the left hand from year-over - heated barrel.

The rest is for inventions excuse the defeat at Isandhlwana, lack of ammunition, jamming, and what else?

We send soldiers into combat without predict supply them with ammunition and they provided the gun that might have problems?

Cheers

Pascal

Barry
The chamber sealing and headspacing eliminates gas leakage, there was an issue re-leakage through a punctured primer, the Martini Had a "gas clearance hole" in the bottom of the block to vent it in such instance.

The Boxer round was designed to expand and create a better seal, if you inspect any freshly fired found they fire form excellently.

Where are the reports that you quote from? "too many reports of the extractor ripping of the base", I can assure you you will find scant few from the AZW, its barely mentioned, and very few in Afghanistan, believe me I have spent many a long time collating evidence for and against this argument, No doubt in 1885 it is a big issue, but as I have written earlier, it is a world away from Zululand in the Sudan, and, please bear in mind, the packets of ammo are fixed two rows of five, head to tail in crepe paper, tightly wrapped in brown and tied, specifically to prevent damage. UNLESS ITS IN A BANDOLIER, now that is the big subject of Bullers complaint in 1880, and latterly the bandoliers used by the Camel Corps in the Sudan.

Martin, fouling was remedied by the paper patching on the bullet, and the beeswax lube cookie, plus a quick blow down the barrel to turn the residue into a liquid, that said, in extended firing tests of the time, (see my earlier quote) it can create a foul around the throat of the cartridge, and its mentioned in the 1875 test.

That's what I said, no problems serious with MH, except that the barrel heats after any shoots, this is not a legend...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Barry
I would most certainly be interested in this suggestion of 'to many reports'. As far as Im aware there are non at all. There are a number of theorists that have looked at various aspects, black smoke etc. But Im no aware of any reports per se.
In terms of poor accuracy, these were battle hardened troop they had marched from Cape Town to Kimberley, through the Easter Cape and fought all the way. Definitlly not fresh faced recruits.
There was a report, I stress A report that said the bullets were flying to high. As far as Im aware the MH had a point in distance sighting that required the sites to be laid from the vertical to the horizontal. In discusions before, I remember this distance as being quoted against the remark of the bullets going too high and both circumstances appearing on a time line together.

Somebody asked, not sure if it was you the weight of a fully loaded ammo box, it was 79 pounds. Around 36 kilos.

One of the programs mentioned as part of this debate was the Ian Knight presentation, in that program all sorts of issues were looked at, including I recall the Zulu were all high on drugs. The local brand of Ganja I believe.
The issue of the black powder creating a smoke screen probably has a certain merit, and would definitly have a significant effect if fired by two men in a sealed room for 5 mins ( that was actually the program ). But in the open with that wind coming down of the ridge, as it does, and the men being two metres apart? Cant see it really.

How about this explanation, the pressure of the Zulu attack was just to much!!!!!!!! Simple as that, When Mkhosana bravely ran in front of the stalled impi and exhorted them to attack they did. Bottom line.

Had a rugby captain like that at school, hulking beast well over 6 foot and twelve years old, he was want to call the team into a huddle and vividly describe what he would do to us after lights out unless we won the game. Brilliant motivater he was.

Regards

Barry

you most remember also the attack was driven to ground till the chief inspired them to attack.

During that time the shooting would have been very low.


Cheers

DB14.. Secrets of the Dead....

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"In my research for the book"

Neil, I do hope you are writing a book. It is about time....!

I mentioned earlier the suggestion that drugs were used by the Zulu. Surely this is a case that would support the missing 5 hours theory.
If the battle was planned for the 22nd then the sangomas would have had a chance to spread the happiness. However if it was planned for the 23rd and brought forwrd accidently then the 'medicine ' would not have been deseminated.
So really the purists that insist the battle was only brought on by the discovery of the impi in the Ngwebeni valley by Raw (IK ) would need to explain why cannabis was administered a day early?

Just a thought.

Hi Springbok

With each battle, the Zulu are drugged ? ...

In any case in this war ?.

Several years ago, I had even seen a web site African moron, glorifying drugs, which explains in detail all drugs taken by the Zulu before Isandhlwana and before explaining that it was thanks to them , that the Zulu had triumphing ...

But even without this crap, there was in the Army Zulu, two regiments ultra-nationalist and ultra so impetuous ( iNgobamakhos and uMcijoi) that triggered the battles have nothing without their being asked (at Isandhlwana and Ulundi uMcijo and iNgobamakhosi has Kambula)

But they did because they were ultra-nationalist and ultra so impetuous, not because of drugs ...

