Save the Camp

Durnford at least, tried to save the camp!

Yes Durnford had not beens ordered to defend the camp ... and when to he arrived there ,he found no new orders awaiting him ...

He rode out to defend the LC's rear and flank.   LC was too far to this Durnford "maneuver" is any impact on the situation on the LC's rear and flank.

I think if he had tried to join LC, he would have taken all of its mounted troops of the NNH and left the RB in the camp available to Pulleine because she could only delay it ...

Yes, Durnford HAD not beens ordered to defend the camp ... But as he stayed too long, he was forced to do ...

If he really wanted to join LC, he would have left earlier with his five troops of NNH.

He would not have sent two of its troops from his NNH in reconaissance in front of the Zulu chest !Pulleine still had enough mounted troops to do ...

And Durnford was not the commander in Isandhlwana! (LC He has never said this, nor Puleine!)

The proof is that Pulleine refused to lend two companies from 24 th to Durnford ...

In fact Durnford too dragged to Isandhlwana ... Originally, it was just passing through, to join LC ...    

pascal wrote:

The proof is that Pulleine refused to lend two companies from 24 th to Durnford ...

That conversation ended between Durnford and Melville. Lets say Durnford would have been pushing his luck, if he had taken two companies out of the camp.

“You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No. 2 Column. Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24, artillery & mounted men with the General & Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant.

J.N.C. If Bengough’s battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Nangwana Valley).

J.N.C  Does this stand for "John North Crealock"

Ray63 wrote:

I can't find nothing in any form, that confirms that Durnfords intention was to go to LC location when he left the camp. No account what so ever. But there are accounts which state he went to meet the Zulu at the front. Surly Durnford intentions would ave been mentioned some where.

Ray. Page 95 "Lord Chelmsford's Zululand Campaign 1878-1879"

Don't have time to copy whole text, but here's the part re: your question!

Notes By Chelmsford on the finding of the court of Enquiry.

Lt Cochrane.

" The enemy are retiring in every direction" This last message was brought in by a man not dressed in uniform- Colonel Durnford on hearing this last report said he would go out and prevent the the one column joining the force which was supposed to be engaged with the troops under the General- and asked for two companies 24 regt to go with the natives"

Hope this helps!

SD

 Yes Sir it helps! This proves ,in any case, that Durnford was not to remain in the camp!  

Hi Rascal .
I'd think it would help , but I have my doubts with some ! . Some of us have attempted to explain why Durnford left the camp , others think,  and will always think , he should've stayed at the camp twiddling his thumbs .  
90th.

Hello "living encyclopedia" of any ways iDurnford was only passing through the camp! But they are who have not yet understood this, they are stubborn, like ethnic Bretons  

Passing through. :[url=http://ww  stopped for Breakfast and two companies of the 24th :[url=http://ww 

Stopped by the nullity of Pulleine ...

Durnford saw Pulleine did not understand what was happening since 7.30 am!

So to get an idea of the situation, he started, alas, two troops of NNH in recognition ...

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Stopped by the nullity of Pulleine ...

Durnford saw Pulleine did not understand what was happening since 7.30 am!

So to get an idea of the situation, he started, alas, two troops of NNH in recognition ...

Melville!

Melville, who was concerned about the situation of the camp the day before ... a smart guy!

Impi .  
Here we go again ! , Pulleine set up the troops in the formation as described by LC ! . Myself and others have posted this many times previously , I dont know if you just dont understand or like stirring ? . Have you a copy of LC's standing orders ? , I doubt ! it if you have you wouldnt be asking this question ! . I'm not posting it again , use the search box you may come across them . Also Pearson set up his force in the same formation at Inyezane , Greaves , Knight and other historians mention this . Then again you dont seem to have much faith in Historians from what I can gather over the years . This isnt hindsight , you must think like they did back in 1879 , those in camp never thought they were to be attacked . The camp thought LC was off giving the Zulu a thrashing ! . As for Melvill confronting Pulleine a brother 24th officer and the commander , it wasnt done ! .
90th.

90th is this an answer to impi's post above yours!

ctsg
90th

Can't see any connection, as it was based on Melville telling Durford he couldn't take the two Compaines.  

