The ammunition question

Just been thinking, yes it hurts!, they could have let the Zulus get within 100 yards. They would have dropped thousands in the first volley. Certainly would have slowed them down not easy running over piles if dead bodies, ten seconds later another volley.

Lord Chelmsford himself suggested latterly that the best way to have defended the camp would have been to line up the companies with their backs against the hill.
But this too has been picked apart by military strategists - why? - the Zulu warriors could climb and they would have attacked the lines from the rear!!!

Quote :

tasker224
Thu Jan 24, 2013 10:07 pm  
Lord Chelmsford himself suggested latterly that the best way to have defended the camp would have been to line up the companies with their backs against the hill.
But this too has been picked apart by military strategists - why? - the Zulu warriors could climb and they would have attacked the lines from the rear!!!

Forum member John as always maintain this even before the Chelmsford take on the matter was posted. You can read Johns posts on this at the very early stages of the forum.

As for climbing Zulus I doubt that very much. And I would be very keen to read where military strategist pick Chelmsford idea apart.

24th .
Not bagging you but I think you may have watched to many war movies on TV ! . As you said '' let the zulus get within 100 yds and fire a volley , they would've dropped thousands '' ! . Well not really as there were only 6 - 700 men in the firing line . So if everyone killed one , that is only 6 or 700 ! . Then as you say '' wait 10 sec and fire again '' , well within that wait time of 10 sec they wouldnt get a chance to fire another volley as they would be in hand to hand combat ! . So I doubt your plan would be successful .

John .
The men werent deployed in companies all around the battlefield ( with the exception of the two companies that were sent up into the hills ) they were strung out in a Dog Leg formation with a soldier to every 2 - 4 yds , this info is in all the books on Isandlwana ! . Things no doubt changed as they began to withdraw , no doubt in Company formation during the withdrawl. You are also neglecting the smoke problem , volley fire produced much smoke when after several volleys in quick succession they wouldnt be able to see what was in front of them , dont forget their was much dead ground and places were the zulu could take cover as in the grass etc , etc .
90th

Hi Springbok .
In answer to your reply regarding my post . The amount of Ammunition detritus found near the front is neither here nor there , the problem is
still the supply , if as you say there may have been '' to much ammo there '' then there was a major problem with its distribution on the line itself ! . Possibly there may have been to much ammo as you say , but did it arrive much to late to be fully utilized ?? . We will never know !. Unless of course someone invents a Time Machine !
Cheers 90th.

90th
Funny you should mention the time machine. I should have it in operation next week. Its based on an old De Lorian, silver actually

Cheers MAte

Hello to all

You make me laugh all to believe that you did not read that Springbok9 and me yesterday have calculated

The infantry was on the line of fire for approx 1 hour and 20 minutes = 80 minutes.

The maximun of hit with the british imperial infantry fire is at 4% as at RD and at RD , the shooting took place at close range in general ...

25 rounds to kill or injure a Zulu RD, as some have died another way in this fight ...

In 80 minutes on the line of fire, the infantry was not even able to fire 170 cartridges per man - 70 on each soldiers and 100 in reserve per soldier in the companies scotch carts ...

For Isandhlwana, the statistics can not beings higher than at RD

That's why the Zulus were retrieve many cartridges in scotch carts ...

Them and their contents, have been abandoned by the infantry when she fled to the camp ...

Firing rate was very slow, 1 shot per minute or maybe 2 in 3 minutes ...

Unless the scoch carts have made ​​several trips between the line of fire and the camp during the 80 minutes or the infantry was on the line of fire, which is not certain

To fire at the theoretical cadence of fire in volley fire for 80 minutes, it would have taken much more ammunition and anyway , 80 x 4 = 320 cartridges fired by each soldiers in 80 minutes it is impossible (Unless the scoch carts have made ​​several trips between the line of fire and the camp during the 80 minutes or the infantry was on the line of fire, which is not certain), but it was also physically impossible to fire 80 minutes at the theoretical cadence ...

Cheers

Pascal

. I hope you have a large Flux compacitor ?? .
Cheers 90th.

