The missing five hours.

DB

Even if it was too late to laager the camp, Pulleine still had plenty of warning about large bodies of zulus in the area, and should have used his head. There were dongas and rocky outcrops, there were also lots of empty wagons and carts, these could have been used to form defensive barricades, etc, and make some fortifications around these areas, and they should have also dropped the tents. The ammo should have been closer and made more available to these defensive positions, rather than being well away and having to send runners back and forth for re-supply. Col Durnford and his men were doing well in the donga until the ammo started to dwindle and he was forced to retire, so if defensive positions like this had been utilised and fortified by wagons and carts used as barricades, and with a decent supply of ammo, who knows what the outcome would have been?

That wasn't in his written orders for the defence of the camp.

Everyone, Chelmsford, Pulleine, Durnford underestimated the zulu threat.

The 24th were doing fine till Durnford retreated and lost control of his men.

Everyone wasnted an attack, remember " What a fool a fellow is "



Cheers

Hi DB.
This is the whole point , it mightn't have been in his orders to defend the camp ( Barricades , fortifications etc etc ) but as he was in enemy territory C'ford had
said he was willing to give the commanders every latitude concerning the following of his orders !. Pulleine should have acted and done a hell of a lot better with the time and resources he had available to him . Complacency was what ruined the day if you were English . You say '' The 24th may have been doing fine till Durnford withdrew therefore losing control of his men '' , He couldnt do much else as he was being outflanked , and here we go again his troops ammunition was beginning to run low , notice I said low , and not OUT .
cheers 90th.

DB

90th has made some good points in his post, and also don't forget that Durnford and his men were doing well in the donga, but the ammo was dwindling. And also the uVe and the iNgobamakhosi were extenting to their left in an effort to outflank him, and his position was becoming acutely vulnerable. He had sent riders back to the camp for more ammo, but they could not find where the wagons had been parked, it was at this point that Pulleine ordered Pope to swing round to the right, but Durnford did not know this, and just as Pope's company had began this movement, Durnford had started to abandon the donga and fall back.

The 24th's companies were too far apart, and with only the NNC between them. When the lull in the firing came so that the compnies could make a retreat, the sudden rush that came from the zulus (when the firing stopped), was too much for the NNC, they retreated far too quickly, leaving gaps between the 24th's companies which the zulus rushed between, preventing the 24th from joining up into a united body, and this was the beginning of the end.

How did Pulleine know he could disobay orders

What is your source for NNC being between companies and them leaving gaps that the
zulus broke through ??

If this is so how did the main bodies of C,E,F,H,A, and some of G got back to the camp and further ??

I repeat what " Barricade could defend all the camp, tents, waggons, stores, oxen ??

Martin when did the firing " stop " ??


Cheers

"The 24th companies are ordered to withdraw, with the intention of taking up a new position closer to the tents.  As they do so, however, the NNC units retire faster than the 24th, gaps appear in the lines, and the Zulus mount a swift assault which pushes between the various 24th companies, and prevents them from re-forming.  The fighting then continues through the camp area, onto the nek below Mount Isandlwana itself, and down into the Manzimnyama valley behind."

Source:Knight,

Hi DB

Well, 90th already answered your first question, and littlehand has answered your second and third questions (thanks LH much appreciated).

Like I said earlier, there were rocky outcrops and dongas that could have been fortified by the wagons and carts to form various sorts of smaller laagers and redoubts, etc, and the cattle, stores, ammo, etc, could have been placed within these, and could then have been defended by the various companies.

Regarding the firing. According to uMhoti, "Then at the sound of a bugle, the firing ceased at a breath, and the whole force rose from the ground and retired on the tents. Like a flame the whole zulu force sprang to its feet and darted upon them"
Source: Knight

Primary source that the NNC were in the line, they ran, and created gaps please.

Pulleine couldn't know he was about to be utterly destroyed, everyone thourght that is a
battle was fourght they could win hands down, the GOC had just left to fight that battle. Firing
heard in the morning seemed to confirm this.

There were hundreds unpon hundreds of horses, oxen, mules, waggons, stores
civilains, tents that had to be protected.

The camp was surposed to be protected with 12 companies of infantrey. Pulleine had 6.
The omnidirectional defence of the camp with that many men isn't possible.


Cheers

Hi DB.
Pulleine couldnt and didnt have to laager the whole camp , merely try and set up some sort of chain of small fortifications possibly in the same vein as what was done at R.D . C'ford himself told the commanders they could act independently while
in '' enemy Territory '' I think this is mentioned in the booklet he produced in Dec 78 , but I may be wrong . I know he said it ,
but maybe it was after the fact ? .
cheers 90th.