I will not like that a rumor began to explain that the 24th to cut to pieces by an army of junkies ...


Whitout the NNH reconaissances ,no battle at Isandhlwana the January 22...

Cheers

Pascal

... Also if there are starting to jog the noise here on Zulu, you see that one day someone will say that àIsandhlwana 20000 to 26 000 drug users were crushed 2000 alcoholics ...

There were Zulu drug users, but it was not an institution in their army, it's a bit like alcohol in the British ranks.

And the Zulu impulsivity, it covered only two regiments, if not all battles are triggered as the three mentioned above ...

Cheers

Pascal

Barry 1#

I’m now back from the course and can respond. Your post may have been addressed to Pascal but it is open for everyone to comment on. You do indeed have every entitlement to post, as do I. It is not interference, it is posting. It is not arrogance; it is frustration. Our versions of history certainly do not accord. The difference is I have been careful to post primary source material backing up what I say and refuting your quoted secondary sources. So, I hope, as I have repeatedly asked, that you will also post primary source material to back up the following statements made to Pascal:

1. “This is born out by the fact that 200,000 rounds was captured by the Zulu's [sic].”
All the ammo in the cam was certainly lost but no-one knows how much was fired off and how much was captured. The Zulus didn’t count them!

2. “Ammunition was indeed well suppled at the beginning of the fight, but as the opposition grew bigger, the ammunition supply line faltered, became erratic, firing became sporadic, even vicious bursts at times ,but not consistant.”
No primary source account mentions any of this.

3. “The Zulu's were all watching this and knew where the gaps where and took good advantages of them attacking when the firing had slowed right down. Each time this happened the Zulus pushed the defenders back another 20-50 yards, or so.”
No primary source account mentions any of this.

4. “The story about the lack of screw drivers I think was an excuse by the quartermasters to "husband" their ammo. The ammo runners were in no position to argue with them so took the story back to the lines, ie no screwdrivers, no ammo.”
No primary source account mentions any of this.

5. “Now the persisting trickle of ammunition even gave cause for some officers to leave the lines and go back to the Qm to see what was going on there.”
No primary source account mentions any of this.

It becomes rather difficult to refute something that nobody mentions. Nobody mentions a UFO landing but, since no-one mentioned it, I can’t categorically say that it didn’t. On the other hand, I think if one had landed, someone would have said so, don’t you think?
All that said, I apologise unreservedly if I’ve offended you. But if you don’t give your sources, frustration ensues. Nobody can agree with your line of thinking (or even consider it) if you don't provide evidence. It's like winking in the dark at a pretty girl. You know what you're doing, but nobody else does.

90th
“I think the Ammo flow wasnt as uninterupted as people are led to believe when the firing line was still in its original place.”
Where is the evidence for this?
“Therefore DURING the act of withdrawing they were left with what was on their person.”
Well, that would be self-evident. You can’t re-supply a moving line of withdrawal (or advance).
“Also didnt Essex mention the fact that all those able to take ammunition to the front were ordered to do so ? ie , camp attendands etc etc .”
The 'camp attendants' is your assumption. I cannot imagine that Essex would have arranged for camp followers (like Hall) to take ammunition to the line. Certainly bandsmen would have waited to be ordered to take ammo up to the line. Certainly Essex would have roped in any Imperial troops – staff clerks, the 50 or so gunners in camp, the RE detail, cooks, grooms, etc., who happened to be nearby – to give them a hand. These men, I believe, would have the same 'espirit de corps' and would not have bolted. There are no reports of them bolting early, though, as you say, we shall never know for certain.
“I find it hard believe all the ammunition that was to be taken to the firing line actually got there”
Why? I find it hard to believe that any men ordered to take ammo to the line would not have done so. If they suddenly found that the line was moving towards them, that would affect the matter. They might wait to see what was happening. If they suddenly found that the line had broken and Zulus were pouring through, that would also affect the matter. It would be a matter of sauve qui peut and they would abandon their carts and run to a rallying point (and if there were none, keep going, like the sentries Williams and Bickley, and the stretcher-brearer Wilson did).
“no-one knows with 100 % certainty the events that transpired on that fateful day.”
Absolutely, hence its appeal. However there are things that we do know happened. And there are things that we do know didn’t happen.

Springbok 1#
“Assam”
So do I.
“I also enjoy debate, in particular when source material is used as opposed to historians opinion.”
So do I.
“Possible both of the currant protagonists could substantiate there respective arguments with those sources. I do of course mean first hand not second or third, stories do have a way of changing on re telling or interpretation.”
I’ve given mine (see many times above); I’m waiting to see, as you are, to see any evidence to the contrary.
More to follow.