A what ? You do not like the color ?

The Flux compacitor is what makes it go !

Go where ?

90th
Been having some problems with the flux capaciter lately, must be getting old.

I'm very well, and even better, since my birthday, I just feel that on this topic, there are those who confuse MH and assault rifles ...


Cheers

Pascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

I just feel that on this topic, there are those who confuse MH and assault rifles ...

Cheers

Pascal

And flux capacitators!

Ray63 wrote:

Quote :

tasker224
Thu Jan 24, 2013 10:07 pm  
Lord Chelmsford himself suggested latterly that the best way to have defended the camp would have been to line up the companies with their backs against the hill.
But this too has been picked apart by military strategists - why? - the Zulu warriors could climb and they would have attacked the lines from the rear!!!

Forum member John as always maintain this even before the Chelmsford take on the matter was posted. You can read Johns posts on this at the very early stages of the forum.

As for climbing Zulus I doubt that very much. And I would be very keen to read where military strategist pick Chelmsford idea apart.

Ray, I believe Lord Chelmsford postulated this as a putative defence quite a while before John did.
I have read of this in various books over the years. If my memory serves me correctly, FWD Jackson's, "The sources re-examined", covers it nice and concisely.

Chelmsford gave his version in the house of commons way before Mr Jackson. But if you read it correctly his recommend action, was feasible. And would have work.

I expect I will get a reply regarding those at Isandlwana were only following Chelsmsford orders, but Chelmsford wasn't there, and he giving his account of what could have been done.

Pulleine should have taken Gardeners advice!!

Tasker ,I do not confuse flux capacitators ! Nor MH with Assault Rifles ... Like many on this forum...

Instructions of LC to Pulleine were to start the shooting at 700 yards ..;

LC and Pulleine had confused the Zulus with something else ...

Cheers

Pascal

Ray 63
Your quite right and I fully agree it could have worked, not would but could.

Cheers

"Could" being better than total wipe out.

John fully agree, if the men had been located to suit the situation.

But yes, Pulleine followed the instruction of LC for the defense of the camp

Ray63 wrote:

Chelmsford gave his version in the house of commons way before Mr Jackson.

That's what Jackson discusses, Chelmsford's suggestion. It is not Jackson's "version", Ray, it is Jackson's analysis of Chelmsford's suggestion.
Do you have Jackson's book Ray? It is worth a read if you haven't.

Ray63 wrote:

Pulleine should have taken Gardeners advice!!

He did

He ignored the order to pack the camp




Cheers

Yes, but it is because he was ordered to disassemble the camp at the instand that the battle begins ...

springbok9 wrote:

Ray 63
Your quite right and I fully agree it could have worked, not would but could.

Cheers

Indeed Springy, Chelmsford was not a fool, especially when armed with hind-sight, which Pulleine did not have the benefit of.
Firing lines backed on to the hill would have undoubtedly been an improvement on the defence set up by Pulleine, and probably would have been much more effective.
Could it have saved the day? We'll never know of course.
However, the camp and hill would still have been surrounded in the usual fashion and the Zulu would almost certainly have infiltrated the rear of the lines with the horns undermining the position from over and around the western side of the hill, as the chest engaged from the front.

Pascal MAHE wrote:

But yes, Pulleine followed the instruction of LC for the defense of the camp

Pascal, Ray had previously pointed this out in his post, before yours, that Chelmsford was not there!!!
As such, Pulleine would have been well within his rights, and indeed expected, to defend the camp using his own iniative regarding tactics.
Pulleine was the senior officer on the ground as the situation unfoded in front of him. The calls were his.

Consider upgrading your flux capacitor so you can go and check it out!

Tasker

Cavaye was already on the Spur and Durnfords force was all over the hills, also Pulleine had to defend the camp and if he had put his back to the moutain than all the supplies would have been lost.



Cheers

Yes but Pulleine has still followed the instructions of LC ...