Unless your talking about your normal replies.

Search box.  
Hindsight.  
Thinking like a soldier in 1879.

My living encyclopedia wrote: Pulleine set up the troops in the training as described by LC! Yes it's in the book of Julian!
Here we go again! , Pulleine set up the troops in the training as described by LC! . Yes it's in the book of Julian!
My living encyclopedia wrote also: Myself and Others have posted this many times Previously, I dont know if you just dont understand or like stirring? . Have you a copy of LC's standing orders? , I doubt! it if you have you would not be asking this question! . I'm not posting it again, use the search box May you come across' em. Also Pearson set up His strength in the same formation at Inyezane, Greaves, Knight and other historians mention this. Yes it's the regulation of 1877! Then again you dont Seem To Have much faith in Historians from what I can gather over the years. This Is not hindsight, you must think like They Did back in 1879, Those in camp never thought they were to be attacked This. The camp thought LC was giving off the Zulu thrashing! . As for Melvill Pulleine Confronting a brother officer and the 24th order, It Was not done!

10000 Bravos living encyclopedia

My poor Impi as Rascal would say, you made no mention of Durnford making off with the two companies in your post ,
If you had done so we wouldnt be having this conversation . Durnford didnt take them did he , so not to sure what you are trying to say , as usual . I assumed , and not without substance that your quote '' elementary mistakes in the deployment of his troops '' was in regard to the way Pulleine set up the formation , clearly I'm not a mind reader. I think you should heed the 3 items you listed in your post , you may then have some idea of what happened in the Victorian Era , and who knows, you may realise that 21st Century opinions are out of touch with 19th Century happenings .  
90th.

Yes my living encyclopedia, the poor Impi  :[url=http://ww no mention of Durnford making off with the two companies, even me who knows so little about this war, I had thought!

Read down from Chards post at 11:17am. Then you will see impi's connection with the two Compaines.

Hi sas1 .
Not sure if you are talking to me but the post of Impi's I was answering was the one he posted at 9.09 pm today .
90th.

Looking at the bigger picture. Does it really matter what orders were issued to whomever, they were all in the same boat on that day. 

Can we really say, that if the battle had been won, by not following LC standing orders, there would have been repercussions. 

Durnford no doubt had the letter, that states LC would expect his officers to disregard his orders if it was for the good of the Column in enermy territory. (along them lines) as said before one officer who had came from LC had saw for himself the situation advised Pulleine to disobay the Generals orders. 

The blame must lay at the door of those officers who were at Isandlwana, and who had the responsibility of the men under them!

Ulundi wrote:

Looking at the bigger picture. Does it really matter what orders were issued to whomever, they were all in the same boat on that day.

Yes, it does. And I would argue (see bottom) the bigger picture is what you are ignoring.

Quote :

Can we really say, that if the battle had been won, by not following LC standing orders, there would have been repercussions.

About that we can only speculate...but probably not. Winning creates a thousand fathers...losing produces bastards.

Quote :

Durnford no doubt had the letter, that states LC would expect his officers to disregard his orders if it was for the good of the Column in enermy territory. (along them lines) as said before one officer who had came from LC had saw for himself the situation advised Pulleine to disobay the Generals orders.

My guess is that you are referring to Melvill who strongly asserted himself a second time that day in defense of common sense.  In other words, I think you mean when Melvill told his rapidly becoming overwhelmed superior, Colonel Pulleine, that under the circumstances he could safely ignore LC's order to prepare the camp for moving.  I agree that this is an important exchange because it illustrates that the mind of the man Chelmsford put in charge was rapidly being overtaken by events...but I don't see how that helps Chelmsford.      

Quote :

The blame must lay at the door of those officers who were at Isandlwana, and who had the responsibility of the men under them!

To return to the "bigger picture," I would argue that the General who impetuously spit his forces in the vicinity of a far superior force and then absented himself from the main stage leaving an untested career administrator in command bears the lion's share of the blame. He displayed overconfidence and at the very least he should not have allowed an enemy army to camp a few miles from his flank without knowing it.

