Save the Camp

The different colors are there for more understanding ... If there are some who do not understand this, too bad for them ... 

90th, this is where I got the numbers from. I do not know if they are right or not.

Colenso, pp. 263–264 gives 7,800: 1752 Imperial and Colonial troops and 6054 Native Contingent and 377 Conductors and Drivers for the Number 2 Column under Durnford and the Number 3 Column under Glynn which made up Chelmsford's Main Column. The strength of the entire invasion force is given as a total of 16,506 for the five columns: 6,669 Imperial and colonial troops: 9,035 troops in the native contingent; 802 Drivers, etc.

Commander Howse

Hi Mason .
I doubt very much that the Colenso's had any accurate idea of the numbers in the Columns , I'm not home so I cant check any other sources , but , as I said , the numbers I gave you were from the Intelligence department . If Springbok is online he may verify the numbers involved . Thanks for quoting your source . I also dont count the drivers or conductors as they can hardly be construed as ' fighting ' men and even with their numbers they are still well shy of 7 or 8 thousand .
Cheers 90th.  

90th, I would have to agree, the intelligence department would know the real number better than Colenso did. Again thank you for the help.

Commander Howse

CTSG
I dont think Monty Python translates very well into French.
Commander
I have the force for 3 col as being: Staff 20, RA 132, 1275 infantry and 3s0 cavalry 2566 Native Contingent 346 conductors 1507 oxen 49 horses 67 mules 220 wagons and 82 carts.
Hope that helps.

Cheers

Anyway,Masson this is not the number that counts the third column, like all other columns in January 1879 was sorely lacking of imperial troops ... It is also one of the causes of the defeat of Isandhlwana...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Mason.
Happy to try and help  
Cheers 90th.  

Thank you for the help Pascal and Springbok9.

Commander Howse

It's okay Masson, it's normal!

Commander Howse wrote:

90th, this is where I got the numbers from. I do not know if they are right or not.

Colenso, pp. 263–264 gives 7,800: 1752 Imperial and Colonial troops and 6054 Native Contingent and 377 Conductors and Drivers for the Number 2 Column under Durnford and the Number 3 Column under Glynn which made up Chelmsford's Main Column. The strength of the entire invasion force is given as a total of 16,506 for the five columns: 6,669 Imperial and colonial troops: 9,035 troops in the native contingent; 802 Drivers, etc.

Commander Howse

Please , please. Don't believe a word in that book. It's packed with lies. It's only purpose was to discredit the Good Lord Chelmsford. It failed!

Yes, but Colenso failed, but most others were successful, thank you god  LOL

Pascal, look on the bright side, If LC did not split his forces at Isandlwana he would have been massacred too. Then the Zulus most likely would have won the war. Then the Zulus would have lost the Second Anglo Zulu War.  

Commander Howse

Masson wrote: Pascal, look on the bright side, If LC ​​About did not split His force at Isandlwana he Would Have beens massacred too.

 Masson course, since the columns of the first invasion were very poorly made​​.

Masson wrote: Then the Zulus Would Have lost the Second Anglo Zulu War.

 The second (or rather third, see below) Anglo-Zulu war takes place in 1888 ...

Some purists will tell you that the Zulu rebellion of 1888 is the third Anglo-Zulu war, because there was a Zulu attack on a white colony long before 1879, the Zulu attack on a white colony long before 1879 is considered the real first Zulu war ...

What you call the second Zulu War was the second invasion of Zululand in 1879, this is not a new war, this is a new campaign in the same war ...

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal I wasn't counting the second invasion. I was assuming that if LC was killed and the entire number 3 column was wiped out there would not be a second invasion, just another war after the British become reorganized and after sending more soldiers.

Commander Howse

Yes Masson This is true, but it shall have not changed much !

I am finally set to stick with one person to blame at what happen at Isandlwana. After listening to others on here and after reading multiple sources, I am ready to say that the person to blame is LC. This is because in my experience you do not split your forces up when you do not have enough to do so, LC did this twice. The split at Isandlwana was the worst decision that anyone could have made. You do not send your entire/half of your army to scout. That is the job of the cavalry. When reports of Zulus to the east/north were coming in, LC should had sent a scouting party in both directions to find the real threat. I have not read anything about LC and what was going through his head at this time, but to me he sounds like someone who can not make decisions. The split at Isandlwana looks like he couldn't decide if the Zulus were to the east or to the north, so he decided to play it both ways leaving half of his army behind for the north reports and he took the other half to the east reports.

Many on here believe if he would have kept his forces together it would not have made any difference and he would have been killed as well, but I am still on the fence on that one. Some people believe that if Durnford or Pulline fought closer to the camp they would have survived, again I am on the fence on that too. The bottom line is that LC is the one that was out maneuvered by the Zulus and was even warned but like all officers that went down in defeat he decided that the north approach was to difficult, and like all greatest victory the army who gain that victory always came in the direction that was deemed impossible.  