Consider upgrading your flux capacitor also Tasker ,because you you repeat

One particularly persistent legend has it that the British were overrun at Isandlwana because of a failure of ammunition supply, either through the parsimony of regimental quartermasters, or because their ammunition boxes could not be opened – an idea which, of course, effectively excuses a number of deeper military errors.

One of the survivors – a lieutenant named Horace Smith-Dorrien, who was destined to become a general in the First World War – recalled the reluctance of Quartermaster Edward Bloomfield of the 2nd Battalion, the 24th, to issue ammunition as the battle began. Yet a close reading of the evidence suggests that this incident was simply indicative of the confusion that inevitably prevailed in the camp; Bloomfield’s reserves were, in fact, earmarked to be sent out to Lord Chelmsford should he need them, and Bloomfield was showing no more than a proper respect for his orders.

In a letter home, Smith-Dorrien admitted to his father that he afterwards secured a supply of ammunition and spent much of the battle distributing it to the front-line companies. Nor were the boxes particularly difficult to open – although reinforced by copper bands all round, access to the rounds was by means of a sliding panel in the lid held in place by a single screw. And if time was pressing, the panel could be smashed out by a sharp blow to the edge with a tent-mallet or rifle butt – over the years, a number of screws bent by such rough treatment have been found on the battlefield.

In 2000, an archaeological survey of the site found the remains of the tin lining of a number of boxes along the British firing positions – sure sign that boxes had been opened there. Last word, however, should go to the Zulus, many of whom mentioned that the British infantry continued to shoot at them until the final stages of the battle.

Cheers

PTR

Pascal MAHE wrote:

[/color]
In a letter home, Smith-Dorrien admitted to his father that he afterwards secured a supply of ammunition and spent much of the battle distributing it to the front-line companies.

Yes, but there are problems with SD's memoir/autobiography. He seems to have either confused the two quartermasters or got the locations of the ammunition wagons reversed. Either way, SD is one of the prime sources of the belief that there was a significant ammunition choke point and that contributed to the British loss significantly...although I think that idea has fallen out of favor among most reputable military historians these days.

IMO it's better to refer to the letters home he wrote directly after the battle.

SD's Letter to his Father, contradicts the first letter!

Hello gentlemen

What I find interesting is that!

Bloomfield’s reserves were, in fact, earmarked to be sent out to Lord Chelmsford should he need them, and Bloomfield was showing no more than a proper respect for his orders.

He refused ammunition for saving, according to the will of LC?

Cheers

PTR

Well just perhaps they were needed a bit more at Isandlwana. It could be argued that his lack of co-operation delayed ammuntion getting to the firing lines. Although I admire SD, I think he added bits to his letters / reports. Certainly his first letter, and the letter to his father!

LC had instructed Pulleine on what to do in case of attack on the camp!

How he could at the same time you want a restriction on the use of ammunition in case of attack on the camp ?

Pascal MAHE wrote:

LC  had instructed Pulleine on what to do in case of attack on the camp!

How he could at the same time you want a restriction on the use of ammunition in case of attack on the camp ?

Oh c'mon Pascal. You are trying to manufacture a controversy to artificially bash Chelmsford. The General did not anticipate the camp being attacked in his absence and the wagon holding all those rounds must have been VERY heavy -- far too cumbersome for a flying column to drag through dongas. So the wagon was earmarked, not reserved, for being moved forward quickly when the appropriate time came. The fact that some old duffer MAY have temporarily objected to (what may have seemed to him) an uncontrolled dispersal of the asset he was responsible for does not indict his most senior commanding officer to any great degree. LC's problem was that he could only imagine being on the offensive...you don't really need to weaken the argument with petty bashing like this.

And finally, if you must behave like a lawyer, I would point out that Crealock wrote the orders to Pulleine, not Chelmsford. One might surmise LC didn't even think about what Pulleine was supposed to do in the event of an attack.

Bonjour Monsieur

I'm trying to manufacture a controversy to artificially bash Chelmsford.

  I do not make anything of this kind it is not me who suggested this, this is SM !

you do not really need to weaken the argument with petty bashing like this    

LC did not even think about what was Pulleine Supposed to do in the event of an attack.