Melville was not with LC, he was at the camp. Who was the officer who delivered the message to Pulleine regarding packing up camp. That was the chap. I will look him up?

As 90th points out, no one knew the Zulus were there. As far as LC was concerned, along with all the other officers, Dartnell had found the main army they're were looking for. Glyn was in a better position than most to bring his concerns to LC, he failed to do that. Regardless of the repercussion from LC. Glyn was the commander of the third column. If his concerns had been ignored he should have enforced them. Higher ranking officer than Chelmsford elsewhere would have no choice but to back Glyn.

Ulundi, that is the point you do not split your forces in the heartland of your enemies land, especially when you do not know were the main army was for sure. The first invasion failed due to administration failure. So no matter if LC was there or not at Isandlwana it is his fault. In my opinion if Durnford was not there the 500 or so survivors would be far less.

LC did not fortify the camp at Isandlwana when he was there then he left the camp before Durnford arrived. LC weaken the camp from the start and Pulliene inherited a weak camp and did nothing to strengthen it. Pulliene was following LC's plan and intelligence of that day. It wasn't until Durnford arrived that they started doing something, unfortunately they still did not realize they were about to be attack by the main Zulu Army. If they had real intelligence they would have won at Isandlwana. That is one reason Durnford left camp to obtain a real knowledge of what was going on.



Commander Howse

:[url=http://ww  What Chard ? The chard of 1879 or the Chard of the forum ?

Ulundi wrote:

Who was the officer who delivered the message to Pulleine regarding packing up camp.

Captain Alan Gardner perhaps?

"Under the circumstances, I should advise disobeying the General's orders for the present at any rate. The General knows nothing of this, he is only thinking of the cowardly way in which the Zulus are running before our troops over yonder."

Pascal it helps when your enemy's commander of the whole army is inept.

Commander Howse

Masson

This message to break camp is received when the Zulus attacked!

So no impact for the Safeguarding of camp "Save the Camp"!

By cons, if the Zulus had attacked Puleine and Durnford on to join LC, there would have been an even more extraordinary slaughter!

Ulundi wrote:

Higher ranking officer than Chelmsford elsewhere would have no choice but to back Glyn.

There was no other 'higher ranking officer', Chelmsford was top dog, who had a reputation for ignoring advice. As for Glynns effort, read his letters to Colonel William Bellairs, and those from Chelmsford and Crealock.
At one point Chelmsford suggests that Glynn could have disagreed with him, Glynn/Clerys responce was pretty masterful leaving Chelmsford to back down completly.

Cheers

PS Sorry they are pretty copious and beyond my capacity to copy in, try and lay your hands on them.

Save the Camp ! LC have been able to get back to iSandlwana in time?
By 9.15 when the message was received the troops had just arrived in the Mangeni basin, having left at 4 in the morning that shows the time of travel, admittedly a great time delay was moving the guns and support wagons across the Dongas. So assuming the minimum travel time was 3 1/2 to 4 hours the earliest Chelmsford could have got back would have been 12.45 and thats assuming that all the troops where together in one place and ready to march. They werent, they were spread over a large part of the countryside. Just getting them together would have been at least 1 1/2 hours. So the earliest the column could have got back, without the guns, would have been 14.15. After the battle was over.

But at 14.15 pm the Zulu royal army was as always at Isandhlwana!

Another battle was it possible for her?

Because the message was received at 9.15. Then send messengers out for the mounted men, Russell and the others... They could have been on the road back by 10.45 and would have arrived in the camp area, probably close to the Quabe hill in time to help Durnford beat back the left wing.
The conjecture then would be: Would the zulu attack succeed without the left wing? Would the combined companies all facing North on the firing line be enough to stop the chest?

Yes the left horn was caught in the crossfire and 2/24 th, finally relieved, could have helped the 1/24th! In all cases there would have been no encirclement, the Zulu left horn would have folded on the chest ... the problem is the right horn, nobody was concerned to receive it before his arrival !...

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Another battle was it possible for her?