PS This is my final decision on who is at fault. My last comment I said it would have to fall to Pulline, but in my opinion he was just there at the wrong place at the wrong time. There was no way with what he had to prepare for the Zulu attack.  

Commander Howse

Masson wrote: I am finally set to stick with one person to blame at what happen at Isandlwana. After listening to others on here and Effective reading multiple sources, I am ready to say That the person to blame is LC.

You've got it ...

Masson wrote: This is Because in my experience you do not split your strength up When You do not Have enough to do so, LC did this twice. The split at Isandlwana was the worst decision anyone That Could have made. You do not send your Entire / half of your army to scout. That is the job of the cavalry.

You still, all inclusive ...

Masson wrote: When reports of Zulus to the east / north Were coming in, SC shoulds HAD feels a scouting party in Both directions to find the real threat. I have not read anything about LC and what was going through His Head at this time, aim to me he sounds like someone Have you can not make decisions.

If! It can make decisions, but that bad!

Masson wrote: The split at Isandlwana looks like he couldn't decide if the Zulus Were to the east or to the north, so he Decided to play it both ways leaving behind half Time of the Old army for the north reports and He Took the other half to the east reports.

You once again, all inclusive ...

Masson wrote: Many here believe it if he kept Would Have His strengths together It Would not Have Made any difference and he Would Have-been killed as well, I am still aim on the fence on That One.

He was allegedly beaten ... But it was too cowardly to be killed, see how he panicked in Ulundi ...

Masson wrote: Some people believe That if gold Durnford Pulliene Fought closer to the camp They Would Have survived, again I am on the fence on that too.

They were beaten, but they would be dead ...

Masson wrote: The bottom line is That LC is the One That was out maneuvered by the Zulus and was even warned purpose like all officers That Went Down in defeat he Decided That was the north approach to difficulty, and like all the greatest victory army Have you That cam always gain victory in the management Deemed That was impossible.

You once again, all inclusive ...


Masson wrote: PS This is my final decision on All who is at fault. My last how I said it Would Have to fall for Pulliene, purpose in my opinion he was just there at the wrong spot at the wrong time. There was no way with what he HAD to prepare for the Zulu attack.

Congratulations!

Cheers

Pascal

Masson
Before delivering your final verdict let me pose a question.
Chelmsford is awoken in the early hours of the morning with a message that, wrongly or rightly, leads him to believe that the zulu impi is threatening a substantial portion of his, detached, column.
Does he attempt to rescue the Mangeni force? Or does he abandon them to their fate?
Just assume the impi was in the Mangeni Valley and did attack Dartnel. To quote:' What would the papers at breakfast say'?
Did he therefore have any choice but to support Dartnel?
Once that question had been answered the next in line would be how?
He, Chelmsford, was there for one reason and one reason only, to beat the zulu army in combat. Wasnt this then what he was looking for, wasnt this his target?
That decision having been made the last question would have been : How?
He couldnt pack up the whole camp and trundle of across the plain. It had taken over a week just to get the bloated mass from RD, he wasnt going to do it in a couple of hours!
His only reasoned option was to take a flying column, or at least an unemcumbered task force. At the same time all his supplies etc had to be guarded. How does he do that? He splits his force.

The fact that from that point he splits and re splits his Mangeni force is another topic.

Do you still believe that Chelmsford was solely at fault for the reason he split his force?

He is to blame for a lot, a hell of a lot, but I dont believe splitting the column was the cross he should bare.

Think again wasnt the column split from RD onwards?

Cheers

springbok9 wrote : Chelmsford is awoken in the early hours of the morning with a message that, wrongly or rightly, leads him to believe that the zulu impi is threatening a substantial portion of his, detached, column.Does he attempt to rescue the Mangeni force? Or does he abandon them to their fate?

He did that in order to fold it! She was not surrounded and was enough mobile to fold without breaking ...


springbok9 wrote :Just assume the impi was in the Mangeni Valley and did attack Dartnel. To quote:' What would the papers at breakfast say'?Did he therefore have any choice but to support Dartnel?

Yes, as I explained above ...

springbok9 wrote :Once that question had been answered the next in line would be how?He, Chelmsford, was there for one reason and one reason only, to beat the zulu army in combat. Wasnt this then what he was looking for, wasnt this his target.That decision having been made the last question would have been : How?

The sequences of most colonial wars have proven that it is useless to seek the enemy ... A good general at the head of the third column, have once entered in Zululand, chosen his battlefield , set up a good defensive position with a good deployment of the troops ...

He was sure to be attacked by the Zulu royal army and with a good preparation, as indicated above, he had a chance to win, after he could sink in Zululand to Ulundi, waiting for the next attack that it would have countered in same way ...


springbok9 wrote : He couldnt pack up the whole camp and trundle of across the plain. It had taken over a week just to get the bloated mass from RD, he wasnt going to do it in a couple of hours!
His only reasoned option was to take a flying column, or at least an unemcumbered task force. At the same time all his supplies etc had to be guarded. How does he do that? He splits his force.