Wrong, in the book of Julian, Chelmsford left tactical instructions Pulleine if the Zulus attacked the camp
 

Best regards

Pascal the  

Court of enquiry SD Statement!

""6th Evidence.—Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, 95th Regiment, states : I am Transport Officer with No. 3 Column. On the morning of the 22nd I was sent with a Despatch from the General to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, the Despatch was an order to join the camp at Isandlwana as soon as possible, as a large Zulu force was near it.  I have no particulars to mention besides."

I'm fairly confident in saying, if the conversation had taken place between SD & Bloomfield it would have certainly been mentioned, as this would have had some bearing on the auumintion not be distrubtuted fast enought.

I do not mind yet but SM Recalled the reluctance of Edward Bloomfield Quartermaster of the 2nd Battalion, the 24th, to end the battle as ammunition Began. 

And this is not a theory, it is a fact.

Chelmsford has ordered a wagon to be prepared with a reserve of ammunition for the soldiers in recognition if needed. But there were other carts of ammunition to Isandhlwana ... 

You can read all these facts ( And this is not a theory ) in the book of Mr. David Jackson  

Cheers

Pascal the  

Most of the packets would have been opened on the firing line not in the camp, hardly anyone from the burrial parties went out to the firng lines.

Also where are the refrences to tooth brushes ? Razor blades ? Cleaning kit ? We know the soliders had them.

There are loads of accounts of firing going on in the camp for ages after the line fell back so
clearly they still had ammo after they fell back and retreated, in some cases thousands of yards.

Also to open the ammo packets wouldn't you just tear them to peices ? Little scraps of paper wouldn't be visable in long grass, would easily blow away and wouldn't really seem important when surrounded by thousands of bodies ect.




Cheers

Along with much else that wasn't mentioned on the battlefield, I doubt that anyone was surprised to find such packets - they would have been the norm - why would anyone mention them?? No-one mentions cap badges, belt buckles, sugar packets or much of the other norms one would expect to find.
They DO mention spent cartridge cases!!!! Proof enough that there was firing a-plenty going on!!

Good points Julian. However Badges, Belts, and buckles show they were there.

I do recall reading an account where empty cartridges are mentioned. The empty packages would have added weight to the argument that ammuntion was being sent out. And I can't accept that all packets were open just on the firing lines we know that the Zulus smashed open the boxes in the camp area. So many packets would have been in that area.

To me it's a crucial peace of evidence, that would show the men on the firing lines weren't there with only their allocated ration of 70 rounds.
Which I think was the case for some Compaines.

LH  !

The accounts of revisiting the field do not describe what was found on the firing line, where the ammo was sent to.



Cheers

Julian Whybra wrote:

Along with much else that wasn't mentioned on the battlefield, I doubt that anyone was surprised to find such packets - they would have been the norm - why would anyone mention them??  No-one mentions cap badges, belt buckles, sugar packets or much of the other norms one would expect to find.
They DO mention spent cartridge cases!!!!  Proof enough that there was firing a-plenty going on!!

So they can find spent cartridges on the firing lines, in the long grass.

But as 90th says, the Zulus could have dropped those cartridges when they dragged of the ammo boxes.

DrummerBoy 16 wrote:

LH  !

The accounts of revisiting the field do not describe what was found on the firing line, where the ammo was sent to.
Cheers

But Julian has just said, "They DO mention spent cartridge cases!!!! Proof enough that there was firing a-plenty going on!!"

It would pay you both to read this book? 


Click Here


Sorry it's not Jackson!

Impi

The accounts don't say cartridge cases were found on the firing line !!! The accounts just keep to the camp. There for plently of cartridge cases found in the camp meen the men had enough ammo that even after retiring the great distence they were still firing.

I don't think there's a description of the firing line by anyone.



Cheers

Click on the link I post and look for the page were Mitford walks the Battlefield. I think it's around the 80 page mark.

Page 80ish, i can't find anything Isandlwana related  



Cheers