Hi Julian

No problems serious with MH or ammunitions at Isandhlwana, except that the barrel heats after any shoots, the rest is a legend,a excuse for the massacre...

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal

“Formation in laager would have been possible if it had been implemented before the arrival of Durnford.”
No not possible, there was insufficient time and manpower to do it round a camp as large as Isandhlwana. Doing so would have meant abandonment of stores, transport, etc.

Springbok 2#

Thank you. Things have moved on since Holt.

Neil 1#

Thank you. One point I’d add is that QMs routinely loosened screws on ammo boxes well before action in preparation for immediate requirement. It doesn’t need saying that these men weren’t amateurs. QMs had been in the ranks – they KNEW how quickly events turn.

Pascal

But there were scotch carts at Isandhlwana.

Littlehand 1#

For goodness’ sake, the film Zulu was a film, not history. No-one had made any research into ammunition supply. They were relying on Morris’s book, already by then 20 years out of date and when it was known that all Morris’s points had proven to be so much hot air.

24th

DB14 is someone not to be messed with. He’s hungry for knowledge. And he doesn’t take anyone’s word for anything. He researches and checks things himself.

Barry 2#

Neither Doig nor Shannon left an account of the battle. If you have found one, pray tell us in which archive it is held, and publish your researches, you have brought new material to light.

Barry 3#

“Now, to get back to the ammo supply problem which existed.” This is presumptuous in the extreme. You cannot state this as a fact and point of departure without having proved it.

“there are just too many reports from that time to dispense with saying it [ammo] was not an issue.” Which reports from that time? Please name them.

Nobody knows what the kill rate was. You’re conjecturing.

“There are many reports too about the cartridge extractor of the MH not pulling the cartridge out” Many reports? Please list them.

Dave

So, someone fires a 140+ year old gun and find that it eventually it jams. Wonder upon wonder. It might also have exploded. The ‘test’ proves nothing, I’m afraid. RD soldiers had no such difficulties…

M Cooper

Yes, I know the film well, and afterwards it was dismissed because similar effects were not reported after RD, Khambula, Ulundi, Gingindhlovu – the problem of ‘testing’ an antique weapon.
The firing line moved several times during the battle – back and forth – according to participants – to get a better view, to cover dead ground, etc.

Neil 2#

Thank you. Your knowledge about the MH can stop all this superficial conjecture.

Springbok 3# and 4#

Thank you. ‘Tests’ done on smoke from antique rifles aren’t valid. No-one mentions that smoke proved to be an issue in other battles. As I’ve said, the line moved back and forth – if there had been any smoke it would therefore not have been a problem.

The drugs point was another thing raised by the same programme. The truth is that the Zulus did not have time to take them – read the Zulu accounts in the James Stuart Archive. Some even complain about NOT being able to take them. The sudden discovery of the impi precipitating the battle prevented this and other pre-battle ceremonies. I know of just one Zulu account where the language used might be interpreted that the Zulu concerned was under the influence. No others. Where is there any documented evidence that drugs were taken en masse before the battle?

Thanks for that Julian...

Quote :

Littlehand 1#

For goodness’ sake, the film Zulu was a film, not history. No-one had made any research into ammunition supply. They were relying on Morris’s book, already by then 20 years out of date and when it was known that all Morris’s points had proven to be so much hot air.

Quote :

They were relying on Morris’s book

So the reseach they did came from Morris Book. So back to Littlehands Post.

Quote :

Why was the ammunition question paid so my attention too, in "Zulu Dawn"
Someone somewhere had researched the facts about the ammunition problem.

Quote :

Someone somewhere had researched the facts about the ammunition problem

The Research came from "Morris Book" Question answered!!!!!

impi
Cy Enfield used Morris's book as a basis for the film which is why it has so many mistakes in it. Morris created a story of ammo supply difficulty based around lost screwdrivers and an ammo box strap he found on the battlefield which had been prised up over the screw. For anecdotal colour he added the Smith-Dorrien account.
The lost screwdrivers were of course a myth.
He failed to consider that the strap may have been prised up by a Zulu's assegai (screwdrivers don't come with the Zulu job description).
Smith-Dorrien's anecdote was taken out of context.
The 'research' was non-existent.
Out of interest, Morris blamed the defection of the NNC on the disaster. But Morris placed them incorrectly in the line and thereby caused two other myths it's taken decades to combat. Meanwhile TWOTS continues to sell well...