He did not have to make detachments, it was about to be attacked ... By cons, Isandhlwana was a very bad choice to establish a camp or any defensive position for the third column...

springbok9 wrote: The fact That he splits from That Point and re splits His strength is Mangeni Reviews another topic.

Do you still believe That Solely Chelmsford was at fault for the reason he split His strength?

He is to blame for a lot, a hell of a lot, which I believe goal splitting the column was the cross he shoulds bare.

Think again Was not the column split from RD onwards?

Dartnell course carries a very large share of the responsibility for the disaster, but it is still LC, who sent Dartnell out and about, but in war the responsibility of the victory or defeat, is the concern only of the C-in-C ...

Cheers

Pascal

After more research Major Dartnell did spot a force of Zulus to the east towards King's Karal (Ulundi). LC also had reports earlier that there were Zulus in the North not once but twice. He was even told this by Durnford, one of the senior officers on the field. To me this says three things a flanking maneuver, diversion, or reinforcements heading north, unless Dartnell specified what direction they were heading. To me this is not enough information to go by to split your force up, especially in open land and bad terrain.

It is obvious that the British High Command there in Zululand underestimated the Zulus and were caught off guard. In fact LC said himself he was scared the Zulus wouldn't fight, LC was looking for a fight and fell in a trap. springbok9, you bring up a good topic when you state how would it look in the papers. When an Officer tries to conduct a war based on how the people or politicians would act is just asking for failure. LC was to worry what everybody back at home thought about his little expedition. In my opinion Major Dartnell could have taken care of himself, that is what a scouting party is for to send back information and if they get trapped or killed it is not a big loss (military terms).  

LC allowed the Zulus to choose the battle ground and it was a good one for the Zulus. If LC did what Wood did at the Battle of Khambula, we wouldn't be talking about this. By underestimating the Zulus LC as the Chief Commander, LC is to blame for the situation he put everyone in at Isandlwana, by leaving the men there unprotected. As a commander you do not want to be caught moving your forces when the enemy attacks. If the Zulus would have attacked LC or waited for the 1st/24th to move to LC position, it would have been a total massacre and Zulus would have suffered less casualties.

He splits the army into 4 columns (which is understandable), he left a company of number 3 column at RD (which doesn't make any sense, if the Zulus counter attack they would have been wiped out), then he split number 2 column into pieces and ordered them in every direction(indecision kills), then he split number 3 column again at Isandlwana, then LC splits them again to search for the Zulus east of Islandwana (again indecision kills). Even with these splits if he would have simply fortified the camps and sent out native calvary to screen there movements they could have beaten the Zulus easily. LC just underestimated the Zulus thinking they were just savages. In essence this is the fualt of the planner not the subordinates.    

That is why I blame LC for the disaster at Isandlwana because he allowed the Zulus to dictate the battle.  

Commander Howse

Hi Masson
Hindsight is a wonderful analytical tool for what if situations.
The zulu never chose isandlwana, Chelmsford did. 
You havent addressed my main point though, what were Chelmsfords options on the evening/morning of the 21st/22nd. Bear in mind that the "intel" you refer to from Durnford was heresay only. The "intel" he had received was from Dartnels probing. There was no other source at that time Reports being garnered from Browne etc only started to emerge on the 22nd, when the col was on the move.
By the way the movements of Dartnel, Lonsdale and Hamilton Brown were a flanking move.
Dont think because I take a position against you that Im a Chelmsford fan, I leave that to the missguided thoughts of CTSG, I believe that the fault cannot lay with one man, the entire command structure was at fault and are all culpable. However there are certain points that the Red Baron cannot be blamed for. 

 

cheers

Chelmsford chose Isandlwana to camp, the Zulus chose to attack the British there. In essence the Zulus chose the battlefield. The Zulus lured Chelmsford away from the camp and attached the 1/24th. I assume that they wanted Chelmsford to move forward and they would have sweeped behind him and attach number 3 column's rear or even possibly surround the column. The northern Zulu movements reports were before the eastern ones. They would never have imaged he would split his forces, and it most likely saved LC, #3 column, and the War.

I agree many people are to blame, and personally I do not really blame anybody, they just got caught up in the moment, it is easier for me to say who is at fought and what they should have done than it was to decide what should have been done at the time of the actual war. I am just stating for militaristic purposes what should have been done.

I am baseing my opinion on my knowledge and if I have never learned or heard about the Anglo Zulu War, what I would do if I was in the same situation.