He said it in a priavye order to durnford dated 13th of january. Pulleine wouldn't know about it.

RD was tiny, Isandlwana covered over 1,300 meters. That would take ages to fortify, remembering
pulleine had to defend the hole camp.

DB14
Primary sources covering the position of the Native contingent in the line.
War Office Narrative March1879
Lt James
Raw
Essex
Gardiner ( Sketch )
Stafford
Erskine
Higginson

As to the Natives 'bolting', Raw, Higginson, Stafford, Erskine, plus quite a few others. But you knew that didnt you?

Regards

The order was to defend the camp, but thats a definitition thats open to interpretation many ways. Also as a thought, if the 'camp' was left undefended regiments formed up in a defensive posture say on the plain, possibly even in a donga but in any event away from the camp, what would the Zulu do? Attack the Army or rampage through the camp? What were there orders, throw the invaders back to Natal or loot and pilage?

Remember at Khambula, the town in the valley, Utrecht was totallt defenceless, they didnt attack it. Instead they acted on instruction and attacked the invading army. Whos to say really that if Pullein had abandoned the camp and then thrashed the Zulu impi from a defensive position they wouldnt have returned to a largely intact camp?

So just possibly the error was in fact trying to defend the camp?

Just a thought

Hi DB.
You seem to be missing the point , no-one was asking Pulleine to try and laagar the whole 1300 mtrs , that was
impossible and Chelmesford knew that also . Hence his forgoing to attempt to Laagar in the days earlier . I still think
Pulleine could have started to throw together some wagons here and there , unloaded others and hastily erected
some sort of smaller fortifications . There were many men lounging around the camp doing nothing for a long time
while it was known there were many zulu's in the area , they were seen on the ridges etc etc near the camp . Complacency
and a complete disregard for the fighting ability of the zulu was the catalyst which sealed the camps fete , very early in the day .
In any case if Pulleine had managed to cobble together some sort of defensive positions , it wouldnt have saved the day , but at
least he would have been pro - active and we wouldnt be having this conversation .
cheers 90th.

I just wonder what the outcome would have been, if at the early stages lets say 05:30hrs ample supplies of ammunition had distributed though out the camp. We have all read that the firing lines were falling back on the camp mainly due to a shortage of ammunition. We have also read that the Zulus wavered due to the impact of the fire at the early stages.

littlehand wrote:

We have all read that the firing lines were falling back on the camp mainly due to a shortage of ammunition.

Durnford maybe, but not the 24th, they were fine.

Springbok

I was using Snook were he says the only company of NNC on the line was Lonsdale. The others ran early,
were kept in reserve or were behind the line.

Hi DB

Well, there you have it, some excellent postings there from 90th and springbok, and also some excellent thoughts by littlehand regarding some of the action that Pulleine could have taken in the early stages. Well done chaps.

There were many deep dongas that could have been fortified with the wagons and carts to form barricades, the zulus would have had to first get down into them and then up and over the other side, if they had been fortified they would have found it difficult to do this, and the defenders would have been picking them off as they struggled to get themselves up the sides of the dongas and then over the defences. And don't forget that the zulus were getting pinned down until the ammo appears to have dwindled, and the bugle sounded, the firing ceased, and the line started to retreat back towards the tents. But if Pulleine had used the time from when the first sightings of zulus had been reported, and had organised better defences with the ammo close at hand, the zulus would have been pinned down longer, and would have found it hard going to get closer to the fortified defended dongas, and may well have suffered that many killed and wounded, that they themselves might have retreated to get out of the killing zone.

It pays to read books by many different authors before deciding what is what. I have read books by Ian Knight, Ron Lock & Peter Quantrill, John Laband and Paul Thompson, Saul David, R.W.F Droogleever, Frank Emery, Christopher Wilkinson-Latham, Norman Holme, Howard Whitehouse, Charles L. Norris-Nweman, Mike Snook, I also have read various accounts online and also in the AZW Historical Society Journal, and many of the excellent contributions from the members on this brilliant forum. And although I can see many valid points from these 'different camps' so to speak, it does appear that most point the finger of blame at Chelmsford and Pulleine. And with the web of deception by Crealock and Chelmsford against Durnford, many are sympathetic towards him, and credit him for at least trying to establish what the zulus were up to, but he does get his share of the blame from them. So all in all, don't rest your verdict based on any one mans book, read a few different opinions and then decide which side of the fence you fall.