Quote :

Neil 1#

Thank you. One point I’d add is that QMs routinely loosened screws on ammo boxes well before action in preparation for immediate requirement. It doesn’t need saying that these men weren’t amateurs. QMs had been in the ranks – they KNEW how quickly events turn.

Julian. This is the first i have heard of this. Could you name your source:

Where was the Ammunition was it already in a waggons before the attack. Or on the ground.

Hi All,

Agreed IMPI.
Julian will have to name his sources as another very reputable author, Ian Knight if I am not mistaken, says that at least one of thr QM's ( as did Doig and Shannon) did a runner and survived.This must have happened quite early in the battle as the Zulus became wise to the runners and blocked the mZinyathi at Fugitives Drift quite early in the afternoon.


regards


barry

The only Quater-Master that did a runner as far as i know was the one for the BBG, of which he
had to supply around 7 men.

What diffrence does it make if Screws are loosended or not ?

You can open an ammo box with a tent peg, axe, riflebut.

The 24th had the pioneers to open the boxes


Cheers

rifle!!! You can

impi wrote:

rifle!!! You can

In the documentary by Ian Knight ( They showed how the ammo boxs were opened using the Butt of the MH. By smashing the sliding panel downwards. During the dig they found some brass screws that had been bent almost to a right angle. Using the rifle butt have the same affect on the screws they used in their experiment.

Having been lurking for a while. TBH nothing in the original sources points to a lack of ammo being responsible for the defeat. I'll post some thoughts on this in another new thread based strategic parameters that I have been working on.

Lets look at reports that originate in Chapter 6 of Hill of the Sphinx - F W D Jacskon 2002 which covers this topic.

Essex was asked to procure ammo for companies under Cavaye's and Mostyn's companies out on the left because they were running short (unknown how much they had left). He sent ammo with men under either Smith-Dorrien or Paymaster White and followed himself with boxes in a mule cart. In the meantime these companies had fallen back and he found them 300 yards from the camp.

Stretcher bearers returning to the camp from the line witness ammo being taken down to the line in the centre.

On the right of the 24th, Lonsdales Natal Zulus had gone through their allocated 15 rounds. Higginson saw 2 men from the 24th carrying 2 boxes down to the line. Malindi of the Natal Zulus says they got fresh ammo from the camp and continued firing.

Lt Vause of amaNgwane Horse recalled they used their 50 rounds but were refused supply by the 24th. However he found boxes (? own supply) which were not unscrewed and instead found an open box and distributed them to his troop.

Durnford's men were also running short of ammo and Lt Davies returned to camp with 15 men. He obtained 200 rounds from an open box in a tent (? Carbineer's supply). On returning to the donga they were already retiring. This decision taken by Durnford because they were being outflanked. However 200 rounds even amongst 15 men would not have lasted very long. They were at this stage being overrun on the right flank.

The Basutos and the Edendale men on reaching the camp went looking for ammo but report that the white troopers (? Carbineers) had formed a firing line in front of the tents and still had a supply.

Mehlokazulu of the iNgobamakhozi says he heard a bugle call and the soldiers massed together (1/24th) and fired at a dreadful rate. Pvt Williams recalls firing volleys at 100 - 150yds range.

Umhoti recalls "at the sound of a bugle the firing ceased at a breath and the whole British force retired on the tents. Like a flame the whole Zulu force sprang to its feet and darted upon them...."

Game over!

Hi Rob,
A very nice and informative post, thank you.
Reading through the salient stuff however I took note of these words ;

they were running short
Lt Vause called for more ammo having used their 50, but was refused ( resupply) by the 1/24.
had gone through their allocated 15 rounds? ( ie @ 4rdfs/min = 3minutes shooting)
Durnford's men were also running short....
....he obtained 200 rounds form a tent ( not from a QM on a wagon?), for 15men, (ie 13mins shooting for those 15 men?)

It is clear to me, from this alone all was not what it seems or supposed to be. Quite frankly a recipe for disaster, which it was.
Please post more on this subject as I think it has considerable interest.

I will be posting shortly too on the burning and residual properties of black powder (as used in the .45/577 ammunition ) as well as a report on independant accuracy tests conducted on the MH.

regards

barry

Barry

E and F Companies were running short, then a cart full of ammo arrived and restocked them, problem solved.

Durnfords men were running short, what does that have to do with anything? they retreated because they were out flanked, when they got back to camp the game was up, what does ammo have to do with anything ?

They had gone through their allocated 15 rounds, this is the NNC who were just surporting the firing line, they got more ammo from the camp, problem solved.


Cheers