To answer your question

I would have sent two scouting parties in each direction of the Zulu reports. When I receive general reports of Zulu movements I would secure the camp and stay put in the area of my choosing, this is were engineers and being a professional officer comes in handy. I would wait to know for sure were is the enemy and what they are doing. Then if I have to move I would use the cavalry to screen my advance. I would only move with my supplies and on ground of my choosing. In this situation time is not everything. I would take my time. I would only move the army when I truly know were the enemy was. If scouting parties came back and report in detail that there is a large force to the north and moderate force to the east, I would force an engagement with cavalry with my entire fore intact at the camp that was fortified in any way. As long as the troops were in easy reach of the ammo wagons the British would have won the day and had an open rode to Ulundi.

Never split your forces when you do not have the full picture and never let the enemy dictate the war and never use your whole/half of your army to find the enemy .

Masson wrote : After more research Major Dartnell did spot a force of Zulus to the east towards King's Karal (Ulundi). LC also had reports earlier that there were Zulus in the North not once but twice. He was even told this by Durnford, one of the senior officers on the field. To me this says three things a flanking maneuver, diversion, or reinforcements heading north, unless Dartnell specified what direction they were heading. To me this is not enough information to go by to split your force up, especially in open land and bad terrain.

Ah, that's for sure!

Masson wrote :It is obvious that the British High Command there in Zululand underestimated the Zulus and were caught off guard. In fact LC said himself he was scared the Zulus wouldn't fight, LC was looking for a fight and fell in a trap. springbok9, you bring up a good topic when you state how would it look in the papers. When an Officer tries to conduct a war based on how the people or politicians would act is just asking for failure. LC was to worry what everybody back at home thought about his little expedition. In my opinion Major Dartnell could have taken care of himself, that is what a scouting party is for to send back information and if they get trapped or killed it is not a big loss (military terms).

Right!

Masson wrote :LC allowed the Zulus to choose the battle ground and it was a good one for the Zulus. If LC did what Wood did at the Battle of Khambula, we wouldn't be talking about this. By underestimating the Zulus LC as the Chief Commander, LC is to blame for the situation he put everyone in at Isandlwana, by leaving the men there unprotected. As a commander you do not want to be caught moving your forces when the enemy attacks. If the Zulus would have attacked LC or waited for the 1st/24th to move to LC position, it would have been a total massacre and Zulus would have suffered less casualties.

With all the third column on a well-prepared (but not Isandhlwana!) Position + all mounted troops of the second column, there was a faint hope of victory ...

Masson wrote : He splits the army into 4 columns (which is understandable), he left a company of number 3 column at RD (which doesn't make any sense, if the Zulus counter attack they would have been wiped out),

False Masson, the problems of logistics prohibited a small number of columns, if these columns would have been much too long ,they could not have maneuvrer in zululand.For RD, it was a supply stores of the third column ,it's normal he had to one on the Natal Fronier at the beginning of the invasion ...


Masson wrote :then he split number 2 column into pieces and ordered them in every direction(indecision kills), then he split number 3 column again at Isandlwana, then LC splits them again to search for the Zulus east of Islandwana (again indecision kills). Even with these splits if he would have simply fortified the camps and sent out native calvary to screen there movements they could have beaten the Zulus easily. LC just underestimated the Zulus thinking they were just savages. In essence this is the fualt of the planner not the subordinates.

Very good ,but no camp at isandhlwana...

Masson wrote :That is why I blame LC for the disaster at Isandlwana because he allowed the Zulus to dictate the battle.

Congratulations!

Cheers

Pascal

Perhaps it would pay to read the TMFH.  

Pascal, Thank you for your support. I forgot that RD was a supply post, it now makes sense.

Commander Howse

Chard1879, Thank You, I will read the TMFH  .

Commander Howse

Masson wrote :Chelmsford chose Isandlwana to camp, the Zulus chose to attack the British there. In essence the Zulus chose the battlefield.

But no, they chose nothing, they attacked the British, to the place where they were most numerous ...

Masson wrote :The Zulus lured Chelmsford away from the camp...

No there was no Zulu feints , in front of Dartnell, there was only a local clan army, it's Dartnell which induced LC in mistake ...

Masson wrote :and attached the 1/24th. I assume that they wanted Chelmsford to move forward and they would have sweeped behind him and attach number 3 column's rear or even possibly surround the column. The northern Zulu movements reports were before the eastern ones. They would never have imaged he would split his forces, and it most likely saved LC, #3 column, and the War.

No, no the Zulu plan was to attack the British army to the place where she had her biggest strength, whatever this number and location ...

Masson wrote : I agree many people are to blame, and personally I do not really blame anybody, they just got caught up in the moment, it is easier for me to say who is at fought and what they should have done than it was to decide what should have been done at the time of the actual war. I am just stating for militaristic purposes what should have been done.

Yes, but rarely a British army was commanded by such an   ...

Masson wrote : I am baseing my opinion on my knowledge and if I have never learned or heard about the Anglo Zulu War, what I would do if I was in the same situation.