Martin.

Hi Mr C

Ammo had nothing to do with the withdral, it was because of durnfords retreat that the line fell back. The main
bodies of C,F,E,H,A and some of G got back, some much further.

What donga's are in the camp that could have been fortified ?
The photo's i've seen of the camp make me think there aren't any.

I still can't see how with a small fort the whole camp can be defended. Everyone believed they could
beet the zulus hand down, remember the previous wars against natives.



My opinions are based on the works of
Knight, David, Snook, Emery, Lock, Quantrill, Greaves,
Laband, Mitford, Newman, Jackson and most of the AZWHS.





Cheers

DB14
Snook has to be read carefully. His references to the NNC are not based on fact ( When he does refer to accounts he dismisses them out of hand without reason) Read the statements from those I have mentioned, look at the classic historians opinions.
Snook is Im afraid isolated by his conjecture.

There are two major dongas going across the plain stretching from the Nyoni heights. They were at one point defended by the army, possibly Wardell. At the height of the fire the Zulu themselves used this area to shelter. So in answer to your question, Yes there were strategic defence points that could have been defended.

Out of all the so called stands probably the best sited would Have been CS Wolff on the Rocky Ridge, a well supplied company in square could have had some serious advantage.

Regards

These are Zulu accounts that clearly say no attack.

Uguku (umCijo Regt):
'It was our intention to have rested for a day in the valley where we arrived the night before the battle

Mhoti (umCijo)

'The Zulus did not intend to fight that day at all only some mounted natives from the camp rode up the mountain on which we stood and opened fire and the battle began.'

Un-named uNokhenke deserter:

On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making an attack...and we were sitting resting [further discrediting any notion of a deliberate attack at 0730] when firing was heard on our right, which we at first imagined was the iNgobamakhosi engaged. We armed and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We were however soon told that it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people fighting some ten miles way to our left front, [fixing this as 0900 ish] and returned to our original position


Cheers

There was to much Zulu activity for the attack not to have gone ahead TMFH gives primary sources.

The other question to be asked is why did they attack Pearsons coloum. If they didn't plan to attack why move so close to a British camp?

Chard1879 wrote:

The other question to be asked is why did they attack Pearsons coloum. If they didn't plan to attack why move so close to a British camp?

The army attacking Person was discovered, just like at Isandlwana by native troops.
Thats why they attacked.


Cheers

Back to my other question. Why so close to two British camps.

For Isandlwana, it was a good place, water, cover, everything they needed.

If the Zulus were surposedly advancing on the camp why did trooper Barker
describe them as

"A large army sitting down."

What did they do between 7:30 and 11:30 ?

Barry had 3 columns advancing on him, then they retreated, not much of an attack.Over 4 zulu statments clearly say there was to be no attack, why lie to Mitford ?


Cheers

The question should be what did they do from 05:30

Chard1879 wrote:

The question should be what did they do from 05:30

If TMFH is to be belived then they would have to prove that Barker, Cetewayo and Mitford were
lying when they gave there reports.

If the zulus decided to attack the camp at 5:30 then why at 11:30 had the camp not been attacked ?



Cheers

Baker himself states around 05:40 while out on patrol a large number of Zulu tryed to surround them.

The point your missing, is the activity prior to Raw discovery of the Zulus.

The movement of the Zulus is clearly explained by Snook.

There is to many flaws in TMFH.

Why did the zulus only surposidly move 2 miles in 5 hours ??

They could move 40 in a day.



Cheers

The Zulus were moving into position. They were bound to have been seen at some point, but TMFH clearly shows that they had planned to attack. The fact that half the column had left gave the Zulus an ideal opportunity to attack. Why would they want to move 40 miles when the camp was just over 5 Miles away.

Then why was there no attack between 7:30 to 11:30 ??

That is more then enough time to attack the camp. :

TMFH does not prove the zulus were going to attack the camp, it lacks
evidence from any zulu account.

All zulu accounts clearly say no attack, a part of the impi did leave
the valley in the morning, the false start of the UnCijo regiment and the Right horn.


Cheers

James Hammer describes the Zulus as Ants.

The phrase "like ants" can only mean the observer is looking down from a height. Is this not the way in which most people observe ants?



Cheers

Unless of course he was referring to ( Numbers)

Saul David 1879 wrote:

Unless of course he was referring to ( Numbers)

He gave numbers.



We estimated those we saw at 12,000

Like ants. It's a figure of speech. Meaning lots of them.

Isandlwana: A Timetable
By Keith I. Smith

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]


Rather Good.