If I were going to posit an alternate history military engagement -- say to play out in miniature on a sand table -- it would pit the forces that might have counter-marched from the Mangeni against the Zulu reserve that wasted itself against Rorke's Drift the next day. I think that would be interesting, but I do not believe Chelmsford could have interrupted the swing of the Zulu left horn with historically likely time constraints. - 6pdr

Gardner! That's the chap. Thanks pdr.

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Save the Camp ! LC have been able to get back to iSandlwana in time?
By 9.15 when the message was received the troops had just arrived in the Mangeni basin, having left at 4 in the morning that shows the time of travel, admittedly a great time delay was moving the guns and support wagons across the Dongas. So assuming the minimum travel time was 3 1/2 to 4 hours the earliest Chelmsford could have got back would have been 12.45 and thats assuming that all the troops where together in one place and ready to march. They werent, they were spread over a large part of the countryside. Just getting them together would have been at least 1 1/2 hours. So the earliest the column could have got back, without the guns, would have been 14.15. After the battle was over.

But at 14.15 pm the Zulu royal army was as always at Isandhlwana!

Another battle was it possible for her?

Because the message was received at 9.15. Then send messengers out for the mounted men, Russell and the others... They could have been on the road back by 10.45 and would have arrived in the camp area, probably close to the Quabe hill in time to help Durnford beat back the left wing.
The conjecture then would be: Would the zulu attack succeed without the left wing? Would the combined companies all facing North on the firing line be enough to stop the chest?

Yes the left horn was caught in the crossfire and 2/24 th, finally relieved, could have helped the 1/24th! In all cases there would have been no encirclement, the Zulu left horn would have folded on the chest ... the problem is the right horn, nobody was concerned to receive it before his arrival !...

But would Chelmsford had not left himself in an un-fortified position, the men would have only carried their allocated 70 rounds, the guns would have been as much used as those on the Battlefield of Isandlwana. They would have been over run in no time. and don't forget the original Zulu that Chelmsford was chasing from hill to hill. And how long would it have taken for all of his men to have been gathered together before leaving for the camp?

6pdr

It's all about timing and temperament of the people ...

LC is not Desaix (Battle of Marengo) he certainly did not have the kind of temperament needed to rush to Isandhlwana after being warned, it also plays on the consequences ...

Person with him, tried to pleading Lord Chelmford to precipitate on Isandhlwana ?

24th

Because of the disaster, it was absolutely try something and if the Zulu army was still at Isandhlwana, it would have happened things ... The Zulu reserve was in Natal and the left horn is caught between two fires ect ...

It is true that the Zulus in front of LC, the January 22, could have followed LC way to Isandhlwana, but not sure ... Either way they did not seem too aggressive ... They could have beings contained by the tail of the column, if they had followed ...

Ulundi
Time for orders, instructions to go backwards and forwards? Just to long. Plus the sub heading at the top of the forum says it all.
It wasnt 'done' to go over your seniors head, look at Smith Dorean it cost him a potential VC.

Cheers

Sppringbok

In fact since the Zulu army has remained a certain amount of time on the battlefield, if LC had really wanted a second battle it would have been delivered ? Even narrowly, with a tight timing ?

Pascal wrote:

But at 14.15 pm the Zulu royal army was as always at Isandhlwana!

And armed with MH rifles, and thousands of rounds more that LC column.

Yes  , but already the 24 th veterans need an average and minimum of 25 rounds to put a Zulu, hors de combat, so I can not tell you the number of cartridges required for a Zulu warrior for a hit on the British Army ...

At that time, give a firearm to fire an African warrior, is like giving a knife to a hen ...

I also believe that after their loss of Isandhlwana, the victors had no their moral at the highest levels !

As against the morale of the soldiers of 2/24 th way to Isandhlwana with LC had a very high morale, motivation question!

Would you take a charge of getting involved with a couple of thousand bad shot Zulu.

Pascal wrote:

Yes  , but already the 24 th veterans need an average and minimum of 25 rounds to put a Zulu, hors de combat, so I can not tell you the number of cartridges required for a Zulu warrior for a hit on the British Army ...

When you considered the ammunition expenditure and both Isandlwana and RD. i woundn't be overly comfort with that.