I will have chosen a better location, I would not have sent detachments and expected the attack ...

Masson wrote :To answer your question . I would have sent two scouting parties in each direction of the Zulu reports. When I receive general reports of Zulu movements I would secure the camp and stay put in the area of my choosing, this is were engineers and being a professional officer comes in handy. I would wait to know for sure were is the enemy and what they are doing. Then if I have to move I would use the cavalry to screen my advance. I would only move with my supplies and on ground of my choosing. In this situation time is not everything. I would take my time. I would only move the army when I truly know were the enemy was. If scouting parties came back and report in detail that there is a large force to the north and moderate force to the east, I would force an engagement with cavalry with my entire fore intact at the camp that was fortified in any way. As long as the troops were in easy reach of the ammo wagons the British would have won the day and had an open rode to Ulundi.

I will have chosen a better location, I would not have sent detachments and expected the attack ...

Masson wrote :Never split your forces when you do not have the full picture and never let the enemy dictate the war and never use your whole/half of your army to find the enemy .


Bravo !

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal I would have to, but I am going as if I just took command from LC while already at Isandlwana.

After writing the statement, I realized that it could have been that way. They were going to attack on the 23 but seeing LC leave half of a weaken force behind they decided to attack then.

Commander Howse

Masson wrote : Pascal I would have to, but I am going as if I just took command from LC while already at Isandlwana.

After writing the statement, I realized that it could have been that way. They were going to attack on the 23 but seeing LC leave half of a weaken force behind they decided to attack then.

No this is a myth, they would not attack the 23 but 22! Proof they do...

Cheers

Pascal

impi  

impi, I agree the failure of Isandlwana battle was PULLIENE's fault for not fortifying the camp. He was getting reports of large number of Zulus two to three hours before Durnford arrived. Pulliene should have done something to secure the camp well before Durnford arrived. Durnford's orders are still in question, so he can not be entirely blamed, because we do not know what his real orders were. Only people that knew had a lot to lose and can not be trusted.

Who got them there, left them, took most of the artillery, and went on a fools mission without knowing the entire picture. It was LC, but as I mention earlier there are more to blame. Another thing Durnford's arrival and the Zulu attack where within an hour or so of each other. Sources say he went out to prevent LC from being cut off and ran into the Zulu army.

Commander Howse

Commander Howse wrote:

impi, I agree the failure of Isandlwana battle was PULLIENE's fault for not fortifying the camp. He was getting reports of large number of Zulus two to three hours before Durnford arrived. Pulliene should have done something to secure the camp well before Durnford arrived. Durnford's orders are still in question, so he can not be entirely blamed, because we do not know what his real order were. Only people that knew had a lot to lose and can not be trusted.

Who got them there, left them, took most of the artillery, and went on a fools mission without knowing the entire picture. It was LC, but as I mention earlier there are more to blame. Another thing Durnford's arrival and the Zulu attack where within an hour or so of each other. Sources say he went out to prevent LC from being cut off and ran into the Zulu army.

Commander Howse  

I woundn't say it was a fools mission! after all he was going to the aid of another officer! I think Springbok question is valid, what would the papers have said if Darnell force had been wiped out. It would have been said that a thousand men with state of the art weapons and artillery could have held back the zulu army, and that LC should have gone to the aid of poor Major Dartnell who he hung out to dry.
The battle was at Isandlwana, not where LC was. Pulleine and Durnford were the men on the gound at the time. Was ironic about all this, is that Durnford arrived at Isandlwana, and saw for himself that nothing had been done, he has a few choice words with Pulliene regarding who's in command. Pulliene concedes and hands over to Durnford, they have Breakfast, and yet Durnford had also failed to do anything. Reports come in that Zulus are moving towards the camp, and what does Durnford do, he wants two companies of the 24th reg of "FOOT" to walk behind him, like the rocket battery to meet the Zulu in the open. each man carrying 70 rounds of allocated ammuntion. We know what happen to the Rocket Battery they were left behind by play it safe Durnford. The only fault LC is guilty of, is leaving to idiot officers in command.

Major Darnell was not in any trouble. LC's taste for a fight forced him to advance so he wouldn't miss a fight. In order not to miss the fight he desperately wanted he divided his forces to speed up his advance. When there are reports of enemy movements to the north and east of Isandlwana, this should have not been done. In doing so, he took alot of men, rifle and artillery away from 1/24th and other parts of # 3 column. Even if the order to fight close to camp without any way to prevent the Zulus from advancing into the British Camp it would have been the same outcome, just more Zulus dead.

Again if a General plans his campaign based on the opinions of the politicians and citizens reading the paper he is destined to fail.

Again Durnford was to advance to the Camp not take command of it. Once the fight began he then took command and did the best he could have done in the situation. The camp not being fortified was on Pulliene. LC left 1st/24th and the others of # 3 Column at Isandlwana out to dry. Just think what would have happen if the Zulus attacked before Durnford arrived.

Commander Howse

I think if you was in Major Dartnells shoes, you would have seen it from his perpective! They couldn't move. It was Dartnell would wanted to attacked but requested reinforcments. As said before LC at first refused to help. And yes LC wanted a quick fight, thinking with the superior weapons it would all be over quickly, but then so did most of the officers and men under him. Don't forget he was under the allusion that he was about to engage the main zulu army, he needed alot more men and artillery than those required to defend a supply camp. Pulliene was always go to follow up with the supplies and meetup with LC if the camp had not been attack. I think if they had been closer to the camp, with ample ammuntion, the Zulu would have lost heart. Somewhere on the forum, John worked out the amount of rounds that would have been poured into the zulu ranks, it would not have been nice. They were to far away, to be able to hold back the zulu ranks, and once their ammuntion had been expended they had no choice but to retreat back to the camp, looking for more ammuntion. All to late.

If you do not fault LC for making the assumption that the Martini Henry would win the day, you can not fault Pulliene from making the same assumption. He ordered his troops to fight in line, he felt this was the best scenario for the Martini Henry. Martini Henry is useless in open field. The problem was that in order to defend the camp one had to fight away from it because it was to large of a camp. They tried to protect to much ground. The other problem is they did not have enough men at least regulars to do anything. The mounted soldiers were useless and had to revert to Infantry. That is why he is at fault. If Dartnell was in so much trouble where was the Zulu when LC arrived? If I was in Dartnell's situation and pin down I would have sent for reinforcement, but I would not expect LC to split the forces up. I would expect some help and would understand if no or little help came. Especially when there were reports to the north that could hit the camp at Isandlwana and/or flank the column. You never sever your supply line, and that is what he did. He left his supply line weak and they were attacked and destroyed.  

Commander Howse

I'm not saying LC was without fault! What i'm saying is, he needs to be taken out of the equation. based on the fact he was not at Isandlwana.

Capt: Garner had the sense to advise Pulleine to disobay LC orders, why because LC was unaware of what was unfolding back at the camp. They didnt have mobile phones back then. Those in command should have had the experience to deploy the men in accordance with the situation, not as directed by a standing order. I'm not faulting Pulleine for making the same assumption, he no doubt witnessed some of the men laughing and becking the zulu on, thats how confident they were. It was the deployment and lack of ammuntion that lost the day.

impi, I agree with that statement.

Commander Howse

Impi .
I may have missed it , but by who and where is it stated that LC refused to help Dartnell in the first instance  
90th  

90th I think you will find, that was said by Crealock.  

Here you go!

"1. Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

1. Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force
said to be 12 or 14 miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, 4 guns R.A., and Mounted  Infantry."
2. I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."  The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M.

That's the one Littlehand  

Interesting to see it was Glyn who made representation, to go to Dartnells assistance. I suppose LC had to agree with him, after all Glyn was in commard of no 3 Column  

"The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M."

 

Hi Littlehand .
Thanks for that but I doubt its truthfulness , we are all aware that Crealock's original orders NEVER instructed Durnford to TAKE COMMAND of the camp ! . This we have discussed on its own thread ! . I can see why LC initially didnt wish to support Dartnell , the simple fact was , he had other plans , but , when Dartnell sent back that he ( thought he had ) found the zulu main force , nothing was going to hold LC back , as we all know he wanted to attack them quickly , as he put it , once they have had a taste of the M.H I doubt they will wish to do so again , or words to that very effect ! . Impi has implied , or it seems by his post , that LC didnt want to support Dartnell when the note arrived during the early hours of the 22nd .
Cheers 90th.

90th, I agree with everything you stated.  

Commander Howse

90th wrote:

Hi Littlehand .
Thanks for that but I doubt its truthfulness , we are all aware that Crealock's original orders NEVER instructed Durnford to TAKE COMMAND of the camp ! . This we have discussed on its own thread ! . I can see why LC initially didnt wish to support Dartnell , the simple fact was , he had other plans , but , when Dartnell sent back that he ( thought he had ) found the zulu main force , nothing was going to hold LC back , as we all know he wanted to attack them quickly , as he put it , once they have had a taste of the M.H I doubt they will wish to do so again , or words to that very effect ! . Impi has implied , or it seems by his post , that LC didnt want to support Dartnell when the note arrived during the early hours of the 22nd .
Cheers 90th.

Same old, same old. If it doesn't fit in, then it didn't happen or someone's was lying. Crealock's evidence like all the others who gave evidence is primary source. 90th it's a shame, this discussion was doing well but as normal in you come with you " hindsight" " read between the lines" which brings it to a stop! Where can any discussion go, when you keep saying it didn't happen! Read the evidence. If it didn't happen then show something that proves it didn't happen.

Masson  wrote :Chelmsford chose Isandlwana to camp, the Zulus chose to attack the British there. In essence the Zulus chose the battlefield.

Pascal wrote : But no, they chose nothing, they attacked the British, to the place where they were most numerous ...

Impi wrote : THEY ATTACKED THE BRITISH ON THE 22ND BECAUSE THEY WERE FOUND, AND SHOT AT!!!

Pascal wrote : Any ways they have attacked that day ...

Masson  wrote :The Zulus lured Chelmsford away from the camp...

Pascal wrote : No there was no Zulu feints , in front of  Dartnell, there was only a local clan army, it's Dartnell which induced LC in mistake ...

Impi wrote : WHEN LC FIRST RECEIVED THE NEWS THAT DARTNEL HAD REQUESTED HELP, LC REFUSED. HE WAS IN AN AWKWARD SITUATION AND AFTER SOME THOUGHT, HE BELIEVED THAT THE MAIN ZULU ARMY HAD BEEN FOUND. HIS INTENTION WAS TO TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE ZULU.

Pascal wrote :That's what I said ,  it's Dartnell which induced LC in mistake ...

Masson  wrote :and attached the 1/24th. I assume that they wanted Chelmsford to move forward and they would have sweeped behind him and attach number 3 column's rear or even possibly surround the column. The northern Zulu movements reports were before the eastern ones. They would never have imaged he would split his forces, and it most likely saved LC, #3 column, and the War.

Impi wrote : I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE ZULU HAD INTENDED, IF THEY HAD LEFT THE FIGHT UNTIL THE 23RD, THE CAMP WOULD HAVE BEEN EMPTY? POSSIBLE HIT THE WHOLD COLUMN AS ONE!

Pascal wrote :No, no the Zulu plan was to attack the British army to the place where she had her biggest strength, whatever this number and location ...They have attacked the 22 ...

Masson  wrote : I agree many people are to blame, and personally I do not really blame anybody, they just got caught up in the moment, it is easier for me to say who is at fought and what they should have done than it was to decide what should have been done at the time of the actual war. I am just stating for militaristic purposes what should have been done.

Pascal wrote :Yes, but rarely a British army was commanded by such an    ...

Impi wrote :LC WAS NOT AT ISANDLWANA WHEN IT WAS ATTACKED, WHATEVER NEEDED TO BE DONE THAT DAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN BY THE TWO OFFICERS LEFT IN-COMMAND.

Pascal wrote :If LC ​​had been there, it would not have changed his given talent! And Zulu laughed although there or not !

Masson wrote : I am baseing my opinion on my knowledge and if I have never learned or heard about the Anglo Zulu War, what I would do if I was in the same situation.

Pascal wrote : I will have chosen a better location, I would not have sent detachments and expected the attack ...

Impi wrote :HARD ONE, WHEN YOU LEFT OVER A THOUSAND MEN WITH STATE OF THE ART WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY!

Pascal wrote : But that's before LC get to Issandhlwana , ,I will have chosen a better location, I would not have sent detachments and expected the attack ...

Masson wrote :To answer your question . I would have sent two scouting parties in each direction of the Zulu reports. When I receive general reports of Zulu movements I would secure the camp and stay put in the area of my choosing, this is were engineers and being a professional officer comes in handy. I would wait to know for sure were is the enemy and what they are doing. Then if I have to move I would use the cavalry to screen my advance. I would only move with my supplies and on ground of my choosing. In this situation time is not everything. I would take my time. I would only move the army when I truly know were the enemy was. If scouting parties came back and report in detail that there is a large force to the north and moderate force to the east, I would force an engagement with cavalry with my entire fore intact at the camp that was fortified in any way. As long as the troops were in easy reach of the ammo wagons the British would have won the day and had an open rode to Ulundi.

Impi wrote : PULLIENE WAS GETTING REPORTS VERY EARLY REGARDING ZULU MOVEMENTS, HE DONE NOTHING, WHEN DURNFORD ARRIVED THEY HAD BREAKFAST AND DONE NOTHING IN ANYWAY TO FORTIFIY THE CAMP. NOR DID LC, BUT HE  WASN'T THERE DURING THE ATTACK.

Pascal wrote :I will have chosen a better location, I would not have sent detachments and expected the attack ... LC banned fortify the camp ... And that Pulleine control Isandhlwana , not Durnford ... Durnford was only just passing through ...

Masson wrote :Never split your forces when you do not have the full picture and never let the enemy dictate the war and never use your whole/half of your army to find the enemy

Impi wrote : NEVER LEAVE MEN WHO CANNOT COMMAND A MILITARY INSTALLATION, UNLESS THEY SEE EYE TO EYE. WE ALL AGREED AGES BACK THAT IF THE MEN HAD BEEN DEPLOYED CORRECTLY (not so far from the camp)  AND AMMO STATIONS SET-OUT, THE OUTCOME MAY HAVE BEEN BETTER?

Pascal wrote : No , the defeat is irreversible except if  LC Have Chosen a better location, I would not feel Have Detachments and the expected attack ...

Cheers

Pascal

Dartnel first message to Chelmsford stated that he was in contact with a zulu force and would engage in the morning, he requested supplies be sent.
Chelmsford received that message when scouting the nqutu plateau.
Impi is correct in that Crealock asked if Dartnel was to be re enforced, Chelmsford declined ( Dartnels message didnt ask for re enforcements).
During that evening the NNC stampeded on a number of occasions leaving Dartnel with the knowledge that they, the NNC, were not capable of attcking the zulu and re enforcement was required.
As a result of that a second message to Chelmsford stated that situation.
According to Crealock Chelmsford had decided ( see phara 6 Crealocks evidence) to make a reconnaissance to our front. ( That would be to the East and the Mangeni ).
The second message from Dartnel was delivered to Clery who delivered it to Glynn, he in turn ordered it taken to Chelmsford. There is no mention by Glynn or Clery of representations to re enforce.
Crealock states he wasnt present for the discussions between Chelmsford and Clery, thats not quite factual. Its recorded that Crealock was laying in his bed when he heard that and objected as Clery was to junior to issue instructions to a column commander, Chelmsford then ordered Crealock to do so.
So it boils down to a do you believe Crealock or not scenarion as to whether Glynn was involved or not.
Personal I believe that Glynn was so withdrawn from being bypassed by Chelmsford in general that he wouldnt have been involved at all.

To bring the discussion back on track though, from the moment Dartnel decided to disobey orders and spend the night outside the camp is the key point. Chelmsford had no option what so ever, he had to go to his aid. The fact that it fitted into his plans was just a bonus.

Cheers

Crealock was a proven liar, he would say anything to protect his own and LC's backside, so anyone who believes anything he says must be very gullible. There has been much debate on this forum regarding Col Durnford, and even with all the evidence to prove that he was NOT to blame for iSandlwana, there are still those that will not accept it because it doesn't fit in with their misguided beliefs. It has become pointless trying to change their opinion regarding Col Durnford, their minds are made up, and no matter how much evidence you give them to prove that Col Durnford was scapegoated and blamed for the massacre at iSandlwana, they still refuse to 'see the light' because their stubborn minds will not accept anything other than to blame Col Durnford.

Col Durnford was an honourable and very brave man, but his name and reputation have been blackened by the likes of LC, Crealock, etc, in an effort to protect LC's backside and put the blame on Col Durnford, and with him being killed at iSandlwana he could not defend himself against the false accusations thrown around by LC and the rest of his cronies, and between them they conspired to destroy the reputation of a brave and noble officer, shame on them.

springbok9 wrote : Dartnel first message to Chelmsford stated that he was in contact with a zulu force and would engage in the morning, he requested supplies be sent.

Really, Dartnell decided to engage the zulus without asking pemission to Lord Chelmsford?

springbok9 wrote : Chelmsford received that message when scouting the nqutu plateau.
Impi is correct in that Crealock asked if Dartnel was to be re enforced, Chelmsford declined ( Dartnels message didnt ask for re enforcements).
During that evening the NNC stampeded on a number of occasions leaving Dartnel with the knowledge that they, the NNC, were not capable of attcking the zulu and re enforcement was required.

Lord Chelmsford believed that the Zulu royal army was in front of Dartnell!And this is the fault of Dartnel that Lord Chelmsford believed that ...

springbok9 wrote : As a result of that a second message to Chelmsford stated that situation.
According to Crealock Chelmsford had decided ( see phara 6 Crealocks evidence) to make a reconnaissance to our front. ( That would be to the East and the Mangeni ).
The second message from Dartnel was delivered to Clery who delivered it to Glynn, he in turn ordered it taken to Chelmsford. There is no mention by Glynn or Clery of representations to re enforce.
Crealock states he wasnt present for the discussions between Chelmsford and Clery, thats not quite factual. Its recorded that Crealock was laying in his bed when he heard that and objected as Clery was to junior to issue instructions to a column commander, Chelmsford then ordered Crealock to do so.
So it boils down to a do you believe Crealock or not scenarion as to whether Glynn was involved or not.
Personal I believe that Glynn was so withdrawn from being bypassed by Chelmsford in general that he wouldnt have been involved at all.

To bring the discussion back on track though, from the moment Dartnel decided to disobey orders and spend the night outside the camp is the key point. Chelmsford had no option what so ever, he had to go to his aid. The fact that it fitted into his plans was just a bonus.

Well yes, I said dozens of times on this forum for months, that Dartnel was mistaken and misled Lord Chelmsford!

Lord Chelmsford had only remembered Dartnel and his troops, rather than going to strengthen ... There would not have too much damage and the Zulu attack on the camp may have failed to ...