Typical well researched artcle by Keith Smith

Endorses the MFHT

Regards

Hi Littlehand ,

Not only rather good, but an excellent summary by Smith.
It is concise and well referenced too.Thanks for posting it.

* I note that reference is made to Jabez Molife saying that they fell back ten yards at a time

* the references to the shortages of ammunition causing problems in the maintenance of the defence lines is also noted.



regards

barry

Barry
Did you manage to get to RD at the begining of April?

Regards

Hi Sprinbok,
No, I have been waiting for some cooling of the weather (22-28deg c at the mo) then plan to do a round trip via PMB (Ft Napier) then back up into the battlefield area. This likely to happen in a few weeks time.
I see your post about your visit in May. Please take lots of pics for posting on the forum and what you may miss out on I will do when I visit. The size of those dongas woud be one point of interest as well as views from the top of the Isandlwana massif itself.
Best of luck and watch out for snakes.

regards

barry

Quote :

* I note that reference is made to Jabez Molife saying that they fell back ten yards at a time

Certainly a good perspective.

Why assume that the Zulus were trying in some way to hide their presence on 22nd - all the evidence points to the contrary. After all did the Zulus not make their presence well and truly known before Ulundi and Khambula?
And on the 22nd, do we not have accounts of Zulu commanders all the way down trying to restrain their men from attacking and pursuing all the way to Isandhlwana precisely because the attack was not planned until the next day?
Did the Zulu army not attack in an unintended unspecified formation with one horn becoming the centre by default? Why should all the Zulus who left accounts state that the attack was intended for the 23rd if it were really intended for the 22nd? What would have been the point? Why is there not a single Zulu who states that the attack occurred on the intended day?

DB14. Now your thinkIng outside the box.

It was always the intention for the Zulus to attack Isandlwana on the 22nd Jan. even more so when the column was split. It was a opertunity that they just couldn't let pass. It halted the 1st Invasion.

littlehand wrote:

It was always the intention for the Zulus to attack Isandlwana on the 22nd Jan.

It was not always the intention to attack on the 22nd, even L and Q disagree with that.

Why should all the Zulus who left accounts state that the attack was intended for the 23rd if it were really intended for the 22nd? What would have been the point? Why is there not a single Zulu who states that the attack occurred on the intended ?

Why did the Zulus do nothing between 7:30 and 11:45 ?

If they were going to attack the camp then why an earth didn't they attack it, they had 5 hours in which
to do so !


Cheers

To a point I agreed with DB14. In that they would not have attacked if Chelmsford and remained at the camp. The situation would not have changed in respect to fortifications ect. However with Chelmsford leaving the oppertuntinty to make a decidsive Victory must have been to great.

Perhaps a messenger was sent to the Zulus who were waiting to attack Pearsons coloumn to attack on the same day 22nd Jan.

Hi 24th .
Makes some sense , but Chelmesford didnt leave till about 4am ; so not sure a messenger could have gone from the main impi to Nyezane - and arrived in time for that attack to start at 8am . Springbok or another of the S.A Crew may be able to give us the distance involved !.
Cheers 90th.

24th

As has been stated many times before there was only a battle at Nyezane becuase the army was
discovered by a patrol of NNC.




Cheers

24th / 90th

Distance is to great, drivetime 4 to 5 hours. So there would have been no communication between the two groups.

DB

Not quite right. The battle DID take place at THAT time because the impi was doscovered. But I dont believe we can say it WOULDNT have taken place.

Regards

Quote :

24th

As has been stated many times before there was only a battle at Nyezane becuase the army was
discovered by a patrol of NNC.

And again. If they did not intend to attack, why get so close to alllow discovery.

I would be willing to accept the missing 5 hours if the follwoing questions could be answered.

1. Why is there not a single Zulu account that say the plan changed and they were already
attacking when discovered. Why do they all say that there was to be no battle that day but
the next day ? What was the point in lying ?

2. Why did the Zulus not attack the camp in the 5 hours avaliable to them ?
That is more then enough time to attack, but according to the MFH they only
moved 2 miles. Did they crawl on there hands and knees ?

3. If they were advancing when discovered why did Barker describe them as sitting down ?

4. Why did king Cetawayo describe that the men were going to attack the next day and that
all the officers were in conferance when discovered ?

5. Why did the 3 columns advancing on Barry retreat if they were in the middle of
an attack ?



Cheers

Quote :

Why did the Zulus not attack the camp in the 5 hours avaliable to them ?

What times are you stating "5 hours avaliable to them"