A old splendid Post of Old Historian 2 on the statistics fires of the British infantry in this war has shown that the 24 th soldiers were veterans who just fired because they slowly fired ... So knowing that at RD has many Zulus were killed other than by bullets, 25 cartridges for a hit to be ready for reality ...

At the beginning of the Battle of Isandhlwana, the Zulus have no more than 2% of their warriors equipped with muskets or MLR, all in poor condition, bad ammunition, powder ect ... And the Zulu warriors are not good shooters ect ... not to mention the fact that without the loins ,there was 400 zulu "musketeers"at the maximun + the firearms recovered from the killed and others of Isandhlwana,that they do not know how to use the day of Isandhlwana and even later, when they use these modern weapons.

The firepower of the Zulu is a derisory factor!

Hi Rascal .
Many historians are of the impression that the zulu army had many more firearms than was first thought , although these were of limited value as a weapon because of their age , and their owners lack of skill in using them . I think Knight , Greaves among others have stated this in their own publications .
90th  

Pascal MAHE wrote:

A old splendid Post of Old Historian 2 on the statistics fires of the British infantry in this war has shown that the 24 th soldiers were veterans who just fired because they slowly fired ... So knowing that at RD has many Zulus were killed other than by bullets, 25 cartridges for a hit to be ready for reality ...

At the beginning of the Battle of Isandhlwana, the Zulus have no more than 2% of their warriors equipped with muskets or MLR, all in poor condition, bad ammunition, powder ect ... And the Zulu warriors are not good shooters ect . not to mention the fact that without the loins ,there was 400 zulu "musketeers"at  the maximun + the firearms recovered from the killed and others of Isandhlwana,that  they do not know how to use the day of Isandhlwana and even  later, when they use these modern weapons.

The firepower of the Zulu is a derisory factor!

And the British were :[url=http://ww

Subject: Re: The ammunition question   Thu Jan 24, 2013 2:17 pm
Regarding Ian Knights calculation posted by forum member sas1 1700 men
I have discounted 300 men who may not had rifles NNC ect

So based on 1500 men with rifles at Isandlwana.

So this calculations is only taking into account men with rifles who were allocated 70 rounds each. DB states between 70-80 rounds but lets stick with the lower number. 

70 x 1500 = 105,000 rounds between them at commencement of battle.

1500 men firing 6 rounds each per minute = 9000 rounds per minute

Based on 1 man firing for 60 minuites he would require 6 x 60 =360 rounds 

Based on 1500 men firing for 60 minutes. 1500 x 60 = 90,000 rounds an hour.

Stick with 105,000 the rounds which they had beween them at commencement of battle. And it is said approximately 3000 Zulu were killed at the battle, that leaves approximately 102,000 rounds unaccounted for. Not to mentioned those Zulus killed by artillery fire.

Hi "legend of this forum, living encyclopedia, ect ...

Regarding the 2% of musketeers among the Zulus at Isandhlwana and RD, I shows only what has been endlessly repeated to me by some experts in this forum, SEVERAL months ago ...

Cheers

P.

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Hi "legend of this forum, living encyclopedia, ect ...

Regarding the 2% of musketeers among the Zulus at Isandhlwana and RD, I shows only what has been endlessly repeated to me by some experts in this forum, SEVERAL months ago ...

Cheers

P.

Pascal, I thought that most Zulu's had muskets, like most Frenchmen have onions. ;-)

I was seriously led to believe that most Zulu's did have muskets - something like the King got his crew together and got them t hold up their rifles, he realised not many were armed so told them to go to the white traders and get some guns.

cheers

Chelmsfordthescapegoat And the British .... What Were they British :[url=http://ww :[url=http://ww :[url=http://ww :[url=http://ww :[url=http://ww ?

Had the Zulus used MH rifles prior to the invasion?

Hi sas1 .
No , the zulus didnt have MH's . They did have plenty of old antique firearms , Tower muskets etc etc .
Neil is the expert in this field , I'm sure he has posted previously the makes etc etc . I doubt the Martini Henry was
at all available in SA before the invasion . Neil would be the best to answer this question .
Cheers